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Preface to Transitioning to Decent Work and Economic Growth  
by Isabelle Schluep, Philipp Aerni and Marianthe Stavridou
 In the preface of the book on SDG 8, Isabelle Schluep, Philipp Aerni and 
Marianthe Stavridou introduce the reader to decent work and economic growth by 
discussing the development of the Sustainable Development Goals in the aftermath 
of the Millennium Development Goals and the efforts made by the international 
community to provide the economy with a more equal and inclusive perspective. 
In the second part of the preface, the authors present the chapters of the book.
Economic Development and Cultural Change:  
The Role of Multinational Enterprises in Mexico’s Emerging Dual 
Economy (1970s to 2000s)
by Alex Gertschen
 This article focuses on multinational enterprises (MNEs) in Mexico between the 
1970s and the 2000s. From a business and economic history perspective, it depicts the 
MNEs’ transformation in the context of Mexico’s integration into global value chains 
(GVCs) from sceptically viewed outsiders to engines of economic development and 
normative role models. This transformation resulted from an interplay between 
economic cooperation and cultural change. The idea of embeddedness and 
reconstructed business discourses on enterprises’ social responsibility and on total 
quality management serves to grasp this interplay conceptually and methodically, 
respectively. In fact, when local businesses established or intensified collaboration 
with foreign MNE subsidiaries, they engaged in the joint promotion of cognitive 
and normative ideas about the challenges of the global market, and how they could 
be met. Notably, they promoted the idea that competitiveness in GVCs allowed for 
or even required social responsibility. Indeed, this ‘globalised Mexico’ consisting 
of MNEs and their often big local partners is an example that economic growth 
and social standards can be simultaneously reached, as postulated by Sustainable 
Development Goal (SDG) 8. However, this is not the reality of most micro, small- 
and medium-sized companies that constitute the majority of business, the other 
part of Mexico’s dual economy. Therefore, the article also demonstrates that the 
‘virtuous cycle’ of economic performance and social responsibility is historically 
contingent, and that it can work, but not necessarily and not for all.
xi
Challenges for the Host Society—Human Trafficking, Slavery  
and Abuse in the Work Context
by Maria Elo and Arla Juntunen
 The mobile labor force benefits host societies with diverse forms of human 
capital. The economic value and potential of people migrating for work offer 
incentives for the development of illicit and abusive practices that employ the 
vulnerability of the migrants and an institutional lack of attention or experience. 
This may happen regardless of the skill-level of the migrants, but particularly 
migrants who are new, inexperienced, and low-skilled may be targeted by actors 
who wish to exploit their state. These mechanisms may already start during 
recruitment in the home country by transnational criminal networks, but they 
also emerge organically in the host country if there are available activity-scapes 
for such practices. This phenomenon of human trafficking, slavery, and abuse 
related to work entered Finland in recent decades. The actors involved are often of 
foreign-origin or within ethnic enclaves, which also creates cultural- and language-
related institutional divides. We found that a host country that is highly developed 
may not have the needed institutional experience, understanding, or attention 
to effectively combat the phenomenon. We suggest that preventive governance 
with more targeted collaboration across governance, diaspora organizations, and 
civil society could reduce illicit opportunities and increase awareness of what is 
appropriate and acceptable, i.e., decent work.
“Business as Part of the Solution”: SDG 8 Challenges Popular  
Views in the Global Sustainability Discourse
by Philipp Aerni
 Sustainable Development Goal 8 (SDG 8) aims to make the global economy more 
inclusive by directing its attention to the many unmet material needs of the poor 
on this planet. SDG 8 also recognizes the need to decouple economic growth from 
the unsustainable use of natural resources. Tackling these challenges effectively 
requires action-oriented public–private partnerships and the mobilization of 
innovative entrepreneurship for sustainable and inclusive change. However, this 
approach is contested in the current global discourse on sustainable development 
in affluent societies, which is more concerned about the negative impact of 
economic growth. This concern is also omnipresent in the teaching material used 
in ‘Education for Sustainable Development’ (ESD). It is often strictly normative 
xii
in nature and frames the pursuit of growth-oriented business activities as being 
opposed to sustainable lifestyles. This chapter challenges this view by looking at 
business not just as an external black box, but as an integral part of society. In this 
context, concrete examples are presented to illustrate how sustainability challenges 
have been addressed effectively in society by making ‘business part of the solution’. 
Since SDG 8 stands for such an approach, it could lead the way from the rhetoric to 
action in the decade that remains to meet Agenda 2030.
Memories of a Practitioner:  
Ciba-Geigy Crop Protection Activities in Indonesia in the 1980s, an 
Example of Local Embeddedness
by Dino Sozzi
 After the end of World War II, an international initiative was launched by the 
US government to respond to the looming food crisis in the Global South, through 
large-scale public sector investments towards the improvement of the productivity 
of the world’s major staple crops. Ciba–Geigy Agrochemicals and Ciba–Pilatus 
Aerial Spraying Co. were, at the time, strongly involved in the process through 
the delivery of large quantities of crop protection products under government 
contracts. This was also the case in Indonesia where the author worked for Ciba–
Geigy in the 1980s. Looking back, he finds that Ciba–Geigy only started to focus 
on the farmer as the main client in a comprehensive way when the government of 
Indonesia withdrew from its function as a provider of subsidized agrochemical 
input to farmers. Once the farmer rather than the government became the main 
client, Ciba–Geigy started to create many direct and indirect benefits for local 
farmer communities through capacity development programs that included the 
transfer of soft skills, more sustainable and productive agricultural practices, 
and business development skills. This commitment to local embeddedness also 
contributed to higher local average incomes, more jobs, better schooling for kids 
and improved public health conditions. This change of behavior is illustrated by 
concrete initiatives developed and implemented by Ciba–Geigy and its legacy 
companies. Pointing out that business can also be part of the solution, UN SDG 
8 introduced a more solution-oriented view of sustainable development that may 
gather momentum in future policy approaches to achieve Agenda 2030 and new 
ways of teaching sustainable development.
xiii
Multilevel Sustainability Tensions of MNEs in  
Developing Countries
by Lia Ferrini
 Translating the global Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) into the local 
context can be a challenging pathway. Promoting ‘inclusive and sustainable 
economic growth’, as advocated by SDG 8, can be fostered or hindered by relevant 
economic actors depending on global and local framing conditions. This is the 
case for subsidiaries of multinational enterprises (MNEs) operating in developing 
countries, which are confronted by highly regulated international standards and 
weaker local institutional settings. The global–local tension is complicated by the 
growing trend of MNEs to adopt their own Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
guidelines. Ethical tensions faced by MNEs are not new in the literature; there is, 
however, limited knowledge on how a company’s guidelines are conceived in the 
global–local relationship. Additionally, the literature on CSR has been dominated 
by a win–win perspective, neglecting trade-offs inherent in the multifaceted nature 
of sustainable development. The following literature review aims to address the 
abovementioned knowledge gap, by exploring literature on tensions occurring 
between global ethical standards, local contexts and CSR guidelines faced by MNEs 
operating in developing countries, with a perspective on tensions happening in 
and between the three levels. The review is positioned in the international business 
ethics literature and brings together two distinguished debates on ‘business ethics 
and culture’ and ‘trade-offs in CSR’. By investigating current discourses in the 
literature addressing multilevel tensions faced by MNEs, this chapter highlights 
research gaps and proposes new avenues of research. Additionally, five criteria 
are developed to guide the identification of relevant theoretical frameworks for 
empirical explorations of multilevel sustainability tensions faced by MNEs.
Agriculture in the Face of Climate Change:  
Sustained and Inclusive Economic Growth as a Prerequisite for 
Sustainable Development
by Romano De Vivo, Ettore Capri, Henri Rueff, Antonio Gaudioso, Alexandru 
Marchis, and Gianpiero Menza
 Climate change and weather extremes are already impacting millions of 
people, devastating crops, eroding coastlines, and threatening freshwater reserves. 
xiv
The agricultural sector is extremely vulnerable to the potential threats of climate 
change and must be prepared to mitigate and adapt. Decisive measures could 
help agriculture face expected changes, help keep global temperatures in check 
and also serve and create synergies between climate and sustainable development 
goals. Climate-smart agriculture – with its three objectives: sustainable increases 
in agricultural productivity and income, greater resilience of food systems, and 
the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions associated with farming – may 
represent a model to best help direct our actions. Addressing the socio-economic 
and environmental challenges related to climate change requires a concerted effort 
from all actors and locally adapted responses to ensure we move towards sustained 
and inclusive economic growth (SDG 8). Businesses have already started to act 
and need to be supported in their efforts by a system of policies and an enabling 
environment for multistakeholder collaborations.
Employment Gender Gap in the Renewable Energy Sector
by Sumon Vangchuay and Amanda Niklaus
 Renewable energy is seen as avant-garde and a pathway towards a more 
sustainable future. This modern and growing sector is often perceived as progressive 
and conducive to a more democratic and inclusive society. In the context of the 
SDG 8, our paper sets out to examine this claim and to assess opportunities for 
gender inclusion and equality in the renewable energy workforce. We examine 
the rationale for equity and inclusion under SDG 8 and evaluate how gender is 
reflected in its targets and indicators, as well as how they are related to SDG 5 and 
SDG 7. We then employ mixed methods research to examine the gender gap in the 
renewable energy workforce and discuss specific challenges and good practices in 
the sector. We found that the socio-economic progress deriving from renewable 
energy does not necessarily extend to gender diversity in its workforce. We argue 
that gender diversity can be compatible with economic growth when the benefits 
of economic growth and those of gender parity are mutually reinforcing. Inclusive 
growth in the renewable energy transition is possible when women are empowered 
to participate fully, effectively and competitively in their career.
xv
“Me muess d’Lüt neh wie si sy—Anderi gits e keini”.  
Decent Work and Sustainable Development for the 21st Century:  
The Case of Wyon AG in Switzerland
by Marianthe Stavridou
 Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in Switzerland are the backbone of 
the Swiss economy and account for 2/3 of employers in the country. This paper 
examines decent work and sustainable economic growth as promoted by the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goal 8. The author focuses on Small and Medium 
Enterprises and discusses business ethics and human-centred values as drivers 
of inclusive change. We argue that Swiss Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), 
in many cases, create a new paradigm of doing business, relying on tradition, 
innovation and a focus on essential human values. Traditional communitarian 
values, a vision for innovation, democratic flat decision-making structures and 
transparency, as well as financial independence, are crucial elements of the SME-
strategy, offering decent work and a sustainable long-term prosperity. As an 
example of a Swiss SME, we examine Wyon AG a small high-end technology firm 
in the village of Steinegg, District of Rüte, in the Canton Appenzell Innerrhoden. 
This is a desk research.


Preface to Transitioning to Decent Work and
Economic Growth
Isabelle Schluep, Philipp Aerni and Marianthe Stavridou
1. Introduction
We live in unprecedented times. Five years after the launch of the United
Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs) in 2015, and one year after the
first lockdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the global effort to build a
more equal, inclusive and sustainable society will likely experience a serious setback.
The desire to create a more inclusive and sustainable global economy proved
to be one of the few common denominators in the design and launch of the
SDGs. The emphasis on the creation of economic opportunities to address global
sustainability challenges also implied that business should play a prominent role
in the implementation of the SDGs. This view amounted to a major paradigm
shift in the way we think about sustainability. The Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs), which were launched by the UN in 2000 to reduce poverty by half in 2015
(UN 2000), did not regard private sector involvement as highly relevant. Regarding
environmental sustainability, the aim of the SDGs to create a green economy also
implies that regulation alone will not be able to save the planet; instead, it requires
the courage to invest in innovative solutions that effectively address environmental
challenges, while creating new jobs for the next generation. This progressive
understanding of sustainability is clearly articulated in the Agenda for Sustainable
Development (2030 Agenda), designed to implement the 17 SDGs with its 169 targets.
The 2030 Agenda calls on governments, civil society, and, most importantly, the
private sector to join forces in realizing this plan of action for the people, planet
and prosperity (UN 2015). It is based on the basic insight that business is a part of
society—not apart from society.
SDG 8 very much embodies this paradigm shift. It aims to “promote sustained,
inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and
decent work for all”. Its emphasis is on the creation of business opportunities
that especially benefit the local people and the environment. It is also linked to
the importance of institutional and technological innovations designed to enable
this transition. As such, SDG 8 is connected with many other goals, such as the
elimination of poverty (SDG 1) and hunger (SDG 2), the promotion of access to quality
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education (SDG 4) and improved infrastructure (SDG 9), the reduction in global
inequality (SDG 10), the promotion of responsible consumption and production (SDG
12), and capacity development and access to markets (SDG 17). Its emphasis on
economic empowerment has also an important link to gender equality (SDG 5).
Finally, SDG 8 is key to every person’s life. “Decent work is at the heart of
the search for dignity for the individual, stability for the family and peace in the
community” as put by Juan Somavía, former Director-General of the International
Labor Organization (ILO). In addition, SDG 8 stands for the catalytic linkages and
spillovers between employment and development. After all, labor income contributes
considerably to the reduction of poverty (Azevedo et al. 2013); and more and better
quality jobs are the surest pathway to achieve social inclusion, to end poverty and
boost prosperity (IFC 2013).
Even before the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted the world economy, the jobs
challenge has been enormous; it was calculated that, between 2016 and 2030, 30 million
jobs would be required per year just to keep pace with the increasing global working
age population (UN 2018). COVID-19 caused the worst global recession since the
Great Depression in the 1930s (Gopinath 2021), and resulted in the loss of 255 million
full-time jobs, which is about four times more than over the course of the global
financial crisis in 2009 (ILO 2021). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects
that, in 2021, more than 150 economies will have per-capita incomes below 2019
levels, and that workers with little education, youth, women and persons employed
in the informal sector will be disproportionately affected by the expected losses of
income (IMF 2021; Gopinath 2021). As a consequence, the IMF projects that close to
90 million persons could fall into extreme poverty over the course of 2020–2021, which
could reverse many of the social achievements of the past 20 years (Gopinath 2021;
IMF 2021). In reaction to this crisis, the United Nations have released a socio-economic
response framework (UN 2020).
UN Secretary General António Guterres rightly argued that “Everything we do
during and after the COVID-19 crisis must be with a strong focus on building more
equal, inclusive and sustainable economies and societies that are more resilient in the
face of pandemics, climate change and the many other global challenges we face”
(The Lancet 2020). This quote represents the core of SDG 8 on the creation of inclusive
growth and decent work, it very much addresses the concerns of the majority world,
the people who live in low-income countries. Since more than 90 percent of jobs in
developing countries are created by the private sector (IFC 2013), more attention
must be paid to entrepreneurs that help create dynamic, growth-oriented, innovative
and responsible enterprises. To succeed in the long-run, entrepreneurs need to gain
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trust as responsible business partners and create value for society. As such, they not
only propel their own business, but also enable other people to get out of poverty
through the enhancement of local economic opportunities.
In high-income countries, the fear that the fourth industrial revolution could
render many jobs obsolete is real. In response to this concern, the policy focus in
many of these countries has shifted from a defensive attitude toward sustainable
development, which is mainly concerned with preserving economic structures and
preventing unsustainable change through regulation, toward a more forward-looking
attitude, which is more focused on creating new sustainable markets through
innovative entrepreneurship. In this context, the volume “Transitioning to Decent
Work and Economic Growth” may be a valuable guide for policy makers aiming to
move towards a more progressive understanding of sustainable development.
2. Chapters in the Volume
The contributions in this volume may only cover a fraction of the breadth of
SDG 8, but they outline the major opportunities and challenges of the efforts to
implement SDG 8 from different perspectives. Generally, there is a consensus among
the authors that SDG 8 is also highly relevant in the effective implementation of many
other SDGs, and that institutional framework conditions are of crucial importance to
enable inclusive and sustainable change by making “business part of the solution”.
This volume aims to approach decent work and economic growth under different
perspectives. Each chapter highlights a diverse set of issues.
From a business and economic history perspective, Alex Gertschen discusses
multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) local embeddedness in Mexico during the period
from the early 1970s to the 2000s. Analysing the interplay of economic cooperation
and cultural change, he reconstructs MNEs’ transformation from sceptically viewed
outsiders to engines of economic development and normative role models. Together
with local business, they promoted the idea that competitiveness in global value
chains allowed for or even required social responsibility. The author concludes
that MNEs’ embeddedness in Mexico indeed serves as an example that economic
performance and social standards can be reached simultaneously, as postulated by
SDG 8. However, this “virtuous cycle” may work only under certain circumstances
and not for all. This qualification is suggested by the fact that it is largely confined to
the globalized part of Mexico’s economy.
For Maria Elo and Arla Juntunen, preventive governance and targeted
collaboration with diaspora organisations and the civil society are needed to
reduce the phenomena of exploitation, slavery, human trafficking and abuse in
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a developed country like Finland and help the country safeguard decent work
principles. The case study on Finland presents illicit and abusive practices related
to migration, which develop partly due to an institutional lack of attention and
experience. Human trafficking, slavery and abuse may start in the migrant’s home
countries during the recruitment of the workforce by transnational criminal networks;
however, they represent a recent and unperceived phenomenon in the host country
with fundamental socioeconomic implications. The actors of such networks are mostly
people of foreign-origin or people within ethnic enclaves in Finland. This indicates
the existence of cultural- and language-related institutional divides. The authors
suggest investing in targeted collaboration among the main stakeholders to increase
awareness about decent work, close loopholes, and prevent illicit practices early on,
before they start mushrooming.
Philipp Aerni challenges mainstream economic thinking on sustainable
development in high-income countries, which tends to ignore the potential positive
externalities created through scalable innovation for society and the environment.
It fails to understand that poverty is still the main enemy of sustainability in many
low-income countries. He argues that tackling the unmet material needs of the
poor, promoting inclusive economic change and enabling innovation that helps to
decouple economic growth from natural resource use would require action-oriented
public–private partnerships and institutional framework conditions that better award
innovative entrepreneurship for sustainable and inclusive change. He also proposes
an understanding of businesses as an integral part of society and not just an external
black box. In this context, he presented concrete international and national initiatives
that were proven to contribute to sustainable and inclusive change. Finally, Aerni is
concerned that most of the teaching material used in “Education for Sustainable
development” (ESD) tends to ignore examples, which prove that businesses can be
part of the solution.
Dino Sozzi was a practitioner at Ciba–Geigy company in the 1980s in Indonesia,
when the indebted Indonesian government was forced to stop buying agrochemicals
in bulk from the company in order to subsequently resell it at a subsidized price to
farmers. He describes how this agricultural reform forced the company to focus its
attention directly on the farmers, and how they apply their products. The company
realized that it is in its very long-term self-interest to encourage their farming clients
to apply their input in a more sustainable, safe and effective way. It did so by
creating local capacity-building programs that helped farmers to better manage
their resources. Thus, the commercial activities of Ciba-Geigy crop protection,
and eventually its legacy company Syngenta, became more embedded in the local
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economy, which also increased the appreciation of the local farming communities.
The new corporate commitment to supporting local farmers in improving their
agricultural practices changed the landscape of income, education and employment
for the local communities as a whole. This is the turning point at which Sozzi
believes that his company started to make a genuine contribution to a more inclusive
local economy.
Lia Ferrini discusses the literature gap in corporate social responsibility (CSR)
research regarding the ethical tensions faced by subsidiaries of MNEs operating in
developing countries when they have to navigate between global ethical standards,
local contexts and CSR guidelines. Her review brings together two distinguished
debates on “business ethics and culture” and “trade-offs in CSR”, and highlights
research gaps proposing new advances in research.
Romano De Vivo, Ettore Capri, Henri Rueff, Antonio Gaudioso, Alexandru
Marchis and Gianpiero Menza explore climate change mitigation and adaptation
options for agriculture, the world’s largest employer and provider of livelihoods for
40 percent of the global population. They present Climate-Smart Agriculture (CSA)
as a model that can best help to guide transformative actions in the agri-food sector
to increase productivity and resilience and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
in a sustainable way. The CSA’s “action path” for sustainable and inclusive
economic growth includes policies that enable multi-stakeholder collaboration,
and are implemented by organizations that have integrated sustainability into their
business models.
Sumon Vangchuay and Amanda Niklaus examine the gender gap in the
workforce of the renewable energy sector, a young and fast-growing sector often
perceived as progressive by the public at large. The authors discuss this issue at two
levels: framework and practice, and argue that the socio-economic progress to be
made in the renewable energy sector under the SDGs does not necessarily extend
to gender diversity in the workforce. They conclude, that a widespread gender
gap in the renewable energy workforce casts serious doubts about the inclusive
growth and progress made in the energy transition under the SDGs. Vangchuay and
Niklaus highlight the need to align economic growth with inclusion, and recommend
that significant, targeted efforts be put in place to challenge the traditional gender
perspectives and guarantee a sustainable change within this sector.
The last chapter by Marianthe Stavridou focuses on the contribution of a high-end
technology Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) in Switzerland to inclusive and
sustainable change. She shows how innovative entrepreneurship is guided by a
vision to create long-term prosperity among the workforce by taking a human-centred
5
approach to business. The author challenges the existing concept of decent work, in
which economic growth is still understood in its crude measurement as the growth
in gross domestic product (GDP). Instead, she proposes a 21st century narrative of
decent work that is based on a more holistic understanding of economic development.
3. Conclusions
This Volume pulls together analyses and experiences from the past and present,
from large and small companies, from the Global South and North, and from different
sectors. Many contributions point out that entrepreneurship and innovation are
important drivers of inclusive and sustainable change. In this context, there is a
general agreement that business can be part of the solution in efforts to realize the
2030 Agenda in general, and SDG 8 in particular.
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Economic Development and Cultural Change:
The Role of Multinational Enterprises in




Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 8 calls for the promotion of “sustained,
inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and
decent work for all”. In the context of this Special Issue, which emphasises the private
sector’s role in achieving SDG 8, this article focuses on multinational enterprises
(MNEs) in Mexico. MNEs can be defined as enterprises that engage in foreign
direct investment and own or control value-added activities in more than one
country (Dunning and Lundan 2008, p. 3). Historians, economic, political, and social
scientists consider Mexico an important example of a country that radically shifted the
main responsibility of economic development from government to private business.
During the 1980s, in the midst of an economic and financial crisis, state intervention
was drastically reduced by liberalising markets, privatising state-owned companies,
and cutting industrial policies. MNEs were given a crucial role, as they were supposed
to bring capital and know-how to Mexico, boosting competitiveness and employment
in the context of world market integration (Dussel Peters 2000; Moreno-Brid and Ros
2009; O’Toole 2010; Urquidi 2005; Schneider 2009).
From an SDG 8 perspective, the overall results of this “business-led”1 economic
development are rather disappointing (Carrillo et al. 2012b; Dussel Peters 2003;
Moreno-Brid and Ros 2009; Viñuales and Langer 2012). Despite a soaring number of
manufactured exports, the average GDP growth per capita was only 1.5% between
1990 and 2005, and has not considerably accelerated since then (see Figures 1 and 2).
1 Schneider 2009 argues that since the 1980s, due to the dominance of a small number of domestic and
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Figure 1. Composition of total exports, Mexico 1980–2006 (%). Source: (Moreno-Brid
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Figure 2. Mexico and other countries: real GDP per capita (relative to the USA)
1980–2006 (USA GDP per capita = 100, measured in constant 2000 US$) Source:
(Moreno-Brid et al. 2009, p. 162).
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The GDP growth per capita has proved insufficient to provide for enough
employment, let alone decent work. The informal sector, with its precarious working
conditions, keeps growing.2 However, these figures conceal important differences
within Mexico’s economy. For instance, the automotive, electronics, and aerospace
industries have flourished and largely realised what liberal reforms had promised:
dominated by mainly foreign MNEs,3 they have grown in output and productivity,
created jobs with relatively good working conditions for middle- and high-skilled
personnel, and have integrated Mexico into global value chains (GVCs).4 Thanks to
its manufacturing exports, Mexico has reduced its vulnerability to commodity prices,
which makes it a positive exception in Latin America (OECD 2009, pp. 68–73, and
Cadestin et al. 2016, p. 192). This “globalised Mexico” contrasts starkly with the one
described above, which is further characterised by domestic market orientation and
the prevalence of micro, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSME) (see Table 1
for a statistical comparison). Therefore, many authors speak of a “dual economy”
(Moreno-Brid and Ros 2009, p. 187; Pozas 2006, p. 78; Villavicencio 2012, p. 37).5
This article provides an analysis of the emergence of this dual economy in
the context of globalisation from the 1970s to the 2000s. From a business and
economic history perspective, it depicts MNEs’ transformation from sceptically
viewed outsiders to the economic engines and normative role models of globalising
Mexico. The concept of embeddedness helps analytically grasp this transformation.
In line with a business and economic history after the cultural turn, (Berghoff and
Vogel 2004), it emphasises the manifold contingencies of economic activity—cognitive,
normative, institutional, and therefore cultural in the widest sense (Dequech 2003,
pp. 461–70). Like in any other realm of the social world, in the economy, actors’
interests and the ways in which they pursue them can be better understood and
explained if connected to the underlying cognitive and normative ideas, and the
formal and informal rules that characterise a cultural collective.6
2 For historical figures, see (Moreno-Brid and Ros 2009, pp. 261–78; Ros 2008, p. 538). For more recent
development see (OECD 2019).
3 On the emergence of Mexico-based MNEs, see: (Andonova and Mauricio 2018; Hoshino 2013; Lessard
and Lucea 2009; Pozas 2002; Santiso 2013).
4 For working conditions in MNEs, see: (Bensusán et al. 2018; Bensusán and Carrillo 2017; Carrillo et al.
2012b). For an analysis of MNEs’ structural importance in Mexico, see (Schneider 2009).
5 For the description of the same phenomenon, Schneider (2009) coined the term hierarchical
market economy.
6 For a critical analysis of this approach, see (Schmid 2008, pp. 73–103). For my own understanding of
the cultural contingency of economic activity, see (Gertschen 2013, pp. 37–43).
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2009 2014 2009 2014 2009 2014
People employed
889,044 921,878 45,057 31,433 3,726,961 4,120,121
Comment by the authors
Informal hiring is, in MNEs, three times lower than in
non-MNEs, and there is a greater tendency towards the
formalisation of employment with MNEs.
Union Membership of employees (in %; no distinction between Foreign and Mexican MNEs)
Yes 25 25 25 25 11 10
No 73 73 73 73 87 89
Do not know 2 2 2 2 2 2
Working hours per week (in %)
0–14 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.7
15–24 0.3 0.8 0 0 1.7 2.4
25–34 2.2 3.9 0.4 2.3 3 4.9
35–39 4.9 8.3 3.3 1.5 4.1 5.4
40–48 58.6 61.6 84.1 53.6 62.7 52.5
49–56 28.1 17 11 21.2 16.5 17.1
More 5.9 8.4 1.2 21.4 11.4 17
100 100 100 100 100 100
Incomes (per month, in Mexican Pesos)
Average of salaried workers directly
linked to production, sales, or
providing services
7109 7847 7803 9649 5179 6559
Average of administrative, accounting
and management employees
19,418 22,091 21,752 20,433 13,971 15,803
Average of company’s contribution to
social security
1360 1704 1454 2475 929 1149
Average of other social benefits 1015 1327 1306 1085 646 1040
Average of profits distributed to
workers (annual)
5229 7814 3500 12,114 3270 4899
Comment by the authors
Wage tendency is decreasing in MNEs and non-MNEs;
particularly backward in the administrative staff that work in
Mexican MNEs.
MNEs: multinational enterprises. Source: Author; data from (Bensusán and Carrillo 2017;
Bensusán et al. 2018).
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In this vein, Mexico’s dual economy and globalisation are considered economic
and cultural phenomena. There is empirical evidence for a positive correlation
between economic development and MNE subsidiaries’ integration. Local supplier
or provider relationships, collaborations with education and research institutions, or
initiatives to foment local competitiveness have allowed for an industrial upgrading
of both the subsidiaries’ activities and the socio-economic environment in Mexico
(Carrillo et al. 2012a, 2012b). The concept of embeddedness suggests that such
economic processes occur in an interplay with cultural change, which in turn
refers to a notion of sustainable development that goes beyond the improvement
of efficiency and consistency in natural resources management and encapsulates
a cultural transformation (Schneidewind 2018). Therefore, this article follows two
lines of argument: MNEs’ enhanced economic and normative relevance was bound
to cooperation with local actors; and this cooperation required a cognitive and
normative understanding, as well as rules that made actors’ behaviour reliable and
legitimate. The study does not aim to generate insights on SDG 8 per se, but on
historical changes that brought the globalised and MNE-led part of Mexico’s economy
closer to achieving this goal than the majority of the country’s businesses.
2. Materials and Methods
In order to depict and analyse the interplay of economic and cultural change,
which led to the globalised part of Mexico’s dual economy, we reconstruct business
people’s discourses on enterprises’ social responsibility (CSR) and total quality
management (TQM). CSR discourse, which emerged in Mexico in the 1960s (Gertschen
2017), helps us to understand business people’s perceptions of the social context,
of their legitimacy vis-à-vis society, as well as their interest and efforts to establish
trustful relationships with employees and other local stakeholders. Legitimacy and
trust surge from shared cognitive and normative ideas, and institutions. They are
considered indispensable for a company’s licence to operate in a specific society
(Gertschen 2017, pp. 528–30).7 TQM spread rapidly and globally during the 1980s
and particularly the 1990s. According to it, human beings are the main source
of errors, and eliminating these errors is possible if companies enhance control of
processes and products by statistical means on the one side and workers’ involvement
on the other. By emphasising the “human factor”, TQM advanced the idea that
7 For sociological contributions to these terms and their interrelatedness, see Maurer and Schimank
2008. For an important contribution by business history, see (Berghoff 2004).
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culture has a decisive impact on cooperation within and outside the company, and on
competitiveness (Laboucheix 1992; Wilkinson and Willmott 1995).8 Neither CSR nor
TQM discourses signify actual change towards decent work and other aspects of
SDG 8. Used heuristically, they serve to reconstruct the (cultural) change of business
people’s cognitive and normative ideas, and concomitant rules of cooperation,
which enabled MNEs’ increasing embeddedness in Mexico.
For the reconstruction of the two discourses, written and oral statements
of both domestic business people and MNE representatives were considered.9
This allowed for distinguishing between the local context and MNEs, even though
domestic business people represent only an (important) fraction of this context.
The statements were gathered with a qualitative mixed-methods approach (Diekmann
2014). The main sources are documents of the Mexican Centre for Philanthropy
(Centro Mexicano para la Filantropía, CEMEFI), the Social Union of Mexican
Businessmen (Unión Social de Empresarios de México, USEM), and the Mexican
Total Quality Foundation (Fundación Mexicana para la Calidad Total, FMCT).10
They played crucial roles in CSR and TQM discourses, produced a considerable
amount of publications, and connected domestic business and MNEs in terms of
ideas and people. The latter holds particularly true for the CEMEFI and FMCT,
which collaborated closely with foreign MNE subsidiaries. In order to better
reconstruct the MNE perspective, documents from the U.S. American Chamber of
Commerce in Mexico (Amcham), the Switzerland-based MNEs Nestlé and Ciba-Geigy
(as of 1996, Novartis), and their respective subsidiaries Compañía de Nestlé S.A.
(CONESA) and Ciba-Geigy Mexicana (CIGEMEX) were considered.11 Because written
statements regarding the two subsidiaries and the 1990s (due to archival restrictions)
8 For an assessment of TQM in a historical perspective of management thought, see (Bonazzi 2014, ch. 7;
Witzel 2012, ch. 10).
9 Methodologically, we focused on people with executive responsibility on the company or sectorial
level (such as members of an executive committee, board of directors, or representatives of business
associations), and on two different kinds of statements: public statements to foster corporate legitimacy
and trustworthiness with society, and internal statements referring to this business discourse.
10 The CEMEFI operates in Mexico City; a library with archival material (henceforth indicated as
CEMEFI). The national Confederación USEM, also headquartered in Mexico City, has neither an
archive nor a library. However, on eight occasions between 2014 and 2017, the author was allowed to
access then General Director Germán Araujo’s personal library (henceforth Conf. USEM). The FMCT
does not exist anymore. Its publications were retrieved from public libraries in Mexico City or
provided by José Giral, former FMCT president, whom the author interviewed in Mexico City on 11
April 2016.
11 Amcham documents are all publications and therefore publicly accessible. Some documents on Nestlé,
CONESA, Ciba-Geigy, and CIGEMEX stem from the respective company archive Archives historiques
Nestlé (henceforth AHN) and Firmenarchiv der Novartis AG (henceforth FAN).
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are scarce, on an Oral History basis (Obertreis 2012), semi-structured interviews with
two former chief executives of CONESA and CIGEMEX were conducted.12 Amcham
represents the historically most important foreign MNE subsidiaries. CONESA (food)
and CIGEMEX (chemicals, pharmaceuticals) are highly relevant for our topic due to
their size, the sensitivity of their sectors, and their uninterrupted presence in Mexico
during the period of investigation. Even though this sample is not representative
of MNEs in Mexico, it allows one to illustrate, question, and qualify conclusions
based on statements from the CEMEFI, FMCT and USEM, which were representative
carriers of CSR and TQM discourses, respectively.
3. Results
3.1. Enhanced Legitimacy through Denationalised CSR Discourse and a Changing
Economic and Political Context (1970s and 1980s)
MNEs have been engines of globalising capitalism for centuries (Chandler and
Mazlish 2005; Dunning and Lundan 2008; Jones 2005). However, in the context of
the 1960s, marked by decolonisation, popular conscience about the gap between
“developed” and “underdeveloped” countries, as well as U.S. hegemony in many parts
of the world, they started attracting considerable political and academic attention at an
international level. Most MNEs were headquartered in the U.S., for which they were
considered an expression of U.S. dominance and a challenge to national interests (Bair
2009; Hajduk 2013; Maurel 2011; Oliveiro 2010).13 Such scepticism was usually mixed
with positive considerations on MNEs’ impact in terms of investments, technology
transfer, and employment. Mexico was the case in point. Harvard economist Raymond
Vernon, who had a considerable impact on the international debate with his 1971
book Sovereignty at Bay,14 had started working on the topic with the example of
Mexico. His 1963 book The Dilemma of Mexico’s Development15 was about policies
that enabled a developing country in need of capital and technology from abroad
to overcome contradictions between foreign and particularly MNEs’ interests with
12 Carlos Eduardo Represas, born in Mexico City in 1945, was CONESA’s CEO (1983–1994) and chairman
(1983–2004). He was interviewed in Mexico City on 27 April 2017 and 18 May 2018. Peter Reinartz,
born in Puebla in 1946, was director of the agricultural division (1979–1983), CEO and chairman
of CIGEMEX (1989–1996), and chairman of Novartis México (1997–2000). He was interviewed in
Querétaro on 6 May 2017.
13 Additionally in countries like France; see (Servan-Schreiber 1967).
14 (Vernon 1971).
15 (Vernon 1963). See also (Vernon 1964).
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those of the host country. In 1980, another U.S. American scholar wrote that Mexico
had found a middle-way between restricting and attracting MNEs, and inspired
many other developing countries (Sigmund 1980, p. 48).16 This positive conclusion
did not represent a consensus.17 However, a common opinion in both the academic
and political debate was that MNEs were a powerful and growing phenomenon,
which had to be investigated and regulated. This sceptical stance reflected a crisis of
legitimacy of global capitalism in Mexico and around the world. During the 1970s,
which saw the end of the post-war economic “miracle”, this crisis reached its turning
point, from which one can reconstruct MNEs’ changing economic and cultural role
in Mexico.
Mexico’s leftist president Luís Echeverría (1970–1976) was one of the most
important champions of the New International Economic Order, which was promoted
by Third World countries and aimed at strengthening governments’ role in the world
economy, for instance through major control of MNEs by their host countries
(Bair 2009, p. 350; Burke 2012, p. 440).18 Echeverría’s government introduced or
changed several laws with the same purpose, provoking confrontations with Amcham.
For some time, the president had the support or sympathy of an important part
of Mexican business. MNEs’ resources exceeded by far those of the mostly small-
and medium-sized domestic enterprises. This induced concerns even with those
businesses that did not compete directly with them. Moreover, since World War II,
U.S. corporations had greatly expanded in the manufacturing and consumer goods
sectors. Their products and marketing methods influenced consumer behaviour,
for which they had a broader impact on Mexican society than the previously arrived
corporations from extraction sectors.19 Domestic businessmen criticised this as
undermining Mexican culture. They felt under increasing social and political
pressure themselves. Since the 1960s, USEM, an association of businessmen inspired
by Catholic social teaching (CST), had developed a discourse on business’s role in
society. It organised public events directed at the business community and society
at large, invited labour and government representatives, and participated in an
16 The country’s importance in academic research is shown by further international contemporary
contributions such as (Baumer and Gleich 1982; Fajnzylber and Tarrago 1976; Iffland and Galland
1978; Krook 1976; Matthies 1977; Montavon 1979; Newfarmer and Mueller 1975).
17 Moreover, domestic scholars deemed MNEs too influential, and claimed they gained more from
Mexico than they provided. See for instance (Aguilera 1975; Bernal 1976; Chapoy Bonifaz 1975;
Sepúlveda et al. 1974).
18 For an overview of Echeverría’s presidency, see (Schmidt 1991).
19 For the expansion of U.S. corporations in Mexico, see (Moreno 2003; O’Brien 1999; Rosenberg 1982).
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international circulation of CSR ideas, notably the one run by the International
Christian Union of Business Executives (UNIAPAC). This CSR discourse was critical
of global capitalism and promoted the idea of companies as humanist, family-like,
patriarchal communities. For both economic interests and cultural motives, Mexican
businessmen viewed MNEs with suspicion.20
However, the impression that the government became ever more hostile to
private business made a growing number of them change their view of MNEs.
Concerns about socialism increasingly outweighed such about national values and
interests. Big Mexican corporations cooperated with foreign MNEs to both fight
Echeverría’s policies and denationalise CSR discourse. In 1975, they set up the
powerful umbrella association Consejo Coordinador Empresarial (Luna and Tirado
1992), which adopted CST-inspired CSR discourse, but swiftly excluded the question
of a company’s national origin from it. Social legitimacy should no longer be
nationally connoted (Gertschen 2017, pp. 546–53).21 For its part, Amcham criticised
an “unprecedented attack” on “free enterprise” in Mexico and around the world.22
It launched a so-called communication program to convey the benefits that U.S. MNEs
brought to Mexico. It conducted opinion surveys, published articles, awarded prizes
to socially beneficial business practices among its members, invested in a program
for young entrepreneurs, and consulted corporations on new issues such as “public
services” and “public relations” (Amcham 1974a, 1974b, 1977). In 1977, five years
after launching the program, Amcham conceded that up to that time, most members
had “lived by the maxim ‘The business of business is business.’ Low profile and
non-involvement were the passwords” (Amcham 1977, p. 35). It is hard to gauge
the impact of the program, aimed at establishing or improving relationships with a
variety of stakeholders. The experiences of Nestlé’s subsidiary (CONESA)23 and of
20 For business’ CSR discourse in Mexico during the 1960s and 1970s, see (Gertschen 2017).
21 On the cooperation between domestic big business and foreign MNEs, see also (Arriola 1976; Basáñez
1991, pp. 196, 219).
22 See the Amcham president’s statement in (Loretta 1973, p. 13).
23 The Nestlé executive board was well aware of the “quite exceptional” fact that CONESA remained
completely foreign-owned (Swiss) when many MNE subsidiaries were forced to open up to Mexican
capital, and that this was due to the close relationship between CONESA’s president José Represas
(father of Carlos Eduardo, see footnote 12) and the presidents Echeverría and López Portillo. See the
letter by executive board member Carl L. Angst to his board colleague Camillo Pagano of 17 October
1980, in: AHN, NES C1.5/1700-93. For an appreciation of Represas’ extraordinary political skilfulness
by his superior in Vevey, see the “Lettre-circulaire” addressed to all general directors in Latin
America by Pagano of 20 October 1976, in: AHN, NES C1.5/1700-8. Meetings with López Portillo,
which demonstrate Represas’ political standing beyond Echeverría’s administration, are mentioned in
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Ciba-Geigy Mexicana (CIGEMEX)24 suggest that in the de facto one-party regime
of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), relations with the administration
and particularly the president remained paramount. Therefore, MNEs’ quest for
legitimacy was decisively facilitated by the change of presidency. Echeverría’s
successor José López Portillo (1976–1982) saw a political benefit in improved rather
than strained relations with domestic and foreign business.
Moreover, in Switzerland, Nestlé and Ciba-Geigy were confronted with
stakeholders—and the public at large—that viewed them with increasing scepticism.25
With Nestlé, this concerned mainly the corporation’s role in Third World countries;
with Ciba-Geigy the ecological effects of chemical production and social implications
of rising medicine prices in developed countries must also be noted.26 Therefore,
their subsidiaries’ quest for legitimacy in Mexico was part of an effort of the whole
group to cope with changing societal conditions and expectations (Gertschen 2019).
However, in the case of Mexico, it is plausible that political and economic conditions
again were more important factors for the further improvement of MNEs’ status.
In autumn 1982, the government had to declare default and thus triggered a debt
crisis which would soon have global repercussions. In 1985, after failed attempts to
stabilise the country within the traditional state-interventionist scheme, president
Miguel de la Madrid (1982–1988) started liberalising the economy. However, only his
successor Carlos Salinas (1988–1994) abandoned the regime’s revolutionary discourse,
which equated government with the state, and the state with society. He postulated
the minutes of CONESA’s executive board meeting of 20 May 1977, 15 March 1978, and 11 September
1978, in: AHN, NES C1.5/1700-4.
24 Furthermore, in the mid-1980s, when the government was in a much weaker position due to economic
and financial problems, and its rhetoric on MNEs was no longer antagonistic, CIGEMEX considered
itself “extremely vulnerable [ . . . ] due to the political nature” of its agrochemical and pharmaceutical
business. Quote from general director J. P. Scott in Issue Management Committee, Minutes of the
Meeting of the IMC 3-1985, 8 May 1985, in: FAN, Ciba-Geigy Mexicana, Korrespondenz Divisionen
und Dritte, 1986, Akten Dr. S. Schmid, RD 06.07.01. Accordingly, even at a time when the regime’s
grip on society was beginning to ease, the only addressees of PR activities were authorities; see the
document “Major problems and opportunities 1987/1988—Key projects”, in: FAN, Ciba-Geigy
Mexicana, “Korrespondenz Divisionen und Dritte”, 1987, Akten Dr. S. Schmid, RD 06.07.01.
25 According to Kuhn, the emergence of a Third World discourse in Switzerland during the late 1960s and
early 1970s was inextricably linked with the rising criticism of MNEs based in the country. See (Kuhn
2012, pp. 278–81; Kuhn 2009, pp. 115–20). An important contribution from a business history
perspective is (Pitteloud 2019, esp. ch. 7 and 8).
26 The most famous and best researched case is the campaign against Nestlé’s infant formula business,
see (Kalt 2009, 2010; Sasson 2016; Sethi 1994). A general account of Ciba-Geigy and Novartis, which
tackles the shrinking social legitimacy of Ciba-Geigy and the chemical industry in general, is provided
in (König 2016). An insightful journalistic contribution is (Bürgi and Imfeld 2004).
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that national sovereignty and development could and should no longer be only the
government’s responsibility. Civil society and business mattered, too, especially in
the context of globalisation in which competitiveness was as vital for sovereignty
as territorial control.27 In this vein, Salinas’ (neo-)liberal discourse justified an
important—and lasting—shift in power relations. Before the crisis, MNEs had to
demonstrate their social responsibility and trustworthiness to be allowed to operate
in Mexico. Afterwards, the burden of proof was reversed. It was the country
and particularly its government that needed to be endorsed. An MNE like Nestlé
actually did so, affirming in newspaper ads that it was “a good moment to invest in
Mexico”.28 With president de la Madrid, Mexico’s sheer necessity improved MNEs’
status; with president Salinas, it was their depiction as symbols of development
and competitiveness.
3.2. Enhanced Competitiveness by Adapting to and Shaping Society (1980s and 1990s)
MNEs were not ready to live up to these high expectations from the start.
Their subsidiaries had grown used to protectionism. Most of them had been
established to circumvent trade barriers and serve the Mexican market, not to
compete internationally. The depressed domestic market and increased import
competition put both Mexican and foreign businesses under enormous pressure.29
Being part of an MNE provided foreign subsidiaries with more resources than
domestic companies, but also exposed them to increasing competition within the
group. Like other MNEs, Nestlé and Ciba-Geigy wanted to benefit from trade
liberalisation by serving different national markets from centralised production units,
thus realising economies of scale.30 The North American Free Trade Agreement,
27 On Salinas’ neoliberal “reinvention” of Mexico, see (O’Toole 2010, chp. 2 and 4).
28 “Si en 1930 Nestlé tuvo confianza en México, ahora con más razón”, “Informador”, 24 September 1986,
p. 9A.
29 For accounts of CONESA’s struggle, see the minutes of the board of directors meeting of 28 July
1981, and the letter of then-General Director C.E. Represas to José Daniel, member of Nestlé group’s
executive board, of 28 February 1984, both in: AHN, NES C1.5/1700-4. For difficulties of chemical
and pharmaceutical companies, including Ciba-Geigy, see the interview with P. Reinartz on 6 May
2017. de la Garza (1999) provides a more general account of the radical restructuring of Mexico’s
manufacturing industry during the 1980s and 1990s.
30 This meant for instance that former CIGEMEX products could be supplied by Ciba-Geigy U.S.A.
See Agricultural Division, Major problems and opportunities 1987/1988, in: FAN, Ciba-Geigy Mexicana,
Korrespondenz Divisionen und Dritte, 1987, Akten Dr. S. Schmid, RD 06.07.01. For respective efforts
by Nestlé in Europe and North America, see the annual reports of 1990, p. 7, and of 1991, pp. 6–7.
According to (Bielschowsky and Stumpo 1995), Mexico’s foreign trade was decisively boosted by
intrafirm trade of MNEs.
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which entered into force on 1 January, 1994, decisively added to this context. During
the second half of the 1980s and the 1990s, CIGEMEX made great efforts to improve
productivity and quality. It introduced TQM, flexibilised labour relations, and reduced
the workforce.31 With CONESA, a similar process occurred.32 It seems plausible
that the integration into the global market boosted awareness that MNE subsidiaries
relied on a competitive and cooperative environment, if they were to prosper.
In their internal and external communication, CIGEMEX and CONESA depicted
their efforts to become more competitive as part of a national effort.33 During
the 1990s, CIGEMEX launched several collaborative projects aimed to fight lepra
(partnering with government), to promote the responsible disposal of toxic waste and
help improve laboratory safety at universities, or to promote ecological technology
innovation (partnering with various academic institutions).34 According to then-CEO
Peter Reinartz, they improved relations with stakeholders, because they were based
on a real and shared interest. Only one was a mere “marketing gimmick”.35
31 See 3rd Quarter Review 1986, section 1 “Major Aspects and Outstanding Issues for Parent Company’s
Attention”, in: FAN, NoAr, Regionsdienste, CIGEMEX, Protokoll MC 23 June 1986, RD 06.07.01;
the confidential report by R. H. Muhr on his Mexico trip, dated 25 November 1986, in: FAN, Ciba-Geigy
Mexicana, Korrespondenz Divisionen und Dritte, 1987, Akten Dr. S. Schmid, RD 06.07.01; and the
comments on TQM by the responsible for Latin America at group level in El Dr. Rolf A Meyer
acompaña a la representación suiza . . . , in: Imagen, ed. by Ciba-Geigy Mexicana, August 1995,
pp. 6–7. General Director P. Reinartz wrote of “painful decisions” that had to be taken, see Editorial,
in: Imagen, ed. by Ciba-Geigy Mexicana, November 1993, p. 3.
32 Interview with C.E. Represas on 18 May 2018.
33 Illustrative of this framing is, for instance, Los mexicanos también hacemos calidad total, in: Imagen,
ed. by Ciba-Geigy Mexicana, November/December 1989, p. 15.—CONESA was a founding member
and C.E. Represas a board member of the below described Fundación Mexicana para la Calidad
Total (FMCT), and both CONESA and CIGEMEX participated in TQM events; see Calidad Total,
Monografías 7, ed. by FMCT, México D.F. 1991; El Hombre y la Calidad, V intercambio internacional
(advertisement), “Informador”, 25 February 1990, p. 9A; XIX Congreso Nacional de Control de Calidad
(adv.), “Informador”, 8.9.1991, p. 3A; Primera Cruzada Jalisco por la Calidad (adv.), “Informador”,
20 October 1999, p. 2G.
34 For the lepra project, see Sigue la colaboración del Fondo Ciba Contra la Lepra, in: Imagen, ed.
by Ciba-Geigy Mexicana, August 1996, p. 4; Se ha registrado reducción en la incidencia de lepra,
“Informador”, 17 October 1996, p. 11A. Ciba-Geigy had set up a fund to fight lepra in ten countries
during the 1980s; see (Bürgi and Imfeld 2004), p. 188. For the project on ecological technology
innovation, see Premio Ciba de Innovación Tecnológica en Ecología, in: Imagen, ed. by Ciba-Geigy
Mexicana, October 1993, pp. 3–4; Se entregó el III Premio Ciba . . . , in: Imagen, ed. by Ciba-Geigy
Mexicana, May 1996, pp. 10–11. For the project on the disposal of toxic waste, improved laboratory
safety, and traineeships to students, see the interview with P. Reinartz on 7 May 2017.
35 P. Reinartz on an epilepsy campaign during these years to win doctors’ favour. Interview with
P. Reinartz on 7 May 2017.
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CONESA had established comparable collaborations already in previous decades,
and continued corresponding efforts.36
Business CSR and TQM discourses demonstrate that intensified relations
between MNE subsidiaries and their local environment, and the concomitant interplay
of economic cooperation and cultural change, were a more general phenomenon
closely connected to global market integration. Already during the 1970s, carriers of
CSR discourse had promoted the positive interrelatedness of social responsibility,
productivity, and quality. Andrés Marcelo Sada (born in 1930) was arguably most
important in voicing that the company be “humanistic for both its proper and for
social interest” (Sada 1978, p. 3).37 He was a founding member of USEM’s chapter in
Monterrey, and headed the chemical company Celulosa y Derivados S.A. (CYDSA).
CYDSA was part of the “Grupo Monterrey”—an ensemble of corporations based
in Northern Mexico’s industrial centre owned by a few intermarried families with
multiple relations with foreign MNEs as clients, suppliers or joint venture partners.38
According to the human resources director of a Grupo Monterrey company, who held a
speech about workers’ participation at USEM Monterrey in 1975, internationalisation
made workers’ reality “more similar to that of the European than to the average
Mexican worker” (Valdés 1976, p. 15). The automotive industry, dominated by U.S.
and European corporations, was paramount for the introduction of new technical
and social norms in Mexico.39 As of the early 1980s, MNE subsidiaries started
applying standards and processes of statistical control and continuous improvement
of quality, and soon requested the same from their providers (Gutiérrez 1992, p. 61).40
36 In the interviews on 26 April 2017 and 12 May 2018, C.E. Represas claimed that CONESA had focused
on creating value for both the company and society since its establishment in the 1930s. Nestlé has
sustained this claim with many publications, such as “An illustration of Nestlé’s role in developing
countries: Example of the State of Chiapas, Mexico”, excerpt of the report of Rémy Montavon, Geneva
1972, and Ganadería lechera en el trópico húmedo de México. Experiencia de una década en la
Chontalpa, Compañía Nestlé S.A., México D.F. 1986. CONESA’s continued efforts to foster good
relationships with its environment are documented by (Montavon 1994; Soberón et al. 1995, pp. 17–18).
However, there was also criticism that such efforts were not successful or only intended for the
company’s benefit. See for instance (Bertolami 1983); Convention d’actionnaires (probably 1985);
(Harrisson 1982).
37 For one of his many public contributions on the topic, see also his opening speech at the First
International Symposium on Productivity, and Quality of Working Life in Monterrey in 1979;
see (Sada 1980).
38 On CYDSA and the Grupo Monterrey in general, see (Montavon 1979; Cerutti 2000; Flores 2000;
Pozas 2002).
39 For an overview see (Gereffi 2003; Humphrey et al. 2000). On the change of labour relations in
particular, see (Luján Uranga 2011; Pries 2000).
40 The importance of the car industry is also stressed in (Calidad Total 1990; Gutiérrez 1991, p. 260).
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The Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey (ITESM), a university
of applied sciences founded by the Grupo Monterrey, established the “Centro de
Calidad” in 1982. Two years later, in cooperation with Ford, the ITESM launched a
program to build up TQM capacities in the whole of Mexico’s automotive industry;
later it was also incorporated in the chemical, metal manufacturing and service
industries (Gutiérrez 1992, pp. 63, 279).41 In the same context of enhanced global
market integration and competition, USEM Monterrey held two major conferences on
CSR in the light of supply chains and stressed the importance of improved relations
with workers, trade unions, suppliers, and even competitors (Farias Arizpe 1985, p. 5;
Ardavín 1987).
The creation of the foundation FMCT in 1987, and the establishment and
subsequent revaluation of the National Quality Award (Premio Nacional de la
Calidad) between 1986 and 1989, were milestones of TQM discourse.42 At least half
of the 22 founding members of the FMCT, and most of the Award winners, were MNE
subsidiaries or suppliers of such corporations.43 The FMCT mission was “to boost
and promote a Total Quality culture in Mexico, adequate to our context” (Gutiérrez
1991, p. 262). Precisely this context was seen as the greatest challenge. Julio Gutiérrez,
the first FMCT president, acknowledged that “the tools and technologies of quality
are useful and important. But the Foundation considers that they are insufficient to
render the country really competitive.” Overcoming “obsolete beliefs” was needed,
such as considering criticism as a lack of respect for the superiors, formal authority
as always being right, the foreign as always being superior, or Mexicans as unable
to work in groups (Gutiérrez 1991, pp. 264–65). In this quest for cultural change
and economic success, history was evoked. FMCT director Joaquín Peón resorted
to a famous anthropologist’s thesis of the two Mexicos that had existed since the
41 For the introduction of TQM measures in a Grupo Monterrey company as of the 1970s, see the speech
by CYDSA chairman Andrés Marcelo Sada in Calidad Total 1991, Monografías 6.
42 The FMCT organised conferences, published “Calidad Total” (with the edition lines “Casos”,
“Monografías”, and “Perspectivas”), and pushed the government for rehauling the National Quality
Award launched in 1986. See the latter on Agustín Portal, of the Ministery of Commerce and Industrial
Promotion, in: (Calidad Total 1991, Monografías 6, pp. 1–2).
43 Among the founding members, Alcatel Indetel, Celanese Mexicana, Hewlett-Packard de México,
Industrias Resistol, Unión Carbide Mexicana were MNEs. Suppliers were for sure: Alfa Corporativo,
Conductores Latincasa, CYDSA, Grupo Condumex, Metalsa, Vitro Bienes de Capital. This does
not exclude that among the following members there were more MNE subsidiaries or suppliers:
Banamex, Celloprint, Cía. Industrial San Cristóbal, Consultoría en Productividad, Corporación
Industrial San Luis, Gigante, Promociones Industriales Banamex, Rassini, Real Turismo, Seguros
América, Texel. See (Calidad Total 1989), backside. The annual winners were presented in the various
FMCT publications.
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Spanish conquest. “Deep Mexico” was indigenous, traditional, and suppressed by
modern, European “imaginary Mexico” (Bonfil 1987). Peón did not share this thesis.
The point he made was that both their indigenous and modern heritage provided
examples that Mexicans cared about the distinction between the bad, the regular
and the best, and about excelling models. “The National Quality Award refers to
this part of our collective ethos and responds to our necessity to have new heroes
and to dispose of an instrument that fosters the optimum development of Mexican
organisations [ . . . ]” (Peón Escalante 1991, p. 2). Accordingly, total quality was “as
an updated form of giving continuity to the fundamental values [ . . . ] of our culture”
(Peón Escalante 1991, p. 2).44 José Giral, the second FMCT president, expressed the
same when calling for a “synthesis”, a “Mexican modernity” (Giral 1991, pp. 23–24).
However, this vision of an evolutive and somewhat harmonious process
was contradicted by the same protagonists who declared that Mexico needed a
“cultural revolution” (Peón Escalante 1991).45 From an embeddedness perspective,
this ambivalence was no coincidence. TQM discourse worked two ways.
The consideration of the company as part of society led Mexico’s National Quality
Award, in contrast to contemporary awards in Japan, the U.S. and Europe, to pay
special attention to a company’s impact on its environment.46 The premise was
that business had to respect and adapt to society and nature. Nevertheless, as a
management idea and method, TQM aimed to understand, control, and use the social
and material world. Accordingly, TQM discourse intended to shape society, to adapt
Mexico to the “changed environment”.47 This environment was described in terms of
modernity and, in its most powerful form, the global market.48 Despite horrendous
economic hardship, carriers of TQM discourse connoted the forced change positively.
The removal of attendance recorders, formalities in day-to-day communication such
as titles, or car lots hitherto exclusively assigned to executives, were presented as
symbols of a more equal and human “new corporate culture” (Giral 1991, pp. 235–55;
Peón Escalante 1991, p. 2; Zárate in Calidad Total 1991, pp. 22–26). Total quality’s
44 The minutes of the 1990 congress, at which Peón held this speech, were published in various
“Monografías”.
45 According to Giral (1991, p. 14), Mexicans needed to “revolutionise” their perceptions and attitudes.
46 For the criteria, see “El Premio Nacional de Calidad”, (Calidad Total 1991, Monografías 4, pp. 16–22).
This difference with other quality awards was highlighted in (Gutiérrez 1991, p. 266), by foreign
speakers at the 1990 congress; see (Calidad Total 1991, Monografías 5, pp. 12, 23), and is still today on
http://www.pnc.org.mx/nuestra-historia-2/ (last accessed on 24 October 2019).
47 See José Giral’s introduction in: Más allá de la Calidad Total, Memorias del VIII Congreso Internacional
de Calidad, México D.F. 25./26.11.1996, p. II.
48 See the paradigmatic book ( 1991), featuring many important businessmen as authors.
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promise was a better Mexico in all possible aspects, and globalisation was perceived
as a helping hand in this endeavour (Giral 1991, pp. 10, 17–18; Gutiérrez in Calidad
total 1991, p. 268).
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, TQM and CSR discourses mutually
reinforced each other. Catholic social teaching (CST) was rooted in the 19th century,
for which it endowed catholic CSR discourse with a memory of modernity’s
and particularly capitalism’s negative social and cultural effects. Consequently,
this discourse was more conservative and sceptical of the sweeping economic
liberalisation than TQM discourse. However, it also promoted the idea that the
ethically good would prevail in the global market, that a virtuous circle of social
responsibility, quality, competitiveness, and prosperity was possible and actually
required by competitiveness.49 TQM and CSR discourses were sustained and
interrelated by people and companies, relatively small in number and partly
identical,50 which certainly contributed to the consistency of this message—but
also to its limited reach.
The efforts and difficulties to spread the idea and practice of this virtuous circle
can be exemplified by the second FMCT president José Giral. Born in 1938, a chemical
engineer from the National Autonomous University of Mexico (Universidad Nacional
Autónoma de México, UNAM), he spent the first two decades of his professional
career with the U.S. MNE DuPont. Between 1983 and 1993, he directed the
Mexican corporations Pliana and Grupo Xabre. From 1968 until at least 2004,
he belonged to an UNAM group that investigated culture and technology from
49 On the necessity of breaking the “vicious” and entering the “virtuous circle”, see (Ardavín 1987, p. 12);
Elizondo in (Ardavín 1987, p. 2), and Andrés M. Sada in “Foro Nacional Balance Social” (Sada 1989,
p. 26). Significant was the manual (Confederación USEM 1993), which synthesized decade-long
reflections at USEM, and integrated CSR and TQM discourse. For elaboration, see (Revista USEM
1997, p. 13).
50 For instance, Carlos Llano, Augusto Pozo Pino, and Andrés Marcelo Sada belonged to the FMCT
Board of Directors (enlisted in all publications). They all played an important role in CST-oriented
CSR discourse as of the 1970s. See Actas del Consejo Central de Delegados de América Latina de la
Uniapac, Caracas, 18–21 November 1970, or Acta del CCDAL de la Uniapac, Quito, 26–28 September
1973, both in: Conf. USEM, CCDAL 1970, 1971 and 1973; or the news section in: Boletín USEM
México, (Jun. 1973, p. 4). At the beginning of the 1970s, Condumex corporation, headed by the
later FMCT president Gutiérrez, collaborated with USEM to promote best practices in stakeholder
relations. See Visita a Condumex, in: Boletín USEM México, Mar. 1972, pp. 2–3; news section in
Boletín USEM México, (Aug. 1972, p. 4). Moreover, Grupo Bimbo of the leading USEM members
Lorenzo and Roberto Servitje both referred to and were present in TQM discourse, see Tarin (1990,
pp. 8–12); and Servitje (in Más allá de la Calidad Total, pp. 186–97).
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a management perspective and offered consulting services.51 In his 1991 book
“Culture of Effectivity”, Giral wrote that management could not force cultural change,
“only guide, facilitate and accompany it” (Giral 1991, pp. 23–24). He was optimistic
that “in any circumstances, our people can act with great productivity, creativity,
and responsibility, if they are inspired and freed from obstacles” (Giral 1991, foreword).
In the book’s second edition of 1993, he recognised that changing corporate culture
was proving difficult, especially with small companies, and explained it with Mexican
culture (Giral 1993, pp. xi–xiv, 11–12). Acknowledging culture’s importance was one
thing, re-engineering it quite another.52
3.3. Polarisation and Consolidation of the Two Mexicos (1990s and 2000s)
The gap between ambition and reality was revealed in a brutal and unequivocal
manner by the so-called Tequila crisis, a financial and economic crisis that began in
December 1994 amid the change of presidency from Carlos Salinas to Ernesto Zedillo
(1994–2000). Growth picked up in 1996, again, but did not prevent rising bankruptcies,
unemployment, and poverty (Dussel Peters 2000, Middlebrook and Zepeda 2003;
Pozas 2006). Already in early 1994, in a manifesto for the future administration, three
major business associations had jointly called for a “market economy with social
responsibility” (Propuestas 1994, ch. IV). This implied that the “big part of medium,
small and micro enterprises”, for which liberal policies had brought about “adverse
results”, should get a bigger share of economic growth (Propuestas 1994, pp. 3, 16).53
Indeed, the dual structure of Mexico’s dual economy had been taking shape since the
early 1980s, as a result of companies’, sectors’, and regions’ highly different capacities
to react to international competition. The “Tequila crisis” and its aftermath revealed
and exacerbated this polarisation.54
Between 1999 and 2004, José Giral co-authored four more books on
competitiveness. They all insisted on the central message of CSR and TQM discourses
that socially and ethically responsible business behaviour paid off economically
51 See quiminet.com/articulos/forjadores-de-la-quimica-en-mexico-jose-giral-barnes-2634425.htm
(4 October 2019), and interview with J. Giral on 11 April 2016.
52 A business consultant and bestselling author shared Giral’s appreciation, see (Münch Galindo 1992,
pp. 144–55). The book was updated twice and still sold in 2006.
53 A fourth business association criticised that an “oligopolistic market structure” left only crumbles for
the “immense majority” of businesses, see (Concamin 1994, p. 3).
54 Dussel Peters (2000) and Pozas (1994, 2002) demonstrate that big domestic and multinational enterprises
were in a much better position than SMEs, and that regions with no or little MNE presence and
integration into global value chains fared particularly badly.
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(Giral et al. 2004, p. 98).55 According to Giral and his co-authors, a major reason
why most companies were unable to enter this virtuous circle was that the crisis
had devastated most value chains. Globalisation “conspired” against re-articulating
them, because corporations imported supplies instead of integrating national SMEs
into their value chains (Giral et al. 2002, pp. 17–18). For the authors, an aggravating
factor was foreign control of most corporations, because they were even less inclined
to invest in national suppliers and commit themselves to Mexico. They suggested
measured state intervention, including incentives for Mexican-controlled big business
to create local value chains (Giral et al. 2002, pp. 17–18; Giral et al. 2004, pp. 118–19).
About 25 years after the question of foreign capital had been excluded from business
CSR discourse, they brought it back. However, such criticism had little echo in
Mexican business and politics. Only one major business association seems to have
broadly shared Giral and his fellows’ analysis.56 For several reasons, even in the
context of renewed and massive economic hardship, the role of MNEs was not
broadly questioned. Mexican corporations were becoming multinational themselves.
Then, there were important differences between foreign MNEs, which can again be
illustrated with Nestlé and Ciba-Geigy/Novartis. The former expanded its activities
in Mexico. Today, the country is the company’s fifth largest market worldwide.57
Novartis México, on the other hand, divested during the 1990s,58 and has further
reduced its capacities in the country since then.59 Most importantly, by the mid-1990s,
MNEs had acquired a position of economic power and normative authority, which
protected them from broad criticism.
Business CSR discourse is revealing of this privileged position. After the “Tequila
crisis”, representatives of USEM continuously denounced the global market for its
economic effects and normative foundations (Milanés 1995, p. 1; Milanés 1996, p. 1;
55 For the importance of business ethics and CSR for competitiveness, see (Giral et al. 1999, p. 7;
Giral et al. 2000, p. 5; Giral et al. 2002, p. viii; as well as Giral et al. 2004, pp. 100, 127–35).
56 Though it did not explicitly mention corporations as co-responsible for the country’s malaise,
see (Concamin 2000). For its part, contemporary academic research confirmed Giral’s and his
co-authors’ analysis, see for instance (Zepeda and Lugo 1999).
57 Today, Nestlé México has more than 13,000 employees, see (Nestlé 2018). In 1983, when the subsidiary
was facing bankruptcy, it counted less than 3500, see the letter of then General Director C.E. Represas
to José Daniel of 28 February 1984 in: AHN, NES C1.5/1700-4.
58 For the development of Novartis’ activities in Mexico until the turn of the century, see (Zeller 2001,
pp. 146, 491–96, 525–39).
59 Today, there is no production facility anymore. See (El Universal 2018).
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Loza Macías 1998, p. 1; Castillo Peraza 1999, pp. 15–24; Revista USEM 2001).60
However, MNEs as the agents of the global market were anathema. The example
of CEMEFI (Centro Mexicano para la Filantropía), which was founded in 1988 and
became the most important carrier of CSR discourse in Mexico at the turn of the
2000s,61 is even more telling. CEMEFI differed from USEM in various aspects.
For instance, it was secular (not adherent to CST), it tackled CSR as a corporate issue
(not as a question of personal leadership, integrity, and spirituality), and foreign
MNEs played a crucial role. U.S. corporate foundations served CEMEFI as financial
supporters and role-models for Mexican civil society.62 MNE subsidiaries such as
CONESA were among its first members and partners for campaigns.63 In 2001,
CEMEFI launched the “Distintivo ESR”, which was based on a self-assessment and
grew rapidly to become Mexico’s best-known CSR award.64 The overwhelming
majority of the first companies to receive the award were MNE subsidiaries. Again,
CONESA and Novartis México were among them.65 Economically successful and
complying with relatively high standards, they served as examples that the business
case of CSR promoted by CEMEFI actually worked. Vice versa, CEMEFI’s discourse
promoted the cognitive and normative ideas, and the institutions—the cultural
context—that facilitated MNEs’ integration and the cooperation with them. It even
represented MNEs’ enhanced embeddedness in globalised Mexico.
60 An interview with Kenneth Arrow was entitled “Stop the savage economy!”, even though this
economist did not use the expression. See ¡Basta con la economía salvaje!, in: Revista USEM, May–June
1995, pp. 12–13, 205.
61 On CEMEFI’s status, see (Agüero 2005, p. 121; Gordon Rapoport 2008, pp. 83–89; Grayson and Nelson
2013, p. 25).
62 For the CEMEFI’s official account, see (CEMEFI 1996, p. 14) and (CEMEFI 2016). (Fernández 1995) is
an example of the model character ascribed to civil society in the U.S. and Canada. For an academic
contribution, see (Gordon Rapoport 2008, pp. 67–68, 78).
63 For the corporate philanthropy program “Mira por los demás”, see Informe 1995–1996, p. 28,
and Acciones y logros en 10 años de trabajo. Resumen del documento de Dr. Rubén Aguilar del
CEMEFI presentado en la reunión previa a la Asamblea de Gobernadores del BID en 1998 en Cartagena
de Indias, p. 5, in: CEMEFI, MIC f 57. Moreover, CONESA set up an important health fund in the
1990s (Soberón et al. 1995). In 2000, about half of CEMEFI’s corporate members were of foreign origin,
see Informe Anual 2000, p. 40.
64 CEMEFI: Distintivo ESR a la Empresa Socialmente Responsible®, Edición 2003, in: CEMEFI, F1288.
In 2001, 17 companies received the award, in 2002 28, in 2003 41, in 2004 61, in 2005 84, in 2006
124, and in 2017, 1505. See (CEMEFI 2007, p. 21) and https://www.cemefi.org/buscadoresr/#/ (8
December 2017).
65 See (CEMEFI 2006, p. 23).
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4. Discussion and Conclusion
Business’ CSR and TQM discourses in Mexico represent a profound change
of MNEs’ embeddedness in this country during the period from the 1970s to the
early 2000s. They turned from actors with little social legitimacy to the centres
of the globalising part of Mexico’s dual economy. MNEs’ central role consists of
both their “hard” economic power, especially their ability to coordinate global value
chains, and their “soft” power, which refers to their perception as role models that
succeed in creating a virtuous cycle of competitiveness and social responsibility.
Indeed, the emergence of Mexico’s dual economy was both an economic and cultural
phenomenon. Local business did not only engage in economic activity with MNE
subsidiaries but shared and jointly promoted cognitive and normative ideas about
the challenges of the global market, and how they could be met. This cultural process
implied a better adaption by MNEs to the Mexican context, but local actors’ increasing
compliance with the standards set by MNEs. MNE’s enhanced embeddedness
worked two ways; it was about adapting to and shaping society. It meant a new,
an increasingly trans-nationalised governance for the Mexican economy.66
In the light of SDG 8, this analysis offers various conclusions. Globalised
Mexico could serve as an example that, in the context of the global market, economic
growth, decent working standards and corporate social responsibility, in the wider
sense, are compatible, if not mutually beneficial. However, it also demonstrates the
limitations of this dynamic. The majority of businesses, consisting of micro, small-
and medium-sized enterprises, have not entered the virtuous cycle of economic
competitiveness and social responsibility. Obviously, this positive interplay is
contingent; it works under certain circumstances, but not necessarily and not for
all. This is even demonstrated by globalised Mexico itself. Recent studies suggest
that working conditions in MNE subsidiaries are still clearly better than the national
average, but that employment stability and remuneration have come under increasing
pressure (Bensusán et al. 2018, p. 13; Bensusán and Carrillo 2017, p. 36).67
The positive economic and social effects of global capitalism are neither enjoyed
by everyone nor can they be taken for granted. Such are the rules of this game.
However, the legitimacy of this social order requires that these rules not be applied
66 On the concept of transnational governance, and the importance MNEs play in it, see (Djelic and
Sahlin-Andersson 2006; Folke Schuppert and Zürn 2008; Gereffi et al. 2005, pp. 78–104).
67 On the different types of foreign direct investment, and the opportunities and risks associated
to them—such as a “race to the bottom” of wages and working conditions in the face of global
competition—see (Carrillo et al. 2012b, p. 84; Mortimore 2006).
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too strictly. Otherwise, resistance grows. Since the “first globalisation” of the 19th
century, expanding global capitalism and economic nationalism have been two sides
of the same coin.68 It depends on the historical context what side is up; neither
force can be considered dead. By adapting to and shaping society, MNEs have
had important merits. However, expressing both the rejection of nationalism as a
zero-sum ideology directed against other nations, and the confidence that private
business is key to globally sustainable development, the UN Agenda 2030 bestows
MNEs with an even greater responsibility. They have to deliver more.69 This is what
the example of Mexico suggests, too.
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Challenges for the Host Society—Human
Trafficking, Slavery and Abuse in the
Work Context
Maria Elo and Arla Juntunen
1. Introduction
The United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 8 (SDG 8)—decent work
and economic growth—is central to the human rights and wellbeing of individuals
who are at the productive age. In the globalized world, the mobile labor force
has become an issue beyond being an economic production factor. At the same
time, this mobility of people has introduced new challenges in host societies in
developed and developing countries that are receiving migrants. Emphasis on the
social and economic integration of migrants has dominated discussions about the
implications of human mobility. Yet, these discussions have remained too simplistic
to address the multifaceted nature of the phenomenon. It seems that civil society in
the host countries and institutions does not adequately understand and discuss the
challenging implications of migration. Components of decent work—employment,
social protection, workers’ rights, and social dialogue—may be lacking (Ghai 2008).
For example, regarding ethnic businesses and possible side-effects such as human
trafficking, slavery, or work-related abuse, those tend to remain in the shadows.
Even though the host society as a whole has possibly dealt with these problems
historically, and enjoys a high level of development, the modern civil society and its
institutions do not necessarily perceive the existence of these challenges re-entering
the local context.
Partly due to the limited research and the novelty of the phenomenon, there is
little awareness and few systemic competencies to effectively address the challenges of
human trafficking and work-related abuse in host societies once the problems begin to
emerge. The learning that needs to happen for such systemic improvements has been
discussed in sociology, but less so with regard to managing the updates in institutional
structures and processes (e.g., Potrafke 2016). However, preventive, rather than
reactive, governance is considered more efficient to tackle the challenges. Preventive
governance ex ante hinders the emergence of an illicit practice, like abusive labor
practices, as it has created effective procedures to recognize and correct problems,
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if or when they arise. Reactive governance is acting ex post on an illicit practice that
has already started its rooting process.
We use the term foreign worker to describe immigrants, asylum seekers,
and migrant workers in this article. This is because work is the focal concern
in terms of regulation, and it is used to determine categorization for the type of
migrant; work differentiates, for example, categories such as marriage or student
migrants who do not enter the host country with the sole purpose of work
(e.g., Heikkilä and Rauhut 2015). The “foreign” refers to the migrant origin and
status of the worker. Foreign workers here are interchangeably referred to as
migrant workers or migrants.1 The term migrant is often mixed with other terms or
used interchangeably (e.g., Vore 2015); migrant is a more inclusive term that includes
e.g., refugees, temporary workers, marriage migrants, and those moving for economic
reasons. Vore (2015) highlights the term migrant when referring to people who are still
on the move or may wish to return home one day, i.e., are perhaps not permanently
immigrating. The term “immigrant” typically refers to migrants who have moved to
a foreign country with the intention of settling there—with a permanent residence.
Following the newest definition by the International Organization for Migration,
we use the term migrant as “a person who moves away from his or her place of usual
residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or
permanently, and for a variety of reasons” (IOM 2019, p. 130), since this is well in line
with the need to address migration in the country of origin and start the preventive
and protective measures regarding exploitation already there.
Newly arrived foreign workers are most often not knowledgeable about the host
society and its institutional system and unaware of the rights and obligations they
have regarding employment. Similarly, as with other entrants (such as firms and
entrepreneurs) coming to a new context, they are liable not only for being foreign but
also due to their newness in the context and their lack of connectedness (e.g., Johanson
and Vahlne 2009). These liabilities translate into vulnerability and hazards for the
entrant (Denk et al. 2012).
Those foreign workers who migrate following their family, relatives, or friends
receive information that is not necessarily correct or adequate; it may offer a very
informal and limited view of the host country’s labor system. Typically, the highly
1 The person is a migrant because of having crossed a border, but their work status differs; hence,
in some phases, we only refer to the person as a migrant for reasons of simplicity.
40
skilled corporate expatriates receive formal onboarding and information on the
destination, but this is less so for those arriving via social connections.
Migrants and foreign workers bring with them different practices and behaviors
related to work and these often blend in with the existing practices of the host
society. This may happen irrespective of whether or not these practices are legal
in the host country. As a result, illicit labor-related practices diffuse into the host
country context. This is partly because the migrant workers do not always know
what is illegal or because they are dependent on their employers and, thus, cannot
protect themselves, and partly because the employers may not know or care if
they are using illegal or abusive labor practices (Martin 2012). The ethnic enclaves
and business networks may not operate in a legitimate manner for diverse reasons,
such as previously dominant practices, profit making, or crime. Furthermore,
the idea of a “safe corridor” of entry into a new country’s labor market by following
co-ethnics2 or relatives abroad and working in their businesses is alluring and social
tie-driven for new immigrants dreaming of a better future without poverty. This safe
corridor mechanism provides a socially connected and often even dependent human
resource base. Social ties in ethnic economies are central and their meaning in
employment and business is notable (Wahlbeck 2007). Ethnic economies describe
migrant businesses with co-ethnic employees, pointing out a migrant minority
business and employment sector that coexists with the general economy (see more in
Light et al. 1994). It is argued that the entrepreneurs in the ethnic enclave economy
earn higher returns while their employees earn lower returns than they would
in the general labor market (Sanders and Nee 1987). Ethnic enclave economies
represent a part of a dual labor market, a labor market with inferior/secondary
status (Light et al. 1994). Such ethnocultural settings can develop shadow economies
(Grzymała-Kazłowska 2005) as their social and ethnocultural systems and norms
continue to exist in the host economy and do not necessarily integrate into the
host society.
As a result, this context in the host country can be deceptive for the newcomers
as they do not speak the language well, or not at all. Migrant workers often do not
understand the host country’s legal system or do not know the labor market practices
2 Co-ethnics are people who share common features of ethnic heritage; they may or may not have the
same citizenship, but they do share other features, e.g., ancestors/family in the same country, language,
religion, racial as well as other diasporic characteristics. Typically, we refer to co-ethnics when the
people are abroad (e.g., in labor diaspora) and share important features with their co-ethnics that they
do not share with the local people or other migrant populations.
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(cf. Light et al. 1994), and lack access to formal work-related information, especially
if they enter the host country mainly through informal ethnic channels. Ethnic
channels of entry refer to an entry with the help of family, relatives, and other weak
tie-connections and other relational networks that do not involve labor organizations
and other labor authorities (Wilson 1998). This makes them vulnerable to exploitation
by co-ethnics or others who sense their vulnerability, which is an under-researched
concern and a loophole in many governance systems (Li 2017). There may be
intentional economic strategies by e.g., a criminal network providing cheap labor to a
sweatshop (e.g., Lan 2015), but there may also be partly unintentionally illicit strategies
linked to employers’ lack of knowledge on the labor market regulation and conditions,
especially if the employer himself is from a different country of origin and faces
numerous liabilities of foreignness as an entrepreneur (cf. Denk et al. 2012). Davitti
(2010, p. 42) claimed that “Conflict-related child trafficking is particularly fluid in
nature as it follows patterns of insecurity, instability and the collapse of law and order,
which are characteristics of conflict and post-conflict countries.” However, human
trafficking is also a concern in Europe that is well documented. In both the Prato
area of Italy, textile production, and in the ethnic food market of Finland, exploitative
and abusive practices were found where non-European exploitative labor practices
developed in an ethnic cluster despite the European institutional setting (Lan 2015;
Teittinen 2020); such cases were found where cultural distance3 was notable, e.g., in the
Nepalese ethnic restaurant business (Teittinen 2020). Regardless of the etiology or
origin of these practices, they need to be addressed efficiently and in the early stages,
as they undermine governance and its legitimacy in a particular enclave (e.g., Sanders
and Nee 1987; Chen and Liukkunen 2019). So far, sociologists and migration scholars
highlight the importance of turnaround management that addresses these negative
formations, especially to restrict such institutions from developing and becoming
deeply rooted in their contexts (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010; Bell and Machin 2013).
The purpose of this paper is to increase the understanding of decent work in the
context of integrating migrants as employees and entrepreneurs while maintaining
societal harmony. Empirically, this paper illustrates what kind of abusive practices
around vulnerable migrants have emerged in a highly developed Nordic country and
how institutions tackle them. We focus on Finland, which is a theoretically interesting
context having one of the lowest corruption indexes in the world (Transparency
International 2018) and a highly regulated labor market (ILO 2019). Finland is also
3 See more on cultural distance in (Triandis et al. 1988).
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a country with a long tradition of decent work and societal awareness of human
rights. It serves well to explain the appearance of abusive labor market practices
related to foreign workers as the country has a relatively young history in terms
of receiving migrant workers (e.g., Elo 2017). This era started only when the first
Somalian refugees arrived in Finland in the 1990s, making Finland young in the
receiving country context (e.g., Heikkilä 2017). Today, the country hosts migrant
populations from diverse backgrounds. It is one of the European Union countries
that received notable inflows of migrants from Syria, Iraq, and other countries during
the so-called refugee crises in 2015. As this is a recent phenomenon, it means that
there are no dominant practices or established governance traditions in the Finnish
labor market regarding labor migrants. Mechanisms to effectively monitor large or
unexpected immigration flows are first being created facing the new pressures on
the EU external borders. This is a reason why the governance system went through
a real-life stress-test during the migration crises and faced suboptimal conditions.
The systemic resources of the state were consumed mainly to cope with the inflow of
migrants, and not to govern or to develop entrepreneurial or business practices or
guidance for ethnic labor markets.
The recent developments underline the importance of the topic. The increasing
cases of intra-ethnic exploitation bring up the need to re-address the concern that
decent work conditions, ethics, and laws apply to everyone, including newcomers
(Teittinen 2020). This negative development, i.e., diffusion of foreign illicit and
abusive practices, needs the attention of the civil society and Finnish formal
institutions, because it is a societal caveat influencing all (Kolodziej 1992). Local labor,
labor protection, and work conditions have been central to governance concerns
from very early on in Finland and the role of labor unions has traditionally been
important in co-developing labor market regulations. Despite that, in the developed
Nordic societies, the reintroduction of such “historical” or “foreign” issues has
been happening under the radar. These practices have emerged within minority
populations that remain out of sight. Furthermore, it is a window of opportunity and
a profitable strategy for those ethnic entrepreneurs to abuse co-ethnics, other migrants
or relatives, since the entrepreneurs have enjoyed the fruits of that labor without
paying the respective contributions and tariffs. Lack of attention and loopholes in
legislation and regulation have left newcomers partly unprotected.
This paper addresses the need to develop societal, multi-level mechanisms for
increasing awareness and formal institutional systems that may reduce and terminate
these negative developments that have shaken the idea of worker protection and
inclusion in the host society. The focus is on the migrant newcomers, e.g., foreign
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workers, as this is the most vulnerable group, but we recognize that such practices
may influence any worker. This phenomenon of abuse is not a problem of developing
countries or countries with weak institutions, as dramatic evidence from domestic
workers’ abuse has suggested (Chin 2003); it is a global challenge, shifting and
changing its nature according to its context.
This discussion contributes to decent work on three levels: first, on the level of
formal governance and institutional response; second, on the level of civil society
acceptance vs. disapproval of the illegal, foreign practices4; thirdly, on the level of
shutting down illicit and exploitative entrepreneurial opportunities. The paper is
organized as a conceptual discussion; it starts with a review, presents findings related
to the case of Finland and ends with a discussion and conclusion.
2. Reviewing the Phenomenon and Its Landscape
2.1. Background and Challenges in Finland
The number of migrants and refugees has grown due to diverse global conflicts
and threats. These are caused, e.g., by terrorism, such as ISIS in the Middle East,
natural disasters, like earthquakes, tsunamis and hurricanes, or political turmoil and
uncertainty, such as that in different Latin American countries or on the continent
of Africa. These developments have introduced new challenges inside the host
societies. There is a great urge to develop formal policies and suitable solutions to
cope with global migration flows (Barnard et al. 2019).5 The recent migratory waves
put pressure on countries receiving migrants and their institutional systems to absorb
this additional labor force. Civil society and the already existing, established migrant
populations and diasporas face challenges in absorbing the newcomers (Daley 2007;
Kupferberg 2003). Extant diasporas often become scapegoats and feel threatened by
the newcomers; hence, it is important to capture the micro-foundations of diaspora
politics when making assumptions for related governance dynamics (Délano Alonso
and Mylonas 2019).
Countries lacking experience in receiving migrants suffer from limited capability
in governing the new migration-driven challenges in labor markets as they are
4 Foreign practices refer here to practices that are not known/habitual in the local population and society
and have a foreign origin, i.e., are arriving to the context with and practiced by foreigners.
5 See e.g., the Special Issue “Migrants, Migration Policies, and International Business Research: Current
Trends and New Directions” of the Journal of International Busines Policy, Volume 2, Issue 4, December
2019 by Guest Editors: Helena Barnard, David Deeds, Ram Mudambi, and Paul M. Vaaler: this should
be included in the reference list.
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different from local governing challenges (see e.g., Heikkilä 2017). Finland also lacks
adequate resources in terms of personnel that understand the ethnic backgrounds,
and have foreign language competencies and the cultural understanding that is
needed to tackle the issues (Finnish Border Guard 2014). This suggests that Finnish
institutions face several challenges due to such developments.
However, the main challenge relates to the victims of these practices and
the prevention thereof. The global elite migrants represent the most privileged
entrant type, while asylum seekers and so-called “economic refugees” form the
most vulnerable group of migrants needing protection. In this vulnerable group,
those who do not qualify under formal refugee criteria or are paperless tend to
seek work and livelihood from alternative sources, below the radar. The low-skilled
migrants seeking a better life in foreign countries’ labor markets have remained
a heavily debated category of migrants, especially, regarding the formal entry
pre-requisites, permit processes, length of stay, illicit entry practices, and the impact
on the host society (e.g., Rivera-Batiz 1999). For example, in 2015, the flow of irregular
migrants, particularly from Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, entering the EU reached
unprecedented levels and has remained high after 2015, which has raised questions
of governance.6
There are limited formal options for low-skilled migrants to enter the labor
market beyond temporary project work or seasonal work visas in areas such
as agriculture. On the other hand, the growing number of new immigrants,
particularly asylum seekers and refugees, has challenged many host countries
and their administrations in terms of monitoring, assessing, and integrating these
incoming people. There are numerous institutions responsible for the post-entry
processing of vulnerable migrants, addressing their role and place in the host society,
which creates administrative difficulties. The placement after entry is particularly
problematic for paperless migrants as they typically enter shadow labor markets
(e.g., Hughes 2000). However, it is also a systemic issue and many shadow labor
markets are largely socially accepted phenomena, for example, minor household
work. Such dual economies are usually found in developing country contexts
(Callebert 2014).
The limited resources of governance systems have partly allowed the emergence
of illicit practices, the criminal exploitation of migrants, and irregular entrepreneurial
6 See more in https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/irregular-migration-return-policy_
en (accessed on 12 April 2020).
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activities, which are not contributing as they should to the host economy
(e.g., Vero 2018b). The inadequate capacity of governance to address the in-depth
nature behind such foreign practices that are “imported”,7 mainly by ethnic
populations into the country and not affecting the mainstream Finnish people directly,
is a fundamental and complicated problem (Callebert 2014). It is less perceived due
to its “invisible” features (Haynes 2009).
These negative developments in labor-related practices particuarly include
human trafficking, slavery, and abuse, all of which generate profits and benefits
illicitly. These are categories of practices that are clearly illegal and not in line with
SDG 8. Hence, the problem does not arise from the lack of laws and regulations
(e.g., Finlex 1959), but more from inadequate attention, a lack of competences,
and missing resources to tackle such practices. As these hazards are of international
and transnational nature, not inherently local, they are less perceived. Both the
governance system and the civil society in Finland face a form of liability of foreignness,
but from the receiving side, in addressing these concerns (Johanson and Vahlne 2009).
It is institutionally challenging to adapt the governance (e.g., Teittinen 2020).
In prior research, the problems of irregular and illicit activities in ethnic enclaves
and migrant networks have been thematized, and there is a danger of the emergence
of subcultures that do not follow the host society’s laws and the rules of the game
(cf. North 1990; Ojo et al. 2013). It is apparent that without proper governance
processes in place and a well-functioning support network, the vulnerable new
migrants and refugees might face the risk of being mistreated, abused, and becoming
victims or even criminals themselves (e.g., Kelly et al. 2005). Depending on the
ratio of risk and profit received from such practices, it might also become a strategic
option for entrepreneurs to continue such practices. If the host country is unable to
govern them and maintain locally legitimate and acceptable practices in the overall
society, these loopholes are soon identified, as the experiences from Italy indicate
(Dugan and Edelstein 2013).
Increasing migration and globalization has challenged the functions and balances
in the Finnish institutions and society. It is important to notice that it is the
responsibility of the Finnish state to govern its territory and the practices within that
7 With “imported”, we mean that these practices do not typically pre-exist as Finnish labor market
practices; they are transplanted in Finland as foreign practices that are brought in and take place in
ethnic populations. Hence, they are not transplanted in the visible mainstream society. Naturally,
there are also classic forms of exploitation, such as prostitution-related human trafficking, that are not
new, foreign, or transnational and take place in Finland among mainstream Finns. However, this study
is focusing on the host country challenges and respective “imported”/transplanted developments.
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territory, regardless of the status of the people residing in Finland. Laws protecting
workers are non-negotiable and apply to all members of the society. During recent
decades, Finland has internationalized in terms of its population (see Figure 1).
The refugee crisis in Europe during 2014–2015 brought 32,476 refugees from the
Middle East to Finland according to the Immigration Department of the Ministry of
the Interior (2016). This number is ten times more than the number of refugees in
2014 when just 3651 refugees arrived from the same area. Such notable developments















Figure 1. The development of foreign-origin people in Finland—foreign citizens,
persons with foreign background, foreign-language speakers and persons born
abroad, 1990–2017. Source: Statistics Finland/Population structure, (Statistics
Finland 2019).
According to Statistics Finland, since the 1990s, the number of foreign-born
residents has grown ten times, from 0.5% to, in 2017, 5%, largely due to the sudden
immigration flow from Syria through Europe to Finland. The number of refugees
in the European Union increased ten-fold during the years 2014–2015, during the
so-called refugee crisis, without respective resource increases. In parallel, Finland
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is attracting qualified labor from abroad for various industries, e.g., construction
and shipbuilding. Many labor migrants have a permanent residence in Finland,
but temporary labor migrants also enter Finland for diverse occupations in agriculture
and the service business. During recent decades, the Finnish labor market has also
been able to attract highly skilled migrants from developed countries, e.g., for tech
and other knowledge-based industries. These migrants are typically well informed
and less vulnerable to abusive practices. The statistics show that most of the incoming
flow settles to the southern part of Finland, where the capital and the largest cities in
Finland are, causing the most pressure in this area (Heikkilä and Pikkarainen 2010).
The sudden increase in refugees stretched the capabilities of the Finnish
administration, laws, and processes, and thus, spurred action and changes that
were reported in the recent Ministry of the Interior’s report (See Ministry of the
Interior 2018). According to a recent Ministry of the Interior report (2018, p. 18),
the “Immigration Unit” tripled during the year, from just over 70 to approximately
250 employees. The Finnish Immigration Service opened nine service points for the
reception of applications and other customer services. Meanwhile, the number of
personnel at the Asylum Unit decreased when the fixed-term employment contracts
of the employees hired in 2016 to handle applications for asylum ended. However,
the total number of personnel at the agency was on the rise again in 2017: it grew
from 800 to 900 during the year and the upward trend continues. It has become
evident that the institutional sector needs more agile resources to proactively and
reactively respond to the challenges.
Moreover, the role of the Finnish Immigration Service as the authority responsible
for asylum matters was strengthened by concentrating all permit matters in this
office, including innovating new types of residence permits for seasonal workers,
and growth and start-up entrepreneurs. In addition, the asylum procedure and other
processes were updated, including the background information search from social
networks. Processes relating to the integration of immigrants were also developed
because the local communities had never seen a large number of foreigners enter
in such a short period. Just the number has been a challenge, but also the different
backgrounds, languages, religions, and traditions caused integration and interaction
problems with local communities.
2.2. Terms and Cases of Human Trafficking and Modern-Day Slavery in Finland
It is important to discuss the nature of the terms related to the abuse of migrant
workers in more detail and broaden the perspective that is needed to perceive and
tackle the phenomenon. We start by presenting views from the extant literature that
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explain what these forms of illicit practices can be and how they are conceptualized.
In statistics, they are not represented as clear-cut categories.8
Slavery is not only some colonial-era phenomenon; actually, it is a concern
in many Western and emerging economy societies. This “modern slavery” can be
defined as “a servitude broadly defined in a new study as forced and state-imposed
labor, sexual servitude and forced marriage” and “it is a complex and often hidden
crime that crosses borders, sectors, and jurisdictions” (Walk Free Foundation 2018).
Slavery or its forms are almost commonly accepted practices in many countries,
where labor regulations do not protect vulnerable groups, such as migrant women
who are housekeepers, nannies, or other domestic workers. Several studies have
pointed out the complicated nature of the responsibilities in governing, especially
the transnational labor and the internationally active agencies and their practices
(e.g., Hepple 2005, see also the International Labor Organization (ILO) website9).
Hence, it is obvious that once the phenomenon of silently accepting slavery-like
practices becomes systemic and part of everyday life, there is less interest in the
society to govern it according to international laws and ethics (e.g., Jureidini 2010).
In Finland, slavery has traditionally represented a thing of the past, a historical
practice that has happened in far-away countries. The first law against slavery in
Finland was introduced in 1335. Finland joined the 1926 Slavery Convention in 1959
(Finlex 1959). Moreover, in Finnish criminal law codes, the exploitation of migrant
labor refers to any form of illegal acts against persons of foreign origin who are
working in Finland. These can be, for example, paying less than minimum wage to a
migrant worker (Turtola 2018).
The Finnish civil society has not considered slavery or the peril of it as a
possibility, and therefore, different forms of slavery have not been given serious
attention. The Finnish labor unions, the employers, and the state have a long tradition
of trade and work negotiations that form a specific governance style for addressing
the labor markets and forming the respective regulations. These negotiations
have generally covered diverse categories of workers, but not the slavery theme.
The Finnish labor markets as formal institutions have not been discriminative in
their nature due to the egalitarian culture and the Nordic approach, and this has
8 See more in http://www.stat.fi/til/rpk/2018/13/rpk_2018_13_2019-05-16_tie_001_en.html (accessed on
14 April 2020).
9 Specific publications are found here: https://www.ilo.org/global/publications/lang--en/index.htm
(accessed on 14 April 2020).
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protected migrant workers in the eyes of the law before this recent migration wave
(e.g., Ristikari 2011).
However, despite the governance and institutional structures that have long
been functioning well, slavery has arrived in Finland. Vaarakallio (2013) interviewed
Professor Kevin Bales about modern-day slavery and concluded in his article that
“slaves in Finland have to work, for example, as sex slaves or slaves for domestic
and agricultural work”. In popular discussions and media, cases from very specific
industries have been pointed out. For example, a slave-like status of the berry
pickers arriving from southern East Asia has been pointed out. These migrants
have a temporal work visa, but they bear the financial risk of profitability of their
berry picking trip to Finland as their work is not compensated per hour but per
result. They do not have an employment contract and they are seen as self-employed
(e.g., Richards and Saastamoinen 2010).
It is difficult to draw clear boundaries based on the criteria that are used to
describe different terms on exploitation. Human trafficking is a term that is rather
inclusive and incorporates multiple activities. In the majority of OECD countries,
there is a variety of terms used to describe human trafficking, including trafficking in
persons and contemporary or modern-day slavery. The different terminology makes
comparisons challenging. For streamlining and harmonizing legitimate practices
across cultures and host countries, some generally accepted terms and clarity in the
criteria are necessary. Similarly, research comparisons are needed. We found out that
it is difficult to compare statistics of the work-based slavery or slavery in Finnish
crime statistics because there is no umbrella term in the Finnish law for statistical
purposes for all the different crimes related to modern-day slavery. In Finland,
there are different criminal codes to tackle human trafficking and work-based slavery.
We present some cases of work-based slavery as a part of human trafficking
and abuse to illustrate the diversity within the terms. The empirical materials in
this study consist of cases that have been through the justice system in Finland
under the label of human trafficking or abuse at work among migrant workers.
The crime of extortionate work discrimination (Finlex Work-based discrimination
code 47 (3)) refers to the exploitation of migrant workers due to their vulnerable
situation, their dependence on the employer, or their lack of Finnish language or
understanding of rights in Finland. The exploitation can include threats against
migrant workers and even human trafficking (Crimes against Freedom 25 (3), 25 (3a)).
The elements of codes 47 and 25 partially overlap with the criminal provision on
human trafficking depending on the seriousness of the crime.
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Additionally, the industry context affects the interpretation and, in Finland,
the restaurant sector has been one of the main areas of legal cases. Heima (2019)
reported on workers’ abuse in Nepalese restaurants: these workers were requested to
work 16-h days and the labor law regulations were not obeyed. Another abuse case of
restaurant workers was in the city of Kuopio: Hamalainen (2018) wrote that the owner
of two ethnic restaurants was sentenced to three cases of human trafficking. Recently,
Finland has experienced its first “pizza-gate” of illicit business practices.10 The police
generated a campaign to increase Finnish consumer awareness on pricing, work and
tax-related practices, suggesting that in the independent fast food sector, especially
the pizza business, if the price is lower than that what is considered appropriate
for a business to operate on profit, then consumers should question the legitimacy
of that price and offering and report it to police officials. This was the first formal
campaign to raise awareness and to educate civil society on gray economy practices
and increase broader societal audiences’ awareness to combat practices that do not
follow the appropriate schemes. This campaign received a lot of attention and was
discussed from various perspectives, including multiple case calculations showing
how the pricing is constructed when minimum salaries and all taxes are included.
The counterargument took place mainly from the perspectives of migrant business
owners who, as entrepreneurs, could not calculate a tariff salary for their work time
to remain competitive in the food sector, and also from the new entrepreneur point
of view, of offering special pricing to attract customers.
Typically, the HORECA (Hotel, Restaurant, Catering) business has a high degree
of manual labor and is among the key employer categories of migrants. In addition,
there are increasing numbers of ethnic restaurants and bars owned by migrants in
Finland. Several prior studies pointed out that service businesses, like restaurants and
bars, are typical entry-level businesses for migrant entrepreneurs (see, e.g., Waldinger
et al. 1990 on ethnic restaurant businesses; Altinay and Altinay 2006 on catering).
The type of work in this sector is often a subject of debates regarding the salaries
and duties, and the respective criteria for assessing those regarding the work of
less-vulnerable non-migrant employees. Hence, this sector is sensitive to exploitative
practices due to its specific nature and characteristics of work.
Beyond HORECA businesses, various service businesses employ large numbers
of migrants. For example, cleaning, building and maintenance, and other household
10 See more in https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-news-from-elsewhere-34515639 (accessed on 1
December 2019).
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services do not necessarily require notable language skills and act often as the
entry-level jobs for migrants. Pajunen (2014) reported that cleaning services are
among the jobs where migrant workers have been abused by being offered “a full-time
job” and given only part-time work. Additionally, there have been cases where
workers have not been paid according to the collective bargain made between the
employer’s union. However, the migrant workers do not usually know about the
unions and whom to contact.
The building sector has been at the epicenter of media attention. The foreignness
of many of the companies, resulting in questionable employment and work practices,
might be either unintentional ignorance or intent. There are numerous cases of
exploitative or illicit practices in employing or compensating migrant or foreign
workers in the construction business. “In Finland, the union representative of the
Construction Union goes around the capital city to check out the construction sites for
worker violations and abuse. He visits twenty construction sites per month. He finds
about 30 work violations in a year.” (Pajunen 2014), which means there were about
12.5% violations of all the sites visited.
Additionally, seasonal businesses in Finland, like berry picking, have had some
work abuse or work violations reported. However, not all these cases are found
legitimate. In 2014, Thai berry pickers went on strike and filed a lawsuit against
their employer. They also involved the local embassy and the Thai diaspora in the
discussion in Finland. The case was reviewed and the court decided they were
incorrect in their claims (Rönty 2014; Karjalainen 2014). The Thai pickers had arrived
on their own to be seasonal pickers; they were not hired or invited by the company
involved. Due to bad weather, there were not enough berries to be picked, thus they
did not get paid. The court decided that they were not eligible for wages or vacation
pay (Rönty 2014). This case shows that migrant workers are becoming more aware of
their rights when they are employed and are ready to fight for them.
Beyond formal legitimate work, there is the illegitimate side of work that
concentrates on businesses mainly under the radar of the governance systems.
Prostitution and dealing forbidden substances like drugs and prescription medication
represent some such businesses. Prostitution is a highly profitable field of human
trafficking and according to the Finnish Police and Statistics Finland, this is about a
EUR 100 million business every year (Santtu 2019). Previously, the exploited workers
were mainly vulnerable migrants from Eastern European or African countries.
Prostitution has been typically linked to international or transnational organized
crime and their networks. Moreover, unraveling these cases of international or
transnational human trafficking cases can take years. A recent case of sex workers,
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human trafficking, and money laundering took place in several European Union
countries. The investigation started in 2016 and ended with the capture of three
Finnish suspects in Spain in 2019 (STT et al. 2019). The leaders of this prostitution
and human trafficking ring lured young women into the world of prostitution by
promising them a good income, whereas the reality was that the leaders pocketed most
of the money themselves. This highlights that the victims are not necessarily from
a developing country or particularly disadvantaged; instead, there is an increasing
danger of transnational and smartly organized crime that builds on the resources of
the developed countries. This same article suggests that online prostitution services
seem to be easier to create and manage by the criminals, but harder to monitor,
control, and takedown by the authorities. These technological resources and the
transnational nature of the new exploitation and crime also highlights the danger
of illicit practices diffusing and directly affecting the local non-migrant population.
Besides the prostitution and the service business-related slavery, news reports
show that there are also drug users that are forced to commit human trafficking
crimes (Hannus 2018). These crimes can include organ or drug trafficking (Hannus
2018), which highlights the need to address these increasing dangers prudently and
effectively. These practices need to be tackled to hinder their shift and influence from
the criminal subcircles to the everyday civil society.
2.3. Challenges of Governance and Civil Society in Finnish Business
Another concern for governance is related to time and resources, not just the
effectiveness of the governance per se. Lan (2015) points out that legislation alone
is not efficient for de-rooting such phenomena. Governance needs to be linked to
the time windows of the phenomenon. For example, solving a human trafficking
case can take years. A recent conviction of a human trafficking case that started in
2013 and ended in 2016 involved an Indian pizzeria owner in the city of Vantaa and
showed the length of the process.
The novel types of illicit practices are challenging on many levels; they generate
additional needs for governance structures that monitor and also control the field of
such practices more preventively. Illicit actions challenge the views and absorptive
capacity of the civil society to deal with such practices and avoid societal divides,
especially when they are perceived as being late. Such practices influence the
overall perceptions of migrant workers, ethnic businesses, and ethnic enclaves
(e.g., Dana 2007). Furthermore, the bad reputation that results from these cases easily
transfers to other ethnic and migrant entrepreneurs who have nothing to do with
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such illicit practices. Legitimate entrepreneurs who follow laws and regulations have
started to feel the negative implications in their businesses.
The negative brand transfer may take place without any actual reason or fact,
just building in terms and categories such as “ethnic” or “restaurant” in the minds of
consumers. As a result, the economic success and profitability of these businesses
is negatively influenced. This may increase the pressure to develop new means for
increasing profitability and further push illicit practices, even if they were previously
not considered (e.g., Rath 2000). It is important to notice that many migrant businesses
are the primary/sole livelihood generators for the migrant families, and, in several
migrant communities and extended families, the responsibilities are far-reaching
(Heinonen 2010). This suggests that the semantics employed in combating illicit
practices and abuse are very sensitive and may turn against the legitimate migrant
entrepreneurs if not carefully considered in communication and public debates.
The official communication and related “grey economy” campaigns are also subject
to be misused in the political discourse as they may fit various agendas that do not
represent the formal governance views.
In addition to the fragile economic–entrepreneurial dynamics and political
sensitivity that influence the balances in local civil society, there is a challenge
related to the resource implications of governance that has both direct and indirect
dimensions. Directly, if just one human trafficking case in Finland takes years to
process, it will tie up resources from many officials, including police investigators and
criminal prosecutors. Government resources are limited, hence, only those resources
that are available will be allocated to these activities. Meanwhile, if the exploitative
and illicit practices grow faster, the governance institutions will not be able to
control the phenomenon and it will continue to diffuse. Indirectly, if the governance
institutions do not succeed in curbing negative developments and the civil society
begins to perceive and sense the implications of abusive practices more, the legitimacy
of the institutions’ actions will be questioned and the taxpayers will be less likely to
have a constructive attitude towards increasing funds for something that does not
seem to work. The ethnic and migrant entrepreneurs who follow good practices will
face further pressures, and the public opinion will become more negatively loaded.
This vicious circle is difficult to stop if it starts (Porter and Kramer 2019).
Simply the magnitude and pace of recent changes have set new demands
for all layers of institutions in host countries in responding to the vulnerabilities.
Many newcomers are not a priori trained and educated to know about the laws of
the host country and its institutions. This creates a window of opportunity for illicit
action. In the entry and integration process, there are transitions and liminal spaces of
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diverse vulnerabilities (e.g., Craig et al. 2015). These represent a potential disconnect
between governance and practice and there is only limited experiential knowledge
on closing this gap. However, such governance expertise and knowledge is essential
for a sustainable integration and settlement process.
In international business and entrepreneurship, this home–host country
discrepancy related to knowledge, experience, and resources has been addressed
through several concepts and terms (e.g., Johanson and Vahlne 2009), but mainly from
the firm or entrepreneurial perspective. Just like new firm entrants, new migrants face
an unknown territory of work-life and business operations with hazards. The entry
can be approached as a processual setting: pre-entry-, entry-, integration-, and further
development/settlement phase. The receiving host societies need to take care that
they update their administrative resources to address these new demands and
developments before illicit practices start to emerge into a problem in all phases.
Migrants are often conceptualized as the actors producing the crime, but in these
areas of illicit practices, like abuse, human trafficking, and slavery, they are typically
the unknowledgeable victims (e.g., Elo and Juntunen 2015). Those who act illicitly
are often co-ethnics or other migrants, but also local, non-ethnic businesses, and this
may build on proactive transnational mechanisms (e.g., Shelley 2010).
Examples from other countries, like Germany, suggest that due to the
impermeable boundaries of some ethnic enclaves, clans, or even locational aspects,
many of these practices do not appear on the labor markets or formal economy,
but remain unseen, below the level of governance or civil society awareness for too
long.11 This refers to the development of a parallel society. The reasons for such
developments are manifold. One reason, on the institutional side, is the lack of
competences and cultural insights, even language skills, to examine and govern
enclave structures and economic functions. Lots of these crimes might go undetected
due to the delimited official resources, and the resources are mainly not adequately
“ethnic” to tackle these issues without extra effort (Peterson and Uhnoo 2012).
Another problem is the underdeveloped but necessary institutional capacity
and holistic coordination, especially in new receiving countries or peripheral areas.
As human trafficking can have many faces, it is sometimes difficult to identify and
see it. In Finland, few agencies are involved, usually one at a time, in identifying and
detecting human trafficking, and this has not been a noticeable phenomenon like in
11 See more in https://www.cicero.de/innenpolitik/brutale-familienbande/41463 (accessed on
2 December 2019).
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some other countries. According to Hannus (2018), the increasing total number of
human trafficking has also led the Finnish Government, namely the police and border
control, to update their system and train their employees on how to recognize victims
of human trafficking. This training also includes cooperation between different
officials and victim support groups.
It is vital to address the potential victims a priori and educate them before they
become lured into exploitation. For example, U.S. embassies already give information
against exploitative practices and abuse during the visa application process and the
United States has diverse hotlines and non-governmental agencies to support victims
of human trafficking. In new receiving countries like Finland, there are multiple
institutions and government agencies involved in increasing awareness of work
conditions and support systems. However, the victims usually lack language skills
and do not have a support network (STT et al. 2019), the financial resources, or the
travel documents to leave their situation. These victims and their family members in
the country of origin could also be threatened with violence if the victim does not
cooperate. Addressing this problem is a major challenge as the solution cannot be
resolved by just one country. Transnational and collaborative governance is the key
to solving such forms of organized crime that span country borders.
In recent years, the number of attempts of organized illegal immigration
(including aggravated assault) has increased in Finland, which highlights the need
for advanced responses. According to Laitinen et al. (2016, p. 25) “the suspects’
nationality is usually from Iraq, Sweden, Syria, Somalia or Russia”. The numbers
have increased; in 2014 there were 385 and in 2015 2355 people illegally trafficked to
Finland (Ibid.). Ucnikova (2014, p. 4) reported that “an estimate of USD 124 million
is spent each year on modern slavery in the OECD countries”. However, she also
argues that there is no common terminology, and thus, it is difficult to obtain exact
figures. All these aspects indicate how multifaceted and difficult a phenomenon this
is to tackle. A combination of formal institutional attention with support from civil
society and its “preventive” awareness may diminish the negative pattern building
and create more visibility on the potential gaps.
3. Findings
Despite extant laws and regulations, there is still a fraction of businesses that
have paperless and illegal workers or have abused foreign workers or commit other
foreign worker-related financial crimes. Instead of casting shadows on legitimate
businesses, effective governance practices and employment guidelines are needed.
However, due to the limited number of officials and their investigative resources,
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their total number in Finland is unknown. Only the reported and solved crimes are
in official statistics, although not all the reported crimes result in any convictions.
Recent findings trigger concerns on the application of regulation and laws for
all. The key concern lies on the governance system that has not closed illicit windows
of opportunity. In 2018, there were twelve cases involving a sort of modern-day
slavery work in the hotel and restaurant industry in Finland, and eleven cases in
other industries, where the employer had told the officials that the worker did not
work in that location, but the parameters of the employment were fulfilled. In 2018,
the challenges relating the foreign workers are still the hours that the workers actually
work compared to the payment of work done (Vero 2018a). In 2018, tax officials found
1100 illegal workers, but the officials agree that they cannot identify all the illegal
workers (Vero 2018b). In the era of transformation of work, where work becomes
more fragmented and virtual, also more entrepreneurial and flexible, there will be an
increasing demand for governance to catch up and address loopholes for exploitation
(e.g., Rubery 2015).
We found dual-multiple layers in economic structures—with and without
governance—like in Callebert’s work (2014). Furthermore, according to the Central
Organization of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK), there already existed a risk of a two-layer
system in the capital city area in 2014, because of the difficulty of controlling immigrant
employment, and the employers have, e.g., required their immigrant employees
to sign unusual work contracts with requirements for “loyalty to the employer”,
not usually used in Finland, that can require excessive working hours (Pajunen 2014).
One of these reported restaurant employers is a trendy restaurant Vapiano, which had
not paid the Estonian workers according to the Finnish work laws (Pajunen 2014).
We identified key governance actors and the landscape of potential protection
against abuse. As a result, we draw an illustration of the actors. Figure 2 presents
a summary of organizations in Finland that deal with migrant workers: the police,
the border control, and the customs are usually the first contact point when dealing
with asylum seekers and immigrants. Then later on, when they have entered the
country, trade unions or local employment offices are the next points of contact and
they can check if the work conditions and salaries are paid according to the Finnish
laws and regulations. If any of these previously mentioned officials find out that there
is a victim or suspected victim of human trafficking, they can start the investigation
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Ministry of Economic Affairs  
and Employment
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Figure 2. The Finnish organizations in contact with foreign workers and asylum
seekers. Source: Authors.
4. Discussion
The methods that the government officials use to tackle the work violations
among migrant workers and human trafficking are discussed next. First of all, there
is cross-organizational training to recognize human trafficking and its victims, and to
offer help via support organizations for the victims. Secondly, the unions work with
the employers and officials tackle these problems. They investigate and report work
violations and other crimes to the officials. However, the host societies have limited
resources in unions and also within the police and tax administration to proceed
more effectively. In addition, it takes time from the initial findings to prosecution
and sentencing. It can take several years, and during this time, the employer can be
involved in other crimes.
The unions and the officials offer online training and reports to educate the public
as well as migrant workers and employers. The police also had a “grey economy”
marketing campaign to fight financial crimes in businesses. These also made the
civil society and consumers more aware of the abusive practices and financial crimes
that can happen, especially in small businesses under the radar. We argue that the
processes around illicit practices have their own distinct dynamics.
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Hence, conceptual clarity on such practices is a starting point. We reviewed the
current features on two main types (see Figure 3 that presents the differences and
similarities of human trafficking and abuse at work).
Human trafficking Abuse at work
• Legal or fraudulent documents
• Documents taken (controlling the victims)
• Legal or illegal border crossing within one 
country or across international borders
• Coercion
• Exploitation of the victims
• Individual as commodity
• Crime against the individual
• Crime against the host country if fraudulent 
documents were used or if the border crossing 
was illegal
• Purpose: commercial sex trafficking or labor/
services trafficking
• Legal or fraudulent documents
• Documents taken (controlling the victims)
• Legal or illegal border crossing
• Coercion
• Exploitation of the victims
• Individual as commodity
• Crime against the individual rights
• Crime against the labor laws of the host society
• Purpose: low-cost worker/slavery
Figure 3. Summary of the differences and similarities in human trafficking and
abuse at work. Source: Authors.
5. Conclusions
Theoretically, we suggest that there are distinct situations (e.g., pathways) and
cases of illicit practices related to abuse, human trafficking, and slavery that need
to be addressed carefully and specifically. The study underlines that this illicit
and abusive behavior in business is by no means some historical phenomenon or
triviality; it is also not something that is confined to poor developing countries.
On the contrary, we claim that institutional “ignorance” in developed countries may
serve such behavior by not closing loopholes or taking governance needs seriously,
and thus letting abusive profit-making happen under illegal conditions.
For policymakers, the growth and maintenance of such abusive practices
with financial implications reduces tax income, increases the divides, and creates
social problems and negative traditions, undermining the legitimacy of the state.
A cost–benefit analysis of regulating abuse could be an approach for the government
officials to start with, as this has worked well in several advanced economies.
Competitiveness of a country is linked to well-functioning institutions and a healthy
economy that supports positive innovation and internationalization (Tung 2008;
Kumar et al. 2013). Hence, the calls for less government to generate higher
competitiveness and entrepreneurial energy can be seen as rather welcoming for
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abusive practices too, given that “gray economies” and illicit practices mushroom
and grow faster as they do not pay the contributions that others pay.
Entrepreneurially, it is highly significant to avoid wrongdoing in the sense of
negative brand image that could transfer to small- and medium-sized enterprises
and family and ethnic businesses that are acting legitimately, trying to remain
competitive following the laws and regulations. Managers and owners of these
companies need support measures to differentiate between appropriate and illicit in
the eyes of their customers and markets. Participation in UN SDG 8 campaigns and
other identifications with legitimacy is suggested. Policies and programs educating
foreign-born entrepreneurs on how to apply local laws and regulations can be
improved to reduce possibilities of misunderstanding and institutional illiteracy.
Simplified processual “driving licenses” for Finnish employment’s rules of the game
targeting employers and employees could foster a learning process, especially when
available in English and other needed languages.
This paper is limited to a discussion on one country only, with a rather
limited percentage of foreign-born people. It is also debating data from the legal
system and statistics. Future research avenues could explore the establishment and
profit-making mechanisms of abuse for a more detailed understanding of these
practices. Longitudinal processual studies are needed that cover viewpoints from
diverse stakeholders as efficient governance of work practices is difficult without the
involvement of stakeholders. The emergence of non-governmental organizations
and other civil society actors also deserves research attention, replacing some of the
state’s tasks in many contexts.
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“Business as Part of the Solution”: SDG 8




The UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were adopted by all UN Member
States in 2015 with a time horizon of fifteen years to achieve them. The 17 Goals
and 169 targets, which form the core of Agenda 2030, aim to effectively address the
social, economic and environmental challenges of the 21st century by embarking
on a global partnership designed to tackle the environmental, social and economic
dimensions of sustainability simultaneously. Unlike prior global initiatives to save
the environment (Rio Convention) or to eliminate poverty (Millennium Development
Goals), the SDGs are the product of a joint effort that included high- and low-income
countries as well as stakeholders from civil society, academia, government and
business. The outcome is therefore based on a more inclusive process and, with it,
enjoys more global legitimacy (Sachs 2015).
However, criticism about the alleged inconsistencies and contradictions of the
goals, and its targets and indicators abound. There are indeed several overlaps
and trade-offs between the different goals and their respective targets (Barbier and
Burgess 2019).
Moreover, the indicators designed to measure progress on the different
targets are perceived by some stakeholders to be rather crude or even misleading
(MacFeely 2019). Moreover, the lack of data availability and lack of means to
implement the ambitious goals, especially in low-income countries, will be a major
challenge to measure and promote real progress (Barbier and Burgess 2019).
Yet, the SDGs represent a very useful global framework of orientation, and,
more important, they stand for a paradigm shift in the sense that the private sector
should cease to be merely seen as part of the problem, but envisioned as part of the
solution (Scheyvens et al. 2016).
The UN Sustainable Development Goal 8 (SDG 8) on inclusive growth and
decent work is at the heart of this paradigm shift. It is built on the insight that
improving the material well-being of the most vulnerable people will require more
investment in entrepreneurship and innovation on the local as well as the global level
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to enable inclusive and sustainable economic change. For that purpose, governments
need to design facilitating policies that encourage businesses to invest in scalable
innovations that address urgent sustainability challenges and generate inclusive
prosperity (Juma 2016). This sort of people-centered prosperity requires a global
partnership and a bigger appreciation of responsible and innovation-driven firms that
understand that they do not operate in a vacuum but are part of society (Aerni 2018).1
Neither the Rio Principles on Environment and Development, nor the UN
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have put such a great emphasis on the
promotion of inclusive prosperity. In this context, SDG 8 is clearly a goal prioritized by
the majority of the world, the countries where population growth, poverty, youth un-
and underemployment and internal migration are still the main challenges in efforts
to embark on a transition toward sustainability. It is in these low- and middle-income
countries where most of the world’s population still lives in precarious conditions
and where most workers lack any kind of formal employment contract, which would
protect them from substandard working conditions that sometimes are equivalent to
modern slavery (Aerni 2015a; Stoll 2019). Moreover, it is in these countries, where
hundreds of millions of new jobs will have to be created by 2030, just to keep pace
with the growth of the working age population.
Yet, SDG 8 has also been denounced by advocates and scholars of the so-called
“degrowth” movement for being a sort of Trojan horse carrying “neoliberal” ideology
in the global sustainability debate (Carant 2017; Rai et al. 2019). The idea of “degrowth”
envisions an alternative economic system that is not built on the paradigm of economic
growth. As such, its advocates may praise the targets of SDG 8 that deal with equal
opportunity in employment (Target 8.5), the reduction of youth currently not in
employment, education or training (Target 8.6), the abolishment modern slavery and
child labor (8.6) and the protection of labor rights (Target 8.7). However, they take
issue with the targets 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 on promoting Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
growth as well as entrepreneurship and innovation to create a more diversified and
productive economy, especially in least developed countries (Frey 2017). They also
question the idea of “Green Growth” as it is embodied in Target 8.4 with its aim to
decouple economic growth from environmental degradation (Rai et al. 2019; Hickel
and Kallis 2019; EEB 2019).
1 See also comment by Paloma Duran, Director of the UN SDG Fund: https://www.sdgfund.org/
businesses-heart-sustainable-development-goals (accessed on 13 October 2020).
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If one believes that it is affluence rather than poverty that has to be stopped
in order to save the planet, then the opposition to targets 1, 2 and 3 of SDG 8
make sense. Economic development, as measured, among other indicators, by GDP
growth rates, is incompatible with the vision and goals of the degrowth community
for which GDP represents the harmful productivist logic that humankind must
overcome (Rai et al. 2019). The growth-oriented targets of SDG 8 also run counter
to the intention of the de-growth community to stop the alleged efforts to impose
Western capitalist thinking on the rest of the world, to acknowledge and appreciate
the value of unpaid work, especially done by women, and to debunk the view that
innovation would be able prevent environmental collapse (Kallis et al. 2018).
This book chapter addresses these concerns but also highlights the elitist and
paternalizing character of the degrowth mode of thinking. It reflects the viewpoint
of a generation that has grown up affluent and is tired of it, which makes sense
because affluence as such does not provide any meaning, orientation or identity
(Eysenck 1990; Aerni and Bernauer 2006).
Yet, the UN SDGs were not launched to provide post-material societies with
more psychological and spiritual well-being, as the degrowth community suggests
(Kioupi and Voulvoulis 2019). Instead, they aim to address global challenges related
to social exclusion, climate change and environmental degradation that have clear
material consequences for the less affluent on this planet. These challenges must
be addressed through effective public–private partnerships with the private sector
as the main driver of economic change and job creation. This is also why the
UN Secretary-General António Guterres called on all sectors of society to mobilize
for a decade of action,2 and not activism, as many contemporary environmental
organizations who also provide school material for education for sustainable
development (ESD) seem to imply (Kioupi and Voulvoulis 2019).
SDG 8 is very much at the heart of this action-oriented agenda called Agenda
2030. It is based on the insight that business is essentially what people do to make a
living and how they generate the means to care for their respective families and to
address the challenges that emerge within their respective communities. For ordinary
people, economic growth is not about ideology but opportunity. Once they benefit
from business opportunities, they are more likely to meet their essential material
needs and be able to care more about the future of the next generation (Aerni 2015a).
2 See UN Website on the Sustainable Development Agenda: https://www.un.org/
sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda/ (accessed on 13 October 2020).
69
Harnessing economic growth for inclusive and sustainable change, however,
requires well-designed institutional framework conditions that encourage
investments in scalable solutions that ensure an inclusive transition toward
sustainability (Aerni 2018). How this works will be illustrated by means of concrete
examples on how the global environmental challenges related to the ozone hole, acid
rain and industrial agriculture have been addressed in an effective and inclusive way.
2. The Importance of SDG 8 for UNCTAD
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was
established in 1964 in response to the demand from developing countries to address
unfairness in the global trading system and to promote development.
Raul Prebisch, the first secretary general of UNCTAD, pointed at the problem
with the terms of trade that largely favor high-income countries in international
trade and drive low-income countries into debt. After all, the Global South primarily
exports raw commodities, which face decreasing returns due to their low-income
elasticity as inferior goods. As such, they are unable to cover for the costs of
expensive capital goods imported from high-income countries to build up their
domestic economies (Love 1980).
The current Secretary-General of UNCTAD, Mukhisa Kituyi, a Kenyan, believes
that the solution to these structural challenges in international trade is not less
trade—as advocated by many left-wing civil society institutions and right-wing
populists in affluent countries—but better trade, fashioned by the principles of
inclusivity and equity.3
How did it happen that UNCTAD, an institution mainly concerned with
reducing global economic inequality and poverty, became a promoter of trade and
foreign direct investment (FDI) in low-income countries? This is probably because
the empirical evidence gathered over the past five decades clearly suggests that
low-income countries can benefit from international business if they create adequate
institutional framework conditions. These include smart domestic industrial policies
that attract FDI while also enabling technological and knowledge transfer (Juma 2011;
Juma and Yee-Cheong 2005). Evidence also shows that it is not market integration,
but actually a lack of market integration that accounts for most of the extreme poverty
in low-income countries (Hidalgo 2015; Bird 2019).
3 See blog written by Mukhisa Kituyi, Secretary-General of UNCTAD, on “Trade: a more nuanced approach”
published on 23 March 2018: https://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=1699
(accessed on 13 October 2020).
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Since economic empowerment is a core concern of UNCTAD, it has an
obvious interest in SDG 8 on inclusive growth and decent work (UNCTAD 2014a;
UNCTAD 2014b). It also explains why UNCTAD believes that promoting
entrepreneurship training (SDG 4.3 and 4.44), protecting the rights of women
entrepreneurs (SDG 5.5, A, B, C), investing in resilient infrastructure (SDG 9.1–5)
to support growth-oriented domestic business and improving access to technology,
capacity development (SDG 17.6–8) and trade (SDG 17.10–12) will greatly contribute
to inclusive development in low-income countries while also enabling them to
address their environmental challenges more effectively (UNCTAD 2018).
The importance of economic empowerment was already marginally present in
the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG 8 on promoting a global partnership
for development) (Juma and Yee-Cheong 2005). Thanks to the more inclusive
approach in the design of the UN SDGs, the issue has, however, gained importance.
Despite the popular view among donors in high-income countries that economic
growth is primarily a threat to sustainable development, they will have to respect the
fact that recipient countries tend to see it more as an opportunity (Aerni et al. 2015).
As signatories of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness5 in 2005, donor countries pledged
to respect the principle of ownership in development cooperation, which is all
about taking local priorities in recipient countries more seriously. The principle
was also reiterated by the OECD donor countries in the Busan Partnership for
Effective Development Cooperation6 and is best described in the first of the four
Busan partnership principles, which defines ownership of development priorities by
developing counties as follows: “Countries should define the development model
that they want to implement”. So far, there are very few indications that development
organizations who obtain their funding in high income countries would regard the
supposed beneficiaries in low income countries as their clients and therefore respect
their priorities (Aerni 2018; McCourt 2018).7
4 The Sustainable Development Goals consists of 17 Goals and 169 Targets. SDG 4.3. for example refers
to Sustainable Development Goal 8, Target 4. Sometimes there are also letters (A, B, C) in addition to
number that stand for particular targets to achieve a particular Goal.
5 See main principles of the OECD Paris Declaration: https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/
parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm (accessed on 13 October 2020).
6 See website on the Busan Partnership: https://www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/busanpartnership.
htm (accessed on 13 October 2020).
7 See also the author’s comment on the rhetoric of the German Minister of Development Cooperation:
https://punkt4.info/social-news/news/demokratie-braucht-eine-wirtschaftlich-emanzipierte-
mittelklasse.html (accessed on 13 October 2020).
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3. No Mention of a Paradigm Shift in the Global Sustainable Development
Report (GSDR)
The disregard of the ownership principle manifests itself also in the fact that
leading academic and civil society institutions, mostly located in affluent OECD
countries, are ignoring the demand for a paradigm shift in the SDGs.
The difficulties of integrating private-sector-driven entrepreneurship and
innovation into a more comprehensive view of sustainable change is most visible
in the recently published Global Sustainable Development Report (GSDR 2019)
entitled “The Future is Now: Science for Achieving Sustainable Development”.
The GSDR was one of the outcomes of the Rio + 20 Conference in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, on the “Future We Want”. Its purpose was to create a high-level political forum
on sustainable development (HLPF) that would also strengthen the science–policy
interface, building on existing assessments on the state of sustainable development.
After the UN SDGs were approved by the UN General Assembly on 25 September
2015, member states eventually decided that the report should be produced by an
independent group of scientists, appointed by the UN Secretary-General, once every
four years, to inform the UN General Assembly on the state of the SDGs.
Even though GSDR does a good job of describing the current state of global
sustainable development from a scientific perspective, it does not refer to any
paradigm shift associated with the insight that business must become part of the
solution. SDG 8 is only discussed in the context of targets related to labor rights
standards and the problem of child labor. Its call to generate inclusive economic
growth and to upgrade and diversify formal growth-oriented business is largely
ignored. In this context, the report fails to connect sustainability science to the role of
entrepreneurship and innovation as drivers of sustainable change, which explains
why there is no reference to the UN resolution 69/210 on entrepreneurship for
sustainable development.8 It also explains why the GSDR would not mention
anywhere that in many regions of this world, poverty, combined with population
growth, rather than affluence may still pose the greatest threat to the environment
and social well-being (Aerni 2015b; Hollander 2003).
8 The UN Resolution 69/210 on Entrepreneurship for Development was adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations on 19 December 2014: https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/69/210 (visited on
13 October 2020). It recognizes the important contribution that entrepreneurship makes to sustainable
development by creating jobs and driving economic growth and innovation, improving social
conditions and addressing environmental challenges.
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For most low-income countries, the expansion of the informal economy is not
just a manifestation of alternative “livelihoods” (a term used in the GSDR about
50 times) as some scholars suggest (Ruzek 2015). According to the International
Labor Organisation of the United Nations (ILO 2014), the informal economy is rather
a poverty trap, if not an outright indicator for stunted development. For most
young people who grow up in the informal sector, the likelihood that their improved
access to education will translate into better economic opportunities is tiny. Instead
they end up in most cases as self-employed daily laborers or in precarious informal
employment. As such, they lack a formal employment contract that would legally
protect their labor rights (Aerni 2018).
Moreover, they do not have any formally registered property that would enable
them to attract investment; and they lack access to social security and access to other
essential public goods (Aryeetey 2015). That is why SDG 8 addresses the protection of
the rights of migrant workers, particularly women migrants and those in precarious
employment (SDG 8.8). Improving the situation of these marginalized members of
society is of crucial importance to inclusive sustainable change. The focus on the
improvement of the economic situation of the vulnerable is also reflected in other
targets of SDG 8, such as 8.9 on promoting sustainable tourism, 8.10 on financial
inclusion and 8a on trade facilitation. They represent additional means to this end.
Despite taking stock of the global state of sustainable development, the GSDR
report rarely addresses these existential concerns of people in the majority world
that still struggle to meet their essential material needs because of lack of economic
prospects. As a consequence, the report tends to disregard the human-centered
approach of UN SDGs with its focus on the need of every human being to eventually
become integrated in business and society (Arts 2017). Instead, the GSDR focuses on
the description of sustainability challenges that are almost exclusively portrayed as
negative by-products of economic and technological change. This is odd, because,
after all, the SDGs are about People, Planet and Prosperity and not People, Planet
minus Prosperity.
4. Human Ingenuity Challenging the Malthusian Narrative of
Environmental Collapse
By framing material prosperity primarily as a threat to people and the planet,
the GSDR is well-aligned with the account on planetary boundaries in “Sustainability
Science” (Foley 2017; Folke et al. 2016). This account is based on the neo-Malthusian
narrative of the environmental movement of the 1970s predicting the limits to growth
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and the looming environmental collapse caused by population growth and the human
pursuit of material wealth (Meadows et al. 1972).
This narrative, however, has been challenged by the empirical work of pioneers in
sustainability research in developing countries such as Ester Boserup (Boserup 1981),
Alfred O. Hirschman (Hirschman 1992) and Jack Hollander (Hollander 2003), as well
as interdisciplinary scholars such as Jane Jacobs (1969, 1984), who explore the
sustainability potential of innovation ecosystems. Especially the ideas of Janes Jacobs
have been recently validated in research on life-cycle solutions (McDonough and
Braungart 2013; Rockström and Kulm 2015).
The baseline assumptions of Thomas Malthus were also challenged on theoretical
grounds by Paul Romer (Romer 1990), the Winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics in
2018, and César Hidalgo (Hidalgo 2015), one of the leading scholars in the new field
of economic complexity. They argue that population growth would indeed ruin the
environment, if you ignore the impressive track record of humankind in responding
to scarcity through technological and institutional change.9
In order to understand why population growth and increasing affluence have
not led to environmental collapse so far, one needs to take into account the role
of knowledge as the only non-scarce and, therefore, non-rival resource available
to manage the scarce resources on this planet. According to Romer, knowledge
creates social value only when entrepreneurial teams with the appropriate skills and
know-how are able to convert it into new goods and services that address particular
needs or problems in society (Romer 2010). As such, innovative entrepreneurial
teams may create new markets with large and often unintended positive external
effects for society and the environment (Aerni 2018; Naam 2013). In other words,
they may enable humankind to embark on a journey of sustainable intensification
that renders the concept of the so-called carrying capacity in ecology meaningless
when applied to the human species (Haberl and Erb 2017). This is, in essence, also
the argument of Ester Boserup (Boserup 1981), who pointed out that population
growth does not just create more pressure on scarce natural resources, but also leads
to a larger work force and more human brainpower to find innovative solutions to
scarcity problems and help restore prior environmental damage.
9 Cesar Hidalgo refers in this context to the law of entropy that would predict all things alive move
towards disorder and eventual disappearance. This also applies to the human being as an individual,
but not to the species of humankind in general that makes use of information (knowledge and
know-how) passed on over generations, to create order, in the sense of converting natural space into
cultural space (Hidalgo 2015).
74
This is not to deny that innovations, which result in new markets with increasing
returns, do not generate negative externalities or cause re-bound effects that cancel
out the efficiency gains in production through the stimulation of more consumption
(EEB 2019). However, the net-impact of scalable innovation may nevertheless be
positive, especially when the innovation results in an affordable substitute for an
existing problematic product that causes large negative externalities (Naam 2013;
Kaiser et al. 2012).
Often, however, there is reluctance in business to invest in such disruptive
innovations that could potentially generate large positive external benefits for society,
especially because these benefits cannot be captured by the investing company
itself; they go to society at large. A second reason is organized resistance against
innovation that may threaten the social acceptance of a disruptive new technology.
Organized resistance is supported by incumbents in business that benefit from the
status quo (Juma 2016). In view of the high degree of risk and uncertainty related
to private sector investments in disruptive innovation, governments need to come
up with a long-term plan designed to lower institutional uncertainty and, with it,
increase the likelihood of business to generate a return on investment. In this context,
it must be ensured that a long-term government strategy cannot easily be derailed
with the next election (Mazzucato 2013).
5. Understanding the Popularity of “Degrowth” from a Historical Perspective
The community of scholar-activists who propose the normative concept of
“degrowth” as a sustainable alternative to the current growth-oriented global capitalist
system challenge the view that business can be part of the solution (Kallis et al. 2018;
Kallis et al. 2012). They tend to portray advocacy for technological change as a
reductionist approach (technological fix) that would not take into account “systemic”
thinking and thus produce irreversible unintended negative side effects in ecosystems
that may also have long-term economic consequences (Jackson 2009). The German
sociologist Arnold Gehlen (1988) argues, however, that there is no alternative to trial
and error in the history of humankind when facing existential scarcity problems.
As unspecialized deficient animals, human beings have to innovate in order to
survive in a particular ecosystem. These innovations may have negative unintended
consequences, which, once again, have to be addressed by further converting
natural space into cultural space through human intervention, but that is part of the
never-ending learning process (Gehlen 1988).
By disregarding this essential insight from philosophical anthropology,
the degrowth community may run the risk of embracing a reductionist approach.
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After all, it interprets this process of human development merely from an ideological
perspective, namely as an interplay of the expansion of capitalism and its opponents
who have historically preferred alternative economic systems (Kallis et al. 2018;
Latouche 2007). In consequence, their criticism of the UN SDGs mainly focuses
on the first three targets of SDG 8 because they suggest more rather than less
innovation-induced economic growth in efforts to create a more sustainable and
inclusive society (Carant 2017; Rai et al. 2019; Frey 2017; Gerold 2019).
The argument of degrowth advocates resonates well with a public discourse
on sustainable development in postmaterialist societies that is shaped by bipolar
baseline assumptions reflected in slogans such as “defending people’s interest against
profit”, “punishing big business for offending basic human rights” or “ending climate
change by ending capitalism” (Aerni 2018).10
The general view that global companies pose a major threat to human rights
by doing business at the expense of local cultural and economic rights is firmly
entrenched in the sustainability debate of affluent societies and remains largely
unchallenged in academia (Sikkink 2019).
The current defensive and polarized global discourse on sustainability may
also be understood as a response to the recent global crises. The financial crisis and
the subsequent food crises that took place at the end of the first decade of the 21st
century resulted in a general disillusion with the global economy and triggered a
longing for alternative economic systems that would be more sustainable, fair and
inclusive. In this context, the subsequent movements in civil society and academia
ranging from Occupy Wall Street (Sikkink 2019) to Food Sovereignty (Hardt and
Negri 2011) up to the latest Global Climate Strikes (Holt-Giménez and Altieri 2013)
are comparable to the emergence of the powerful social movements of the 1970s
(Aerni 2018; Wright and Nyberg 2019). Back then it was the oil crisis that triggered
an economic crisis combined with a confidence crisis in industrialized countries
(Bosse 2019), in addition to a food crisis in developing countries (Lipset and Schneider
1983). Advocacy groups protested against a Cold War elite mainly concerned with
industrial progress and military rearmament, but tended to ignore its environmental
and social consequences (Devereux 2000). There was already a lot of talk about the
limits to growth (Meadows et al. 1972), the risks of modern technologies, as well as
the lack of openness and transparency in business and government (Gottlieb 1993).
10 See article in the Guardian that illustrates the bipolar framing: https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2019/mar/18/ending-climate-change-end-capitalism (accessed on 13 October 2020).
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Moreover, there were discussions on alternative economic systems that would focus
less on economic growth and more on equality and social well-being—a sort of
third way between market economy and classical socialism (Šik 1976; Kalb 2002).
In this context, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)11 as an indicator of a country’s
level of human development was already a target of criticism. The arguments were
very similar to the ones voiced again recently (Boarini et al. 2006): GDP ignores the
distribution of income, does not take into account other quality-of-life factors, such as
literacy, life expectancy or treatment of minorities, ignores the value of unpaid work
and fails to factor in the environment costs associated with GDP growth.
The activists of the 1970s have successfully completed the march through the
institutions of democracy and the market economy and transformed them accordingly.
As a consequence, environmental issues and transparency in business and politics
have gradually climbed in importance on government agendas (Masood 2016;
Fiorini 1998). Moreover, the United Nations Human Development Program (UNDP)
has responded to the criticism regarding GDP rankings by adopting a human
development index in 1990, while Clifford Cobb and Hermann Daly launched
the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) and Robert Putnam the Indicator of Social
Health (ISH). They all depart from merely measuring a society’s total income and
its total expenditure on newly produced goods and services and focus instead on
the improvement of non-material aspects. Similarly, some eco-minded economists
have tried to add to the GDP an imputed dollar value of the benefits derived from a
healthy environment (Zürn 1998).
Yet, academia and civil society advocates of degrowth12 do not believe that
some amendments to the GDP will do because they find the general idea behind
the indicator to be flawed: the so-called growth imperative implying that economic
growth would be a panacea for all social and economic problems (Rai et al. 2019;
Costanza et al. 1997). This imperative would ignore the planetary boundaries that
humankind may eventually have to learn to cope with by stopping global economic
expansion and instead returning to a more local and autonomous caring-type of
economy (Jackson 2009; Raworth 2012).
11 According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the United States, the Gross domestic product
(GDP) is the value of the goods and services produced by the nation’s economy less the value of the
goods and services used up in production. GDP is also equal to the sum of personal consumption
expenditures, gross private domestic investment, net exports of goods and services, and government
consumption expenditures and gross investment.
12 Degrowth is defined by ecological economists as an equitable downscaling of throughput, with a
concomitant securing of wellbeing (Kallis et al. 2018).
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In this context, advocates of degrowth argue that there is a need to break the
productivist logic in modern capitalist society in order to restore a “decolonized”
vision of well-being as it is believed to have existed in all human cultures and
knowledge traditions prior to capitalism (Kallis et al. 2018). Such a return to the
roots would also stop unchecked environmental depletion as a result of an unfettered
materialist consumption culture (Rai et al. 2019). The idea of degrowth is also
present in many recent manifestos for alternative economic systems (Latouche 2007;
Paech 2012; Rifkin 2014; Jackson 2019). Some call for reforms of the existing capitalist
system, while others call for a revolution to topple it entirely. Most authors
advocate a radical change in lifestyle, becoming virtuous out of necessity by
embracing low-impact livelihoods that promote well-being and equality while
stopping environmental degradation (Kallis et al. 2018; Latouche 2010).
Degrowth demands are also related to feminist concerns related to gendered
forms of unpaid labor on which capitalism would rely, but not respect (Rai et al. 2019),
as well as food sovereignty concerns. The food sovereignty movement has identified
industrial agriculture as the main source of harm for biodiversity, food culture,
decent employment, food security and environmental degradation (Aerni 2011).
It advocates instead for a return to local food systems based on agro-ecological
principles (Holt-Giménez and Altieri 2013; Vivero-Pol et al. 2018).
Degrowth activists are also convinced that a reduction in economic output can
go hand in hand with more engagement in distributive justice and the promotion
of social equality (Kallis et al. 2018). It would simply require a set of integrated
policy reforms that compensate wage losses due to a reduction in working hours
by increasing hourly wages with a living wage policy. Moreover, a universal basic
income (UBI) could be introduced to mitigate the impact on small businesses that
would struggle paying higher hourly wages combined with dividends funded by
taxation on carbon, wealth, land value, resource extraction, and corporate profits
(Hickel and Kallis 2019; Victor 2008).
6. Déjà vu: The Affinity of the Youth Climate Movement to the Old Ideas
of Degrowth
In her dramatic speech to the UN General Assembly on 23 September 2019,
climate change activist and founder of the Fridays for Future Movement, Greta
Thunberg, very much endorsed the world view of the degrowth community when she
argued that “People are suffering. People are dying. Entire ecosystems are collapsing.
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We are at the beginning of a mass extinction and all you can talk about is money and
fairytales of eternal economic growth, how dare you!”13
Thunberg and her young fellow activists also take great care in ensuring that their
lifestyles are in line with their rhetoric and their post-material values. They practice
the art of low-impact livelihood in an affluent and materialist culture.
All this is admirable, and no one would question their idealism and the
authenticity of their struggle for a livable future. Yet, there has been a very
similar earlier environmental youth movement more than thirty years ago that
also equated environmentalism with lifestyle and resistance against technological
change and economic growth (Beck 1986; Braungart and Braungart 1990; Rifkin 1990).
This movement emerged in high schools in affluent countries in the 1980s, once
school textbooks and documentaries started to highlight the negative side effects of
industrialization on the environment, society and human health. Particular concerns
were the damages caused to forests by acid rain and the shrinking ozone layer
in the atmosphere (Clark et al. 2001). As a result, pressure for political action
increased and eventually led to the Brundtland Report outlining the principles of
sustainable development in 1987, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer, in force since 1989, and the first UN Conference on Development
and Environment (UNCED) in 1992 with its ambitious Agenda 21.
7. Technological Change Framed as an Opportunity to Facilitate New Forms
of Cooperation
The fourth industrial revolution was a term coined by Klaus Schwab in an
article in Foreign Affairs in 2015 (Schwab 2015). It refers to the convergence of
different technologies in the fields of robotics, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology,
quantum computing, biotechnology, 3D printing and the internet of things. Its impact
on communication and connectivity in society and the global economy in the
21st century is likely to transform life as a whole on this planet. There are the
doomsayers who predict that this will lead to the destruction of many traditional
industries, the devaluation of practical skills, the end of privacy and lots of
unemployment due to that fact that robots will execute almost any function
that humans currently perform. Yet, this line of argumentation ignores one
crucial fact: the human mind did not evolve by solving problems on its own
13 Transcribed talk by Greta Thunberg available online: https://unfoundation.org/blog/post/powerful-
speeches-un-general-assembly/ (accessed on 13 October 2020).
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but through “shared intentionality” enabling well-coordinated group collaboration
(Fernbach and Sloman 2017; Hosoya and Schaefer 2020). In other words, individuals
are meant to think and work in conjunction with the thinking and working of others.
The group intelligence that emerges from shared intentionality of people in pursuit
of a common purpose goes far beyond individual physical and intellectual skills and,
therefore, also far beyond the capacity of a robot.
Advanced techniques of deep learning may enable robots to do any job faster
and better than humans, but they will never be able to create new markets that result
in new jobs. These markets are always the result of shared intentionality combining
the different mental and physical skills of humans to achieve a particular outcome
(Fernbach and Sloman 2017).
New communication technologies can be harnessed to improve the ability of
humans to collaborate across space and time and to translate ideas into concrete
and safe products and services that help address specific challenges. As such, these
technologies are likely to become tools of economic empowerment and increase
appreciation for cultural achievements elsewhere, provided that the institutional
framework conditions and the physical and digital infrastructure are supportive of
such endeavors and inclusive by nature (Juma 2016; Aerni 2018).
8. Reimaging the Contribution of Urban Landscapes to Sustainable Change
New urban spaces that open up for the creation of a new type of industrious
city (Hosoya and Schaefer 2020) may serve as an enabling platform designed to
re-empower local business—taking advantage of advanced technologies, specialized
business services and standardized modules of production that have become
user-friendly and affordable. Such an industrious city may emerge in a former
industrial zone of a larger established city in a high-income country (Schaefer 2020)
or as a greenfield project in the form of a new city designed to better connect rural
areas in a low-income country with centers of prosperity (Aerni 2020). An emerging
new city can be envisioned as a special industrial zone offering all the amenities
and institutions to attract long-term investments, which then result in technology
transfer, capacity development and more investment in the production of domestic
goods and services, not just for the city with its global network but also for its rural
hinterland. Industrious cities must, therefore, be seen in the context of extended urban
landscapes integrating rural areas in a fruitful economic symbiosis. Such landscapes
comprise various levels of governance that set up coordinating bodies designed to
create institutional framework conditions that enable an industrious city and its
surroundings to thrive, create valuable new jobs and lower the pressure of migration
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(Aerni 2016a). According to Jane Jacobs, such cities prosper and expand if they
can achieve their purpose, which is reinventing urbanity as a location that enables
productive exchange directed toward the constant creation of new markets adding
new work to old work (Jacobs 1969). This purpose can only be achieved, however,
by overcoming the bipolar mindset in which business is denounced as an external
black box driving the introduction of new technologies and urban expansion at the
expense of traditional practices and local culture (Aerni 2018)
9. Public–Private Partnerships for Sustainable Change after the UNCED in Rio
in 1992
In retrospect, humankind may have failed to address certain challenges related
to biodiversity loss or global climate change that were identified during the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio
in 1992 (UNCTAD 2014a). However, there are also success stories that should
be acknowledged.
9.1. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
A good example of a success story is the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer; thanks to its effective phase-out management plan in 1987 to
get rid of Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), the cause of the existential threat of a growing
ozone hole in the atmosphere, humankind was able to avert the looming catastrophe.
The plan was implemented by a global public–private partnership providing crucial
support to enable poor countries to adopt affordable substitute refrigerants called
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) (Mäder et al. 2010). While HFCs are safe for the ozone,
they are also a powerful greenhouse gas. The Kigali amendment to the Protocol,
which entered into force on 1 January 2019, addresses this concern. It aims to replace
the use of HFCs with refrigerants that are less harmful greenhouse gases.
9.2. Acid Rain as a Result of Industrial Pollution
Acid rain also ceased to be a major environmental concern thanks to effective
action combining effective regulation and scalable innovation: sulfur dioxide (SO2)
and nitrous oxide (NOx) emissions, which were widely held responsible for the
phenomenon of acid rain, have been dramatically reduced in the last 25 years.
This was possible thanks to sophisticated filter technologies, flue gas cleaning and
catalytic converters in exhaust systems. Incentive-based regulation based on trade in
polluting permits helped to make the adoption of these technologies also profitable
for companies (Stavins 1995).
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9.3. Environmental Agreements Are More Effective If They See Business as Part of
the Solution
What these two success stories have in common is the fact that business became
part of the solution: through the capacity to innovate (e.g., CFC-free refrigeration and
filter technologies) and subsequently convert the innovative prototypes into scalable
business solutions, not just in developed but also in developing countries. In addition,
business contributed through the willingness to join public–private initiatives to
jointly tackle the challenges. Public sector leadership was important in coordinating
regulatory and facilitating policies with the most important stakeholders in business
and civil society to enable joint effective action (Naam 2013; Juma 1994; Aerni 2015b).
The two large UN conventions on climate change (Framework Convention on
Climate Change, UN FCCC) and biodiversity (Convention on Biological Diversity,
UN CBD) proved to be less effective. This may not just be related to the complexity
of the challenges but also a different mindset that shaped the discourse in the annual
Conference of the Parties (COP) of the conventions. They tended to implicitly frame
the challenges as the negative externalities of technological and economic change
that have to be regulated accordingly (Prins and Rayner 2007; Prathapan et al. 2018;
Aerni 2019a).
During the design of these conventions, it was not taken into account that
scalable technologies that may effectively help to substitute problematic products
and processes were not yet available (Juma 2016). In view of the absence of long-term
government initiatives to invest in future-oriented technological transformation,
the private sector was also reluctant to respond effectively to more strict regulation
through innovation (Goldstein et al. 2020).
Facilitating policies designed to enable change combined with coordinated
action with business and civil society would have been a way for governments to
address the challenge more effectively. However, neither the Kyoto Protocol on
climate change (an extension of FCCC) nor the Cartagena Protocol on biosafety
(an extension of CBD) foresee any concrete action plan on technology development
and transfer, comparable to the joint action plan under the Montreal Protocol
(Prins and Rayner 2007; Overmann and Scholz 2017).
In other words, the role of innovation and entrepreneurship as drivers of
sustainable change in business and society was not taken into account, either in the
FCCC or in the CBD; and, with it, the opportunities for business to develop a scalable
market for environmental goods were largely ignored (Aerni 2015b). The stakeholders
that dominated the agenda of the subsequent COPs of these conventions often put
ideology before pragmatic action. For example, by opposing the use of advanced
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nuclear technology and biotechnology in general, a concrete case-by-case evaluation
of different options related to these platform technologies was no longer possible.14
A balanced assessment of these technologies would have been more in line with the
basic principles of risk management that are meant to guide the application of the
Precautionary Principle (PP), which environmental activists otherwise very much
endorse (Aerni 2019b; Stefánsson 2019). After all, the PP is less about preventing
technological risk and more about coping effectively with global environmental
threats such as climate change by making use of all available options. In this context,
potential technological risks must be compared to potential technological benefits for
society and the environment, taking into account the rapid evolution of the respective
technology (Aerni 2019b; EC 2002).
10. The Problem with Education for Sustainable Development
According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) aims
to “empower learners to make informed decisions and responsible actions for
environmental integrity, economic viability and a just society, for present and future
generations, while respecting cultural diversity”.15 Even though no one questions
the urgency to teach sustainable development, the concrete content of teaching is
kept deliberately vague. It is about “promoting core competencies, such as critical
and systemic thinking, collaborative decision-making, and taking responsibility for
present and future generations”. However, what this exactly means is left to teachers,
who will be free to select educational material that reflects their personal normative
views of sustainable development.
10.1. Predominance of Schematic Views and Lack of Critical Evaluation
Contemporary educational material on sustainability issues in high schools tends
to rely heavily on visual sources taken from social media and research documentaries
on business and the environment (Alyaz et al. 2016). This material is often normative
in nature; it is associated with advocacy for community solidarity, spirituality and
14 See Interview with Calestous Juma on 23 May 2015 at the University of Zurich: https://www.news.uzh.
ch/de/articles/2015/technologische-umbrueche-provozieren-immer-kritik.htm (accessed on 13 October
2020).
15 See https://en.unesco.org/themes/education-sustainable-development/what-is-esd (accessed on
13 October 2020).
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traditional knowledge that is believed to contribute to the “unfinished enlightenment
project of reason” (Fadeeva and Mochizuki 2010).
Often the discourse on ESD in academic journals lacks any critical self-reflection
by comparing stories told in class with actual empirical evidence gathered in the
field (Winter 2007). As a consequence, educational material is based on schematic
views that do not contain any critical evaluation of prior successes and failures on
environmental challenges (Aerni and Oser 2011). Moreover, they tend to portray
the use of the Precautionary Principle mainly as a tool to protect society from risks
resulting from economic and technological change rather than a tool for responsible
and balanced risk management (Winter 2007; Aerni 2013).
10.2. Green Consumerism: Dividing the World into Good and Bad Choices
Empirical research on sustainability textbook content reveals a tendency to frame
the issues as a binary ethical choice (Kowasch and Lippe 2019), also associated with
“green consumerism” (Moisander 2007). It implies that “you”, as an individual and
consumer, have the power to change the world through “your” choice (Rieckmann
2017). Pick the product with an ethical label that stands for your social values on
human rights and the environment, and shun products from corporations that have
been shamed for undermining these values. While choosing the more expensive
product that carries an ethical label also reflects a psychological need for virtue
signaling (Orlitzky and Monga 2018), avoiding products from boycotted companies
is linked to the phenomenon of ecological scapegoating (Schmitt 2019). As such,
green consumerism helps to reduce complexity and provides meaning, identity and
a normative orientation. This affective brand identification also makes it easier to
re-tell the stories to others (Casidy et al. 2019). Yet, such consumer choices may reveal
more about the need to signal one’s prosocial status to others than genuine effort to
address global sustainability challenges through concrete collective action (Miller
2001; Luomala et al. 2020). Because green consumerism is so easy to communicate
and causes individual well-being, companies often make use of its schematic views in
green marketing strategies to insinuate to consumers and customers that they would
share their sustainability-related values (Aerni 2013; Autio et al. 2009). Textbooks
embrace such views for the same reason: it is easy to tell a good story.16
16 “Globi”, a popular Swiss picture book series suited for children in elementary school builds on such
easy to tell schematic views. Globi is a jolly parrot who always draws some moral lessons from an
experienced adventure. In the Globi edition “the smart farmer”, Globi is told by a female African
subsistence farmer that organic agriculture is more sustainable than conventional agriculture. This is
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10.3. Become an Activist! Role Models Communicated in ESD
The use of visual media in schools, such as documentaries, tend to follow
a “win-win” logic, similar to the one of green consumerism. It is designed to
generate a good return on investment by responding effectively to the viewers’
need for meaning and orientation (Hirsch and Nisbet 2007). Often, the collection
of facts is guided by an approach called selectivity bias (Slater 2007) or application
hermeneutics (Langewand 1999). It carefully selects the facts to ensure that the story
being told and its core message are clear and unambiguous, and embedded in a
convincing narrative with emotional flow (Nabi et al. 2018; Nabi and Green 2015).
Incidences that would contradict the core message tend to be omitted or voiced
by someone who cannot be trusted. Often the dramatization and personalization
reduce research documentaries to a theater play containing actors with good motives,
e.g., environmentalists defending “nature” with its endangered species, indigenous
groups, and actors with bad motives, e.g., business executives that would like to
make profits at the expense of people and the environment (Aerni 2018). In most
cases, agency is assigned to NGOs that claim to act in the public interest as well as to
the business-oriented perpetrators, while local people and their environment merely
provide the “natural” setting in which the action takes place (Rangan 2000).
Most award-winning environmental documentaries or stories about
environmentalists, such as “Erin Brokovich: A True Story” by Steven Soderberg
in 2000, “Darwin’s Nightmare” by Hubert Sauper in 2004, “We feed the World” by
Erwin Wagenhofer in 2005, “The World According to Monsanto” by Marie-Monique
Robin in 2009, “This Changes Everything” by Avi Lewis and Naomi Klein in 2015, or
“Bruno Manser: The Voice of the Rainforest” by Niklaus Hilber in 2019, use a narrative
that heavily relies on ecological and social scapegoating to mobilize the affective power
of the movies (Plantinga 2013). All these movies convey the message that the world is
being cannibalized by predatory profit-seekers and that an alternative world is possible
if we have the courage to fight for it. In other words, become good and sustainable by
becoming an activist! It also illustrates the emotional power of providing adolescents
with a normative orientation (Aerni 2018; Aerni and Oser 2011; Slater 2007).
Even though the movies claim to be based on a “true story” or “investigative
journalism”, they tend to work more with negative emotional frames than facts.
illustrated in the third picture in the e-book, see https://www.tierwelt.ch/news/unterhaltung/ein-ganz-
schoen-schlauer-bauer (accessed on 13 October 2020). The authors of “Globi” were collaborating
with the Swiss NGO Biovision and it proved to be not just a good story but also good marketing for
Swiss-based initiatives to promote organic agriculture.
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Experimental research showed that negatively valenced messages in fact facilitate
a stronger relationship between narrative involvement than positively valenced
messages, which are processed by a more cognitive route (Cooper and Nisbet 2016).
Often, the focus on creating more narrative involvement through negative feelings
in research documentaries may also be due to the growing commercial pressure to
entertain rather than to inform (Soppe and Pershina 2019).
The negative emotional frames often used to provide a normative orientation
in ESD and heavily rely on ecological scapegoating (Schmitt 2019), which tends to
entrench rather than overcome stereotypical patterns of reflection on sustainability
and limit the potential of solution-oriented cooperation beyond like-minded groups.
This may to some extent explain the anti-business rhetoric by Greta Thunberg
and other young contemporary activists for social and environmental justice.
They largely associate economic growth with environmental disaster, which explains
their skepticism about SDG 8 with its implicit suggestion that business must become
part of the solution.
11. “Degrowth” as Applied in Agricultural Policies Has Not Led to
More Sustainability
The argument against technology-driven economic change in the degrowth
community is very much related to the concept of the agricultural treadmill proposed
by Willard Cochrane in 1958 (Cochrane 1958). In a nutshell, Cochrane argued that
farmers produce more thanks to economic and technological change. While these
productivity increases may benefit consumers due to lower food prices, they would
drive farm households into debt and harm the environment. In other words, farming
in times of economic globalization would represent a clear case of market failure that
requires state intervention. As such, the concept of the agricultural treadmill became
the main justification for generous state-support systems for agriculture.
Yet, agricultural subsidies and trade protection turned out to have even more
undesirable side effects for the environment because they tended to encourage the
overuse of input and monocultural practices (Aerni et al. 2011). It also caused negative
consequences for farmers in low-income countries who were not able to compete
with the subsidized agricultural exports from high-income countries (Aerni 2011).
That is why they are also described as transactions of decline by Jane Jacobs (1984).
In response to these negative side-effects, a system of direct payment has been
created in many high-income countries that is meant to decouple farm income from
agricultural production and to reward farmers for their other valuable functions in
society (e.g., decentralized settlement, environmental stewardship, domestic food
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security) that would not be remunerated by the markets. The concept behind it is
called multifunctional agriculture and its makes farmers the recipients of an almost
guaranteed income provided by the state (Aerni et al. 2009). As such it is comparable
to the universal basic income (UBI), an idea that the degrowth movement envisions
for society as a whole to break the “productivist logic” and restore the ability of
humankind to engage in meaningful and sustainable work, decoupled from any sort
of global market pressure (Ferguson 2013; Seidl and Zahrnt 2019).
However, since the system of direct payments for farmers is still a subsidy, it did
not lead to the decoupling of income from production (Aerni 2009). It also failed to
make farming more attractive for the young generations (Takayama et al. 2020) and
the positive impact on the environment was relatively low, even with the introduction
of eco-direct payments (Greer 2017; Whitfield 2006; Dempsey et al. 2020).
11.1. New Zealand: An Example of Making Business Part of the Solution in Agriculture
New Zealand, a high-income country where agriculture still matters in economic
terms, realized already in the early 1980s, that subsidies for farming will neither save
farmers nor will they protect animal welfare or the environment in the long run.
Instead, the country remembered the success story of the land grant college system
that was established in the United States in the 19th century to address poverty in the
countryside. The idea behind it was that a state with limited resources should bring
knowledge and investment to the countryside rather than subsidies. In other words,
the state should assume the role of a coach rather than a nanny by encouraging more
collaboration between research, farming and business and by promoting the new
products developed in the domestic agricultural system abroad to increase exports.
Despite problems of agricultural intensification, especially in the increasingly
dominant dairy business, agriculture in New Zealand remains overall less extensive
than the subsidized agricultural systems in Europe. New Zealand has also become a
leader in the development and export of environmental innovation in agriculture
(Saunders 2019). As such, the country was able to keep its image in tourism of being
“clean and green” while keeping the agricultural sector attractive for the younger
generation (Aerni et al. 2009). By reinventing the land grant college idea for the 21st
century, the country essentially falsified the Cochrane hypothesis.
What Cochrane failed to realize is the importance of making use of knowledge,
the only non-rival resource, to mitigate the impact of agriculture on the environment
and to create more value-added for farm products. In other words, knowledge-driven
economic and technological change may not always be part of the problem, but can
become part of the solution if institutional framework conditions encourage business
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to invest in sustainable innovation that proves to be scalable (Naam 2013). If it does
so, then the profits earned are actually important because they signal that investing
in sustainable solutions can also be profitable and therefore financially sustainable
(Aerni 2009).
11.2. The Global Knowledge Economy Makes Diversification through Innovation
More Inclusive
Agricultural reform in New Zealand was a sort of natural experiment. It proved
that business can be part of the solution in a sector that was largely discounted as the
victim of economic globalization. Once agriculture in New Zealand became more
open for business under well-designed institutional framework conditions, it also
became more diversified, more innovative in the field of sustainable agricultural
practices as well as in the creation of new agricultural markets (Saunders 2019).
Even improving animal welfare makes economic sense in New Zealand because it
is an added value for consumers. Moreover, in view of the mild climate in New
Zealand, it makes more economic sense for livestock farmers to let cattle graze
outdoors throughout the year and thus largely dispense with energy-intensive indoor
management and feeding (Aerni 2009).
What Cochrane did not take into account is that agriculture is not just a
commodity business with decreasing returns. If you let farmers, researchers and
the state become entrepreneurs who jointly invest in desirable new products and
services, then you create diversification through innovation (Etzkowitz and Zhou
2006) resulting in new markets with increasing returns thanks to a specific added
value (better for the environment, improved taste, more nutritious, etc.). The New
Zealand approach to agriculture proved that this is possible. In this context,
the global knowledge economy provides unique business opportunities to make
better use of knowledge to create innovation that does not just generate profits for
the innovating company but may also create large positive externalities for society
and the environment (Aerni 2018).
12. The Importance of Institutional Framework Conditions to Make Business
Part of the Solution
Institutional framework conditions play a crucial role in efforts to make business
part of the solution. Such framework conditions must go beyond the regulation
of harmful business activities but encourage a transition in business toward an
inclusive low-carbon economy. This would also require a mission-oriented approach
in which the state assumes the role of a risk-taking entrepreneur to build the basis
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for the next phase of growth and technological progress (Juma 2016; Mazzucato
2013; Sachs et al. 2019). Even taking into consideration concerns about rebound
effects, such an approach may be more effective in addressing global sustainability
challenges than merely relying on expensive regulation, subsidies or a universal basic
income (UBI) to reduce the negative externalities of harmful business practices and
job-displacing innovation (Nabi and Green 2015; Howard et al. 2019; Romer 2010).
A significant number of research publications illustrate how changing
institutional framework conditions have induced business to become part of the
solution throughout history (Juma 2016; Aerni 2018; Naam 2013; Mazzucato 2013;
Nordhaus and Shellenberger 2007; Collier 2018). Moreover, the empirical research by
Ester Boserup in Kenya suggested that a region with high population growth rates
does not necessarily have to fare worse compared to a region with low-population
growth rates (Boserup 1981). After all, it depends on the institutional framework
conditions that either encourage or discourage people to explore new forms of
environmental resource management. Finally, one of the primary lessons of the 20th
century was that the great famines took place almost exclusively in socialist regimes
with their focus on protecting agriculture from international trade and promoting
self-sufficiency (Boserup 1981; Wemheuer 2014; Nolan 1988).
This past experience with direct payments in agriculture in Europe, the
alternative path chosen by New Zealand with its idea of reviving the land-grant
college idea and the negative impact of the concept of self-sufficiency on food security
in socialist countries is of crucial importance to understand why SDG 8 matters from
an empirical perspective. It challenges the normative conceptions popularized by
the degrowth movement.
A Universal Basic Income Is Unlikely to Contribute to More Inclusiveness on the
Global Level
Degrowth advocates may see a great potential in addressing SDG 8, Target 5
(SDG 8.5) to guarantee decent work for men and women as well as equal pay
for equal value by introducing a UBI on the state level as a way to subsidize
work. This may be feasible for high-income countries with a strong economy and
a large tax base, but it will have unintended consequences; after all, it will not
be affordable to low-income countries that have to create a strong economy in the
first place to build up the necessary tax base for funding a UBI. In other words,
instead of global inclusive development, a UBI will most likely remain an exclusive
privilege of affluent countries. Inadvertently, it may create a two-class society within
high-income countries consisting of the privileged citizens who are officially eligible
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for a state-supported UBI, and the migrant workers from low-income countries who
do the work that no one wants to do anymore in high-income countries. After all,
they will not be eligible for a UBI but actually do the hard work in these affluent
societies (Aerni 2016b).
13. Concluding Remarks
The UN Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs) take into account the
past failures and successes in international efforts to cope with global sustainability
challenges. One of the major lessons learned from the past is that there is not just
market failure, but also state failure. Lots of social and environmental problems are
the result of wrong incentives created through government regulation. This was
illustrated in this chapter by using the example of agricultural policies in high-income
countries and the failure of the international community to address biodiversity
loss and climate change in an effective way. In return, it has also been shown
that public–private partnerships combined with favorable institutional framework
conditions can be quite effective in enabling sustainable change. Examples that
illustrate successful cases of collective action are the prevention of the expansion of
the ozone hole in the atmosphere and the reduction of polluting emissions in industry.
Sustainable Development Goal 8 (SDG 8) builds upon these insights and
recognizes the importance of innovation in enabling inclusive growth, more decent
work and a decoupling of economic growth from environmental degradation.
In this context, dynamic urban economies play a crucial role as drivers of economic
diversification and sustainable change in rural and urban areas alike.
As such, SDG 8 represents a pragmatic and practice-oriented approach that is
based on trial and error in the search for scalable solutions. Such solutions may only
provide provisional relief since nature and humankind continuously evolve and with
it, new challenges emerge that have to addressed with new approaches by future
generations (Naam 2013).
SDG 8 also reflects the fact that for the majority of the people on this planet, who
live in low- and middle-income countries, poverty rather than affluence is still the
main enemy of sustainable development (Hollander 2003).
Economic growth and economic diversification through innovation (SDG 8.1/8.2)
are therefore crucial in offering a future for those who cannot invoke any formal
rights because they are not formally employed or are economic migrants with
hardly any legal protection outside their country of origin. Correspondingly,
development policies that support entrepreneurship and formal market development
(8.3), investments in the domestic economy that stimulate job creation and reduce
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youth unemployment (8.5/8.6), and policies that protect the economic rights of
migrant workers and those in precarious employment (8.8) contribute substantially
to the targets of SDG 8. They are designed to reduce poverty and deprivation through
the promotion of more inclusive societies.
In this context, one could argue that achieving the targets of SDG 8 is key
to achieving all the remaining goals. After all, if the income of the poorest of
the poor improves, their access to essential human rights, such as food, shelter,
education, health treatment and political participation are very likely to increase as
well. Moreover, empirical evidence, based on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow
1954; Maslow 1968) shows that once the essential material needs are covered, concern
for the future of the next generation and the environment increases too (Winston 2016;
Brandt et al. 2015; Jacobs 1994; Wilson 2018). This also explains why almost all the
other SDGs contain at least one target that refers to business as part of the solution.17
High-income countries in Europe and the United States successfully addressed
these existential and material issues associated with targets of SDG 8 at an earlier
stage of economic development and are now more concerned with post-material
needs (Aerni 2018).
This may explain why the current global discourse on sustainable development,
as well as the teaching material used for “Education for Sustainable Development”
(ESD) and largely shaped by stakeholders in affluent countries, contains an implicit
anti-business rhetoric. The narrative is based on the view that global economic and
technological changes primarily serve the needs of business, often at the expense of
essential human needs and the environment. This may also explain why normative
theories related to “degrowth” are very popular. They imply that each of us can
contribute to save the planet by defending our values against business interests,
embracing a more frugal lifestyle and by becoming responsible consumers (green
consumerism). This normative approach in ESD provides meaning, orientation
17 The following targets refer directly or indirectly to business as part of the solution: SDG 1.4 on
economic rights, SDG 2A,D,C on the promotion of agricultural investment and trade, SDG 3C,D on
investment in health infrastructure and capacities for managing health risks, SDG 4.4 on promoting
skills for entrepreneurship, SDG 5A,B,C on promoting the economic empowerment of women, SDG
7B on expanding infrastructure and upgrade technology for supplying modern and sustainable energy
services, SDG 9 on promoting sustainable industrialization, SDG 10 3/6 on empowering economic
rights and enhanced representation of developing countries in international economic institutions,
SDG 11.3 on inclusive urbanization, SDG 12.6 encourage business to adopt sustainable practices, SDG
14.7 on increasing economic benefits to low-income countries by promoting sustainable fisheries and
aquaculture, SDG 15.1 on the promotion of sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, SDG 16.3 on
promoting the rule of law and equal access to justice and SDG 17 on public–private partnerships.
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and identity in an increasingly complex world, but it may fail to help address the
real sustainability challenges of the 21st century, including the current COVID-19
pandemic, because it does not recognize that business is an essential part of society.
An effective approach to respond to the growing global challenges cannot consist
of asking poor people to stop their plans to provide for a better material future for
their children. Instead, the focus should be on the transformation of business into a
driver of sustainable and inclusive change and the creation of decent jobs. This is
of particular importance in view of the current job losses caused by the COVID-19
pandemic in low-income countries. It is estimated that the pandemic will cause
1.6 million workers in the informal economy to lose their livelihoods.18
Recognizing the value of inclusive business for sustainable change may, however,
require a change of mindset recognizing that business is always part of, and not
apart from, society. Based on this insight, the public discourse as well as classroom
discussions on sustainability would be more about realizing opportunities through
innovation and less about merely preventing risks through regulation. In order to
realize opportunities, the state must provide incentives to induce people to take the
risk to invest in an alternative future. This view is endorsed by the UN institution
that is generally associated with the voice of the developing world, the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). As described in this
paper, it endorses the view that business can become part of the solution if effective
institutional framework conditions are in place. Such framework conditions mobilize
entrepreneurship and innovation for inclusive and sustainable change and discourage
environmentally and socially harmful practices, not just in business, but society as
a whole. This very practical and pragmatic approach embodies a clear call for a
decade of joint action and is likely to be more effective and humane in achieving the
UN Sustainable Development Goals than the normative approach, which tends to
confuse action with activism.
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Memories of a Practitioner: Ciba–Geigy Crop
Protection Activities in Indonesia in the
1980s, an Example of Local Embeddedness
Dino Sozzi
1. Introduction
In this chapter, I draw on my experience as a crop scientist and former manager
for Ciba–Geigy and in later years its legacy companies Novartis and Syngenta.1
My aim is to demonstrate the connectivity between the commercial activities of
the global company Ciba–Geigy in developing economies such as Indonesia, and
the concurrent transfer of useful soft skills and good practices to local society and
specifically farmers, eventually resulting in a more efficient use of scarce natural
resources, new local economic ecosystems and the creation of new jobs. The chapter
sets the stage with a description of the situation after World War II, with its challenges
of food security around the globe.
In Indonesia, Ciba–Geigy’s crop protection business model profited from
this set-up of industrialized agriculture that was pushed by the so-called “Green
Revolution”, an international initiative mainly sponsored by public sector institutions
to address the global food security challenges in view of rapid population growth.
The company won large contracts with the Indonesian Government, to deliver and
apply by aircraft rather indiscriminately crop protection products over vast tracts
of land. The owners of the fields, typically small rice farmers with holdings of
0.5–1 hectares of paddy land, were not really involved in the process. While the
“Green Revolution” approach certainly helped overcome the rice production deficit
and rendered Indonesia self-sufficient in rice production by 1985, it became obvious
in the early 1980s that this “one treatment fits all” policy had a number of serious
1 Ciba–Geigy was formed in 1970 by the merger of J. R. Geigy Ltd. (founded in Basel in 1758) and
CIBA (founded in Basel in 1859) (pharmaphorum). The merged company was mainly active in
pharmaceuticals, textile auxiliaries, and plant protection agents. In 1996, Sandoz, the other Basel-based
pharmaceutical company, and Ciba–Geigy merged to form Novartis (pharmaphorum). In the year
2000, the agro business divisions of both Novartis and AstraZeneca (Swedish–British pharmaceutical
company) were divested to create Syngenta that produces agrochemicals and seeds and is based in
Basel. Since 2017, Syngenta has been owned by ChemChina, a Chinese state-owned enterprise.
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draw-backs. While farmers were mostly seen as, and pushed to be, rather passive
adopters of subsidized products and technologies, the government faced increasing
budget constraints that eventually made the subsidies unaffordable. Other negative
side effects of this public-sector-driven approach to agricultural modernization were
the overuse of agrochemicals and fertilizers, and the replacement of many traditional
rice varieties by few high-yielding varieties that encouraged monocultural practices
and increased the risk of new pest outbreaks.
Once the Indonesian Government decided to put a stop to all agrochemical
subsidies, Ciba–Geigy was forced to rethink its business strategy. As a consequence,
the company eventually discovered the farm household as the new direct customers
for a sustainable business and commenced to engage with its members in its very own
interest. This started with local initiatives such as farmer Field Days for thousands of
individual small farmers in Indonesia in the 1980s, followed by the development of
the Farmer Team Concept by Bill Vorley in the 1990s, eventually leading to the “Good
Growth Plan”, announced by Syngenta in 2013. While, in the 1980s in Indonesia,
Farmer Field Days seemed to be the obvious thing to do from a local business
perspective, Ciba–Geigy was still a long way from recognizing the company’s global
corporate responsibility that eventually led to the “Good Growth Plan” 25 years
later. Two years thereafter, in 2015, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were
published by the United Nations General Assembly, many of which were anticipated
by and reflected in Syngenta’s “Good Growth Plan”, aimed at sustainably managing
its business.
2. The Green Revolution
World War II had transformed the global geopolitical, economic and social
landscape. On the political side, borders were moved, new countries were created,
political systems were overturned and the “traditional” colonial systems of economic
exploitation got under pressure and started to shift. Economically, globalization
in its modern, capitalistic form started to rapidly expand, supported by advanced
production capacities developed during the wartime experience and technological
advancement, such as the development of shipping containers or airline systems.
And socially, with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the
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United Nations General Assembly in 1948 (General Assembly Resolution 217 A) a
new guideline towards a more humane world was adopted.2
Yet, the geopolitical situation after World War II was also characterized by the
growing confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The resulting
Cold War was also a battle over the hearts and minds in the so-called non-aligned
states, representing mostly developing countries in the Global South that were on the
verge of embracing communism, believing that it would address the concerns of the
poor in a more effective way. The United States responded to this challenge, among
others, by launching a global initiative, which was later called the ‘Green Revolution’
(Gaud 1968), to enhance agricultural productivity and improve food security in
non-aligned tropical countries. The aim was to demonstrate that the capitalistic
system was more effective in feeding a growing population and lifting people
out of poverty. The main promoter of the Green Revolution was Henry Wallace,
Vice-President of the United States under F.D. Roosevelt, who launched the Mexican
Agricultural Program with the support of the Rockefeller Foundation. Its purpose was
to promote agricultural modernization on the basis of the latest breeding technologies,
application of industrially produced fertilizers and the use of modern crop protection,
catapulting productivity of cereals and later rice way beyond the typical one to
two percent annual yield progress. In this context, it was the American Plant
Breeder Norman Borlaug who set the first milestone in the genetic improvement
of wheat in Mexico, by introducing more productive and resistant semi-dwarf
varieties that were made more daylight insensitive through shuttle breeding, to
be more adapted to different latitudes. His approach was then replicated in Asia
for rice. The introduction of the Dee-Gee-Woo-Gen (DGWG) dwarfing gene into
tall varieties of indica rice at the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the
Philippines (Swaminathan 2009) resulted in high-yielding varieties that responded
well to irrigation and fertilizer application and were less prone to falling over (lodging)
(Hargrove and Coffman 2006). Rice production in Indonesia, for example, increased
from 12 million tons in the early 1960s to 44 million tons in 1989 (Ricepedia 1989);
yields increased from 1.76 metric tons per hectare (t/ha) in 1961 to 4.25 t/ha in 1989,
equivalent to an annual yield increase of more than eight percent (calculated from
data on Ricepedia).
2 General Assembly resolution 217 A was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in
Paris on 10 December 1948. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/
(accessed 9 May 2020).
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The Green Revolution proved wrong the pessimists who argued that population
growth would outpace growth in agricultural production and thus lead to famine and
starvation, as reported by the economist Thomas Robert Malthus who predicted this
scenario already at the beginning of the 19th century. But it also had its downsides
since it encouraged monocultural practices with all its undesirable side-effects for
the environment and agrobiodiversity (Gómez et al. 2013). So, while Borlaug has
contributed considerably to save millions of people from starvation and certainly
deserved his Nobel Peace Prize, his approach also created environmental and with it
socioeconomic issues when applied on a large scale. In response to these shortcomings
of the Green Revolution, a paradigm shift took place after the end of the Cold War.
With the fall of the Iron Curtain (Iron Curtain refers to the border between Soviet
influenced Eastern Europe and democratic Western Europe before 1989) in 1989
and the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio in
1992,3 the focus moved away from the narrow production paradigm, more towards
a systemic approach to agricultural development that also takes into account the
exhaustion of resources, and the threat to biodiversity and the environment, from
human agricultural activities.
In response to this paradigm shift, “Sustainable Management” started to show
up in the agendas of political organizations and corporate meetings. Early discussions
were heavily biased towards the economic component and it took time for politicians
and top managers to accept the simple reality that the social and environmental
components in the discussions were of equal importance. In spite of early recognition
that urgent actions were needed, it took another 25 years until the SDGs were
approved by the United Nations General Assembly in 2015, getting rid of the
defensive attitude and accepting that the focus on economic development was the
main component for the slow progress on sustainability. And here my story goes
back to Indonesia.
3. Rice Production in Indonesia
In view of the success with Borlaug’s high-yielding wheat varieties in Mexico and
India, the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) was founded in the Philippines
to replicate the success for rice cultivation. It was established with the support of the
Governments of the United States and the Philippines and mainly financed by the
3 Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit was a major United Nations conference held in Rio de Janeiro in June,
1992, to align Member States on common goals and international cooperation on development issues
after the Cold War.
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Rockefeller and Ford Foundations. The rice genetic program was led by Te Tzu Chang
(1927–2006), a prominent Shanghai-born agricultural and environmental scientist.
He had first studied agriculture and horticulture at the Nanking University, received
an MSc from Cornell in 1954 and a PhD in plant genetics from the University of
Minnesota in 1959. He is the father of IR8, the first “Green Revolution” rice variety
released into South East Asian (SEA) countries in 1966 (Hargrove and Coffman 2006).
IR8 was a cross of PETO, then the most important Indonesian tall rice variety, with
DGWG, an important Taiwanese dwarf variety (Hargrove and Coffman 2006).4 IR8
was followed by a number of improved IR varieties, such as IR36 and IR64, both with
Rice Brown Plant Hopper (BPH, Nilaparvata lugens) resistance. At the time (1960s),
Indonesia was the world’s largest rice importer and depended heavily on supply from
mostly regional neighbors such as Vietnam or Thailand, but still the average supply
of calories was way below basic requirements (personal information). Rice shortages
were then part of the general economic malaise that contributed to the fall of President
Sukarno in 1966 (Coleman et al. 2007). The new regime under General Suharto
(1967 to 1998) decided that economic development must have precedence over all
else (Coleman et al. 2007). The first priority was to invest in the productivity of food
crops such as rice, the primary staple food, to achieve self-sufficiency (Manning 1987).
Suharto saw the big advantage of the industrial approach to rice growing and forced
Indonesian farmers to abandon their traditional forms of agriculture (Manning 1987).
This in turn leads to the erosion of local rice growing and religious traditions,
more dependence on seed, fertilizer and crop protection suppliers and started
to fundamentally change the very traditional Indonesian society (Manning 1987).
These changes were very much in the intention of the Pancasila doctrine which had
been proposed by Sukarno and followed by Suharto,5 to move Indonesia away from
4 “IR8-288-3—which was eventually named variety IR8—was a semi-dwarf rice, about 120 cm tall
with strong stems that held the plant upright, even when heavily fertilized. It was also non-sensitive
to photoperiod, or day length, scientists would later learn. That meant it could be grown in many
latitudes, at any time of the year” (Hargrove and Coffman 2006, p. 37).
5 “Pancasila is the official, foundational philosophical theory of Indonesia. It had been presented
first in 1945 by Sukarno to the Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Independence (Badan
Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan (BPUPK)) and defined the five principles of Pancasila”
(Schindehütte 2006). “The principles include: 1. Indonesian patriotism; 2. Internationalism
emphasizing justice and the virtue of humanity; 3. Deliberative consensus emphasizing a form
of representative democracy in which ethnic dominance is absent and each member of the council
possesses equal voting power; 4. Social Welfare premised on the theory of the welfare state and
emphasizing popular socialism, and; 5. A Divinity that is an ultimate unity (a formulation that can be
seen as implying both monotheism or pantheism, thereby allowing space for all of Indonesia’s major
religions)” (Schindehütte 2006).
107
its historic colonial structure towards becoming a modern society and independent
nation (the five principles include: nationalism, internationalism, democracy, social
prosperity, belief in god), to lead Indonesia out of its colonial history and become a
“modern” society (Schindehütte 2006).
Suharto understood well that cheap rice was key for political stability and thus
gave high priority to rice production. Despite continuing rice shortages and price
increases in the early years of his regime, its success in obtaining large amounts
of foreign aid for rice imports and in rehabilitating BULOG (Badan Urusan Logistik,
the rice purchasing and price stabilization agency made directly responsible to
Suharto) began to show results as rice prices (and the general cost of living index)
began to stabilize in the late 1960s (Timmer 1975, pp. 212–16). BULOG’s purpose
of providing food security mostly to government staffwas extended to become the
safety stock holder and most important rice trader in Indonesia. This included import
and export management, rice stock management and price guarantees. BULOG thus
became politically very important to stabilize the emerging modern society of city
dwellers, albeit generally at the cost of the traditional society of (rice) farmers
The most significant factor in the increase in output and productivity of rice was
the rapid spread of high-yield rice varieties (Hargrove and Coffman 2006). They were
promoted together with subsidized fertilizer, pesticides, and credit through the “mass
guidance” or BIMAS (Bimbingan Masal) rice intensification program (Manning 1987).
This extension program also offered technical assistance to farmers unfamiliar with
the new cultivation techniques. Government investments in irrigation had also made
a significant contribution to increased rice production in Indonesia, also allowing a
second paddy crop to be grown during the dry season (Manning 1987). The BIMAS
program, besides being an outlet for heavily subsidized fertilizers and crop protection
products, was setting up public extension services in the form of teaching and training
programs for farmers, designed to help adapt modern rice growing techniques into
the traditional Indonesian village structure. In this context, young students spent
time in remote villages, educating farmers on more advanced rice growing practices.
In 1969, the Jatiluhur irrigation project was started to irrigate 240,000 hectares of
rice around Cikampek, in the highly fertile coastal plain of North Java, one hundred
kilometers east of Jakarta. This project is related to my former activities at Ciba–Geigy
in Indonesia.
4. Ciba–Geigy’s Original Business Model
These heavy investments in improved infrastructure and rice production systems
paid off well for Indonesia, leading eventually to rice self-sufficiency in 1985
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(Manning 1987), stopping the currency from further devaluation. For farmers,
the change was fast, drastic and often difficult to understand and follow. Ciba–Geigy,
at the time an important supplier of crop protection products to Indonesia’s BIMAS
system, decided to become more active in this lucrative market and Ciba–Pilatus
(a collaboration of CIBA Agro and PILATUS Stans) was founded in 1959,6 with the
aim to commercially apply crop protection products. While active in other counties
as well (e.g., Sudan for cotton), Ciba–Pilatus started to work in Indonesia from a small
air field in Karawang, half way between Jakarta and Cikampek, in the fertile Jatiluhur
irrigation zone, to treat rice, in close cooperation with government organizations.
This worked well for Ciba–Pilatus and went on throughout the 1960s and into the
1970s, with financially good results, probably some questionable business models
and definitely not much discussion with individual farmers.
At the time, Ciba–Geigy opened a small experimental field station in Cikampek,
to support their activities. In the late 1970s, with farmers being better trained,
the government wanting more independence from international companies and
indiscriminate aerial application becoming too costly, the spraying activities of
Ciba–Pilatus were ceased. Ciba–Geigy, however, continued to sell large quantities of
crop protection products to the Indonesian Government. Consequently, the small
experimental field station in Cikampek became Ciba–Geigy’s first science-driven
agricultural experimental station in South East Asia in 1978. As of 1982, with the
appointment of my predecessor Rudolf Guyer,7 the first expatriate leading scientist at
the station, Ciba–Geigy started to heavily invest in the site, developing an up-to-date
infrastructure and introducing modern field trialing and management methods. Most
work at the time was dedicated to traditional herbicide and insecticide development
mainly in rice, and, around the time when I arrived, activities were extended to also
6 The Ciba–Pilatus Aerial Spraying Co. of Switzerland utilized for many years, besides other
aircraft types, the Pilatus PC-6 Porter STOL (Short Takeoff and Landing) utility aircraft which
had been equipped with spraying equipment (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pilatus_PC-6, accessed on
10 May 2020).
7 Rudolf Guyer (1953–), a Swiss citizen with a MS in agronomy from ETH Zurich, Switzerland and a
PhD in weed science from the University of Hohenheim, Germany, worked for Ciba–Geigy and its
follower companies Novartis and Syngenta from 1978 until 2008 in various R&D and commercial
functions. He managed the Indonesian R&D organization of Ciba–Geigy from 1982 to 1986. He later
established the crop protection industry organization CropLife Africa Middle East and served as their
Director from its establishment in 2002 until 2017. Today, he is an independent agricultural consultant,
offering his experience in crop protection and project management through his firm AgriConsult AG,
based in Bülach, Switzerland.
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include fungicide and biocontrol products, and covering additional crops such as
corn and vegetables.
5. Business Model Adaptation
During that same period, the Rice Brown Plant Hopper (BPH), originally a
minor issue in rice due to broad genetic resistance in the local varieties, had become a
major problem, which led to the introduction of the above-mentioned BPH resistant
varieties IR36 and IR64. In a short time, however, BPH resistance broke down and
the pest developed into a real problem. As was soon understood, this was due to
resurgence, a phenomenon where the heavy use of broad spectrum insecticides such
as the prevalent OP’s (Organo-Phosphate insecticides) at the time, certainly would
kill the pest but at the same time also killed most of the over one hundred known
predators of BPH, leading to a hyper fast recovery of BPH in absence of any natural
enemies. With this knowledge in mind, the Indonesian government stopped the
supply to farmers of heavily subsidized and therefore overused insecticides, as of
11 November 1986.8
For Ciba–Geigy, this meant that the existing simple business model of selling
large quantities of pesticides to the Government became obsolete overnight. As a
consequence, the time of easy catering to one large customer (i.e., the Government)
was over and in due time the roughly 30 million individual Indonesian farmers
became the new focus of attention in Ciba–Geigy’s Indonesian business.
6. Embeddedness Effects
In retrospect, the government decision was very sensible, not only to get rid of
the heavy financial burden for the subsidies, but also to take care of all the corruption
typically ensuing such a regulated set-up (Manning 1987). On top, this allowed rice
management practices to be pushed towards Integrated Pest Management (IPM)
principles, relying on a variety of methods to limit pesticide use for the control of
insects, plant diseases and rodents. Not least, such a development allowed farmers
to regain some of the individual responsibility to manage their own affairs, that had
been stripped off from them during the whole “development” process.
While the woes in Ciba–Geigy were mostly in our marketing and sales
organization as the company had lost its one customer and sales went from close
8 For more information see https://www.cbd.int/financial/fiscalenviron/indonesia-subsidyfuel.pdf
(accessed on 10 May 2020).
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to USD 100 million per annum to less than USD 5 million overnight, Research and
Development (R&D) suffered a lot less of a set-back, as this part of the organization
had a given spending budget that was not tied to the country sales and at the time did
also include a lot of work for other South East Asian (SEA) countries. Already under
the leadership of Rudolf Guyer, the Cikampek station had started to collaborate
with a nearby government-run rice research facility, even though they were mostly
concerned with rice breeding. The first field days for farmers were organized in late
1982, where we invited local and regional farmers to visit our trials and explain to
them the opportunities and risks of crop protection products in their fields.
A typical field day would include about 200–250 farmers that were taken in
small groups through several different stations in the course of a day, including
safe handling of crop protection products, correct field application, demonstration
of crop protection products, explanation of IPM principles, followed by a general
discussion which was usually very lively. While these field days clearly had a
marketing perspective to overcome the government’s decision to stop supplying
pesticides and were aimed at establishing Ciba–Geigy as a supplier of crop protection
products at the farmer level, this was also the first time in Indonesia that we started
to interact with rice farmers directly.9 The fact that we had a well-established field
trialing station allowed us to do product development work and invite visitors to
demonstrate to them the results of our work.
It became clear very quickly that safe handling of crop protection products and
IPM principles were the major topics that needed to be addressed. This started with
the safe storage of chemicals, not an easy task in a one- or two-room bamboo house
without locks, or the use of labelled bottles, as often the local dealers would buy a large
bottle and repack it into small soft drink bottles, with the obvious risk of accidental
misuse. Applying the right amount of product in the right way and at the right time
(this included determination of treatment thresholds based on insect counts) was
another teaching topic, as the “more is better” attitude was prevalent among farmers,
historically driven by the availability of cheap subsidized agrochemical products.
And not least the use of some very simple protective measures such as the use of face
masks, rubber boots and washing after application were taught.
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, we usually had two farmer field weeks
per year, one in the dry season and one in the wet season, that were attended by over
9 At the time, foreign companies had no right to directly sell products in the country and had to go
through local importers and distributors. Only technical activities (i.e., R&D) were exempt from
this rule.
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25,000 farmers over the twelve-year period. This does not seem to be a lot in view
of the 30 million farmers in Indonesia at the time. But most of these farmers, many
of them from Java but some coming also from other islands, especially Sumatera,
were village elders/leading farmers that had great influence on the behavior of other
farmers at home. Upon returning from the field day, which often was a great event
in their life, they would sit on their bale (a kind of large local sofa) in front of their
house in the evening and educate their neighbors in the community, as it has been
the tradition in the Indonesian rural society, thus multiplying our efforts to many
more farmers. Often, upon visiting a village to look at trials, somebody would come
up to me, recounting the learnings and experience they had made on the field days.
Besides the farmer field days, every season we offered two to three internships
to excellent agronomy students, which were proposed by their professors from key
agricultural universities, such as Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta or the agricultural
Universities in Padang or Medan. They were selected by my close collaborator
Marjudin Kusnawiria, a senior Indonesian agronomist and plant pathologist in my
team, who had excellent connections into the local academic environment. Typically,
they were doing a small project, including field trials, under the supervision of the
various Ciba–Geigy specialists at the Cikampek station. For the students, this was an
extraordinary experience, being able to learn modern trialing technologies, to connect
with experienced Cikampek staff and working with an infrastructure which at the
time was usually not available at the universities. How important such an experience
was for these young people I only realized many years later. While on a field visit to
an oil palm plantation in Medan in 2012, more than 20 years after having worked in
Indonesia, a middle-aged man who was part of the plantation management team
came up to me and profusely thanked me for the opportunity he was given in the
1980s to do an internship at Cikampek, which he said had been a crucial experience
in his career.
Obviously, our R&D staff, all together between 20–25 people, were also part of
the embeddedness effects. Besides the fact that they were paid quite well, including
a health and pension plan, which at the time was far from being standard in the
country, they regularly travelled in Southeast Asia and beyond. Being experts with
international exposure (at the time a rare experience in Indonesia), they became
sought after specialists in their country.
We also hired daily laborers on a seasonal basis, typically about 50–100 people
from neighboring villages. While they had relatively low salaries, the equivalent
of USD 50–150 per month, it did bring into the local economy a steady stream of
cash and allowed many children to go to school properly fed, dressed and equipped
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with the necessary books which had to be provided by the parents. When building a
second station at Lembang, in the highlands of Bandung, earth work totaling over
2000 cubic meters, was done by hand. It was marginally more expensive than using
a bulldozer, but it provided 100 jobs for a whole year to local villagers and prevented
destroying the delicate volcanic soils structure of the site by heavy equipment.
The most memorable part of my time in Indonesia started, when Bill Vorley came
to join me for a year (1988–1989).10 He was an IPM expert and had joined Ciba–Geigy
shortly before. I spent many evenings in his house in Cikampek, where we enjoyed
lengthy discussions over a cold Bintang beer, talking about the development of
small farmer agriculture in Indonesia and comparable economies. I was not very
knowledgeable at the time about IPM or sustainability (“Sustainability” was just
starting to become a word of the standard vocabulary, as a consequence of the
Brundtland Report, (Brundtland 1987)) and learnt many things from him which
would later influence my own thinking. He was an unorthodox practitioner and
thinker and led an experimental program on our station, focusing on IPM approaches
for rice pest control. To locally make best use of our trial data and with his deep
knowledge of IPM, he sat together with a dalang (a traditional Indonesian shadow
puppet player) and scripted an educational story on how to properly grow rice in a
modern, IPM driven way. The wayang kulit (literally leather puppet) show was then
played in many villages around the station and enjoyed very much by the village
communities, as a piece of entertainment that at the same time was very educational.
And I remember that sometimes, when I was invited for a meal in a modest farmers
hut, the kids would challenge their father to wash his hands before the meal, referring
to what the “Good Farmer” in the puppet show had taught them.
7. Discussion
Even though the word embeddedness had been coined by Karl Polanyi
(1886–1964) already in the middle of last century, I was not even aware of its existence
when I was working in Indonesia, let alone its application to our activities there
as a large global company that was essentially present to do business transactions.
Embeddedness, as a term and as an inherent part of corporate activities in a specific
10 Bill Vorley (1957–), a UK citizen with a Bachelor in Applied Biology from the University of Bradford,
UK, and a PhD in Applied Ecology from the University of Southampton, UK, worked for Ciba–Geigy
from 1985 until 1994 and was part of the Indonesian R&D team, 1988–1989. He is presently linked
to the IIED (International Institute for Environment and Development, London, UK) as a Senior
Associate and works as an independent consultant from his home in East Sussex, UK.
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economy, only came to my attention recently, when working on joint projects with
the Center of Corporate Responsibility and Sustainability (CCRS) at the University
of Zurich (Aerni 2018; Schluep 2019). It made me reflect on my times in Indonesia, at
a time when the local economy was still very traditional and most people neither
had the education nor the experience and understanding of how to make use of
what a global player, represented in their economy, could offer them, beyond strictly
transactional business.
To be fair, even I did not really see or reflect much on the soft potential of
what my company could offer to the local economy. It was more of a spontaneous
approach, originally driven by business needs and probably to some extent influenced
by my experience as a student, reflecting the “Zeitgeist” of the 1960s. Moreover,
looking back, I would probably be more critical of the rather opportunistic approach
of Ciba–Geigy in selling whatever governments wanted to buy in countries like
Indonesia. But, in retrospect, everyone eventually learns and becomes smarter.
Multinational companies must generate revenues and the way they earn them largely
depends on the institutional setting, which they themselves cannot really influence.
Nevertheless, Ciba–Geigy, with its embedded commercial activities in Indonesia,
had some lasting positive effects on the local society and economy, also thanks to the
changing institutional setting at the end of the Cold War. Here are just some of the
most obvious examples:
It started with the building of an R&D team of locally educated people who
then were exposed to a global network of agricultural experts, within and outside of
the company, vastly expanding their knowledge, experience and exposure to “other”
ways of running business, doing research and connecting to the farming economy.
They were closely connected to local academia through presentations and lectures
to students and the internship programs, thus passing on their expanded personal
experience to a whole generation of young Indonesian agricultural students. And I
remember well the coaching sessions in proper Indonesian behavior and language
I received from the team before giving my first lecture on fungicide resistance
management to a body of students at the prestigious Gadjah Mada University
in Yogyakarta.
A second important effect of the company’s activities was the injection of cash
into the rural societies around our stations. It may have been, relative to the size of
the country, a small token, but for the local communities it made a big difference,
especially in helping children’s schooling efforts. While schooling was compulsory
and free, parents often struggled to pay for the school uniforms and books as these
were cash out items.
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A third effect was our close interaction with the farmers. Field days were always
the highlight of the season, for the commercial team to prepare the list of invitees,
for the R&D team to set up the program and prepare the show trials and lectures,
and, of course, for the farmers who were selected to come to our research station in
Cikampek, as it often meant a refreshing break from their daily life activities in the
village. I was always impressed by their intrinsic knowledge of rice growing, their
keen interest to learn, and their ability to listen and observe. They were also very
active participants in the discussions and brought up many critical and interesting
questions, despite the fact that many of them had only limited formal education.
Personally, I believe that these field days were our most lasting and effective way of
connecting with the farmers and teaching them new insights into rice growing and
crop protection.
Of course, there were many other companies that left their imprint on Indonesia’s
economy at the time. My chapter is a very personal reflection on the most challenging
and interesting time in my early career and how I experienced it through my
company. It demonstrates that a company can contribute to decent work and
inclusive growth through local embeddedness, which is an inherent component
of any commercial activity pursued by a global company that sets up business
in a particular economic environment. It is in the self-interest of the company to
collaborate with local stakeholders and ensure that they co-benefit from corporate
investment. A commitment to local embeddedness is especially beneficial in a
developing country context, in which the transfer of soft knowledge and behavior
can be a stimulus to the local people and economy, way beyond the core of the
transactional part of business. My experience in Indonesia taught me many important
things about fruitful local collaboration, which I could later use again while working
in Latin America and Africa, as many of these farming communities were facing very
similar issues and were very open and keen to any kind of educational stimulus.
8. Aftermath and Outlook
My personal experience in Indonesia was not unique. Similar learnings had
been collected by Ciba–Geigy collaborators in other parts of the developing world.
Coincidently, there was growing pressure on the chemical industry, notably after the
explosion of Union Carbide’s Bhopal plant in India in 1984 and the Sandoz warehouse
fire in Schweizerhalle, Switzerland, in 1986. Driven by public pressure and supported
by in-house learnings, there was growing recognition at the company leadership level
of the importance of corporate responsibility and sustainable business management.
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Ciba–Geigy under the leadership of Dr. Alex Krauer,11 then President of the Board,
developed its Vision 2000 where the “triple bottom line” responsibility of economy,
environment and society was introduced for the first time (Vorley 2013). While the
strategy certainly was a step in the right direction, introduced through an extensive
collaborator training program and aimed at supporting an open dialogue with the
public, it was never incorporated to its full extent due to internal policy swings.
It was also focused too narrowly on efficiency increases as well as waste reduction
in production.
An equally important step toward a more responsible business behavior was
the establishment of the Farmer Support Team (FST) in 1991 in Ciba–Geigy’s Crop
Protection business, under the leadership of Bill Vorley. It was financed with CHF 2
million annually and its aim was to support and train small farmers in the developing
world of Africa, Asia and Latin America, obviously with the intention to gain
new customers, but just as much in the innovative spirit around the Vision 2000
to transfer knowledge and capabilities designed to make farmers more familiar
with “environmental and ethical product stewardship” (Vorley 2013) and advanced
methods in integrated pest management. While the project was not yet holistically
aimed at promoting sustainable agriculture at the time, it was the first time in the
company that a realistic and serious attempt had been started to address the problems
of small holders in the developing world. In spite of Vorley’s convincing arguments
and hard work and dedication to the project, progress was slow and the project was
under constant pressure from the more conservative faction of our organization. Not
surprisingly, Vorley left the company in 1994, frustrated over the slow progress and
continuous confrontations. Obviously, while these first attempts for a change in
thinking were made in Ciba–Geigy, the time for a breakthrough was just not ripe yet.
While working in Colombia in the late 1990s though, I was lucky to have a
strong FST in place and relied heavily on it for small farmer education and training,
late proof of the solid base that had been laid out by Vorley. In the same years, it was
decided to phase out all the highly toxic OP’s, which at the time were the company’s
main-stay insecticides. The decision was controversially received and with all the
good intention at the time, it eventually took about 20 years to actually reach this goal.
Another aspect of the changing attitude in Ciba–Geigy was an increased focus on
biological products which culminated in the acquisition of Bioline AgroSciences Ltd.,
11 Dr. Alex Krauer (1931–), economist from Basel, Paris and London School of Economics, PhD in
Political Sciences from the University of Basel, was a longstanding Ciba–Geigy manager and President
of the Board at Ciba–Geigy 1987–1996.
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Colchester, UK in 1992. The business developed nicely over the years, but always
constituted only a small portion of Ciba–Geigy’s agrobusiness. This was not really
due to a lack of interest but rather the complexity of the biologicals business and the
incompatibility with our chemicals business model.
After the formation of Syngenta in 2000, sustainable farming and small farmers
became a growing point of interest for the company’s agribusiness, not least
because there remained a large vacuum for the technification of agriculture in
developing economies, including a substantial business potential. And there
were also business opportunities in the developed world around the sustainable
management of agriculture under the pressure of growing regulatory constraints
and increasing customer expectations. In 2008, the first “Forum for the Future of
Agriculture (FFA)” was held in Brussels by Syngenta, together with the European
Landowner’s Organization, to “create an open platform, where all stakeholders
interested in contributing to a more sustainable agriculture system could come
together and debate and share knowledge and expertise on how this could be
achieved” (Forum For Agriculture 2020). The FFA constituted the start of a real
breakthrough in Syngenta, where sustainability issues in agriculture, problems of
farming communities and consequences for society at large were publicly addressed
and discussed. The learnings from these meetings, not least the strong public reaction
to this “coming out” of Syngenta eventually led the company into the launch of its
“Good Growth Plan” in 2013.12 The plan’s six key focus points are:
• Make crops more efficient
• Rescue more farmland
• Help biodiversity flourish
• Empower small holders
• Help people stay safe
• Look after every worker
With the “Good Growth Plan”, Syngenta as the legacy company to Ciba–Geigy
for the first time introduced a fully integrative plan for the sustainable management
of its business and the relationship with its customers. The plan, introduced in 2013,
has been successful and achieved its challenging goals by 2020, well within its set
targets. The plan is in line with Syngenta’s corporate responsibility position, and
12 For more information see https://www.syngenta.com/sustainability/good-growth-plan; accessed on
14 June 2020.
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its execution was monitored and audited by external stakeholders. It aligns very
well with the United Nation’s SDGs and fully encompasses SDG 8, decent work
and inclusive growth. So, finally, fifty years after starting to recognize the risks and
downsides of the “Green Revolution’s” industrial approach to agriculture, public
(SDGs) and private (Good Growth Plan) sectors have aligned around agreed base
principles of how an agricultural business has to be managed, not only from its strictly
economic, transactional aspect, but also from the local embeddedness perspective
to contribute to inclusive and sustainable growth and decent work, especially in
developing countries.
9. Conclusions
Looking back to almost 40 years of working in Ciba–Geigy and its legacy
companies, I only realize today how we were often caught by the moment, around
an exciting idea, a breakthrough or an opportunity, and at the same time blind to the
bigger context, or the consequences and impact on society at large. I do not want this
to be understood as negative critique or outright condemnation of the approaches
we took at Ciba–Geigy (or for that matter the industry at large). It is simply the
recognition in hindsight of how much we are all caught in the zeitgeist of societal
norms and limits, our wishes and projections, and our excitement.
Corporations are set up to earn money, not to resolve societal problems. They will
change over time as they recognize direct negative consequences for their business,
when societal norms move or laws (typically driven by the societal change) force
them into new behaviors. This was the case with labor laws in the 19th century,
sustainability in the late 20th century and climate change in the early 21st century. In
this context, the UN SDGs, with their emphasis on global partnerships, constitute a
great joint effort to further incentivize industry to contribute to sustainable change.
Education: During my educational years in the 1960s and 1970s, a time of
massive change, driven by the experience of a global war and its consequences,
the essential driver was economic growth. The recognition of the limits of unabashed
growth was at best dawning, sustainability was not a goal and compartmentalized
thinking was the norm. Meanwhile, full employment and decent work were highly
politicized terms embedded in the narratives of the two ideologies of the Cold War.
What we need today is a change in education in two critical areas: (1) A
consequent move from learning in compartments to learning that promotes
connectivity and contextual thinking, addressing risk and its consequence for the
environment and societal integration at all school levels. I am aware, of course, that
this is to some extent wishful thinking, limited by financial and political constraints,
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but I am convinced that it would constitute a useful long-term investment that
would benefit society, business and the environment alike. (2) Introduction of
integrated management, leadership and responsibility training at all levels of higher
education. This would give young leaders the vocabulary and base understanding of
the inherent virtues of SDG 8 and positively affect individual and corporate behavior
in the long term.
Corporate: Financial goals are and remain critical when managing companies.
But there is more acceptance today of the fact that environmental and societal aspects
are integral parts of corporate management and many companies have embedded
them in their corporate strategy. Unfortunately, this process of recognition was rather
slow and consequential action even slower, often only under huge societal/legal
pressure. Additionally, views on how to politically integrate sustainable development
goals, including SDG 8, into societies, laws and education differ greatly across the
globe. In the long term, this issue can only be addressed by a dual strategy which
relies on (1) consequent integration of SDG-8-related topics into the educational
systems at all levels and (2) societal pressure (legislation and consumer behavior)
to hold corporations responsible for their commitment to sustainable and inclusive
change. In reality, we have to accept that such changes will never come overnight.
Effects of educational approaches take at least a generation to become effective and
societal changes tend to be rather slow, as proven by the SDGs which were approved
by the United Nations in 2015 only, although first recognition of the underlying issues
goes back to the 1950s and 1960s. We also have to accept that individual corporations
will respond differently to the expectations of society. Legal consequences have to be
applied systematically and have to bite to bring up the laggers and deniers.
Society: Societal processes are slow and cumbersome, driven by recognition of
critical facts and their acceptance and integration into behavior over time. Smart
leaders and visionaries at all levels can speed up change, just as much as conservative
thinkers and or profit oriented opportunists may slow it down, for economic or
political reasons. In view of the odds of all nations agreeing to a common base,
the adoption of the SDG principles seems like a miracle and is a crucial step in the
right direction. The UN SDGs have become a global reference point at all levels for
corporations to design their strategic goals and corporate responsibility plans, for
NGO’s to reference progress and point out deficits, for political structures to align
around and converge on common goals, for nations to design their legal frames and
for global organizations to hold each other responsible.
A critical societal issue that slows the roll-out of SDGs is the economic divergence
within and across nations. Affluent nations can “afford” to be more sustainable but
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at the same time they are the biggest consumers, while the poorer nations remain
essentially focused on economic growth, just to fulfill the minimum of SDG 8 goals.
There is clearly a responsibility but more and more also a self-interest of the developed
nations to support the less affluent world in developing through investments in
inclusive and sustainable change and thus contributing to a fairer sharing of wealth.
An awareness of the need to preserve our natural resource base in order to secure the
future of mankind will, in the end, be the critical driver for this process. So, while the
SDGs are a leap in the right direction, it will probably be another generation before
they are truly embedded in society and broadly adopted. However, the fact that they
exist is a great advantage to educate the younger generation against a set of globally
agreed principles that should drive sustainable and inclusive growth.
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On the 24th of April 2013 at 08:45 in the morning in Dhaka District, Bangladesh,
an eight-floor commercial building, known as Rana Plaza, collapsed due to a
structural failure. The building contained apartments, banks and clothing factories,
which produced ready-made garments (RMG)1 for major Western clothing brands
(BBC 2013). With 1134 deaths and 2500 injuries, the Rana Plaza incident was classified
as the deadliest structural failure accident in modern human history (Chowdhury
2017). The tragic accident received global attention, raising awareness of Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR) across global value chains (GVCs).
When the RMG industry first emerged in Bangladesh in the 1980s, it represented
one of the key sectors, which contributed to employment creation, poverty alleviation
and empowerment of women. However, as the sector expanded, it started to face
several challenges regarding compliance with international standards to ensure
workplace safety and adequate working conditions for its employees. This happened
for several reasons, among them the political and social instabilities of the country
(Barua and Ansary 2017).
The expansion of the RMG industry in Bangladesh exemplifies challenges
associated with the achievement of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 8, which
argues for “economic growth with full employment and decent work for all” (United
Nations General Assembly 2015, p.14). The consolidation of the human right to
decent work and economic growth is complex, especially in the challenging context
of developing countries. In these countries, the expectation to generate economic
growth can undermine compliance to human rights, especially for local small and
medium enterprises (SMEs) producing for GVCs.
The achievement of SDG 8 is strongly associated with the activities of
multinational enterprises (MNEs). MNEs that operate in GVCs can represent a
1 The ready-made garment industry (RMG) refers to the finished textile product from clothing factories
(OECD 2018).
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major resource for developing countries by boosting inclusive growth, creating better
job opportunities and consequently reducing poverty (World Bank 2019). On the
other hand, the expansion of these economic giants has to go hand in hand with
compliance with international rights and duties along the value chain. Only if this is
pursued correctly can MNEs facilitate the integration of international standards in
the local ecosystem of SMEs in developing countries and act as successful drivers for
economic growth and decent work.
From a wider perspective, challenges faced by transnational actors such as
MNEs, reflect the broader complexities of pursuing a global development agenda in
diverse local socio-economic contexts. This is the case for Agenda 2030, which has at
its core the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Despite the inclusive nature
of the SDGs, the different domains that are covered and their global range make the
implementation of the ambiguous goals not always straightforward, resulting in
synergies but also conflicts between and within the goals (Nilsson et al. 2016).
The implementation of global standards and goals is translated into the firm’s
business-level, through the adoption of its own Corporate Social Responsibility
practice and guidelines. These need to adhere to international, as well as
country-level expectations.
The multidimensionality of these tensions that MNEs are faced with in pursuing
a globally established sustainability agenda cannot be avoided because it is inherent
in the nature of transnational organizations. This raises substantial questions on
how to achieve such inclusive and sustainable growth when faced with complexities
stemming from the global, local and organizational level?
A first step to tackle this question lies in the understanding of the
multidimensional complexities faced by MNEs. Given these premises, the following
chapter gives an overview of the triangular relationship between global ethical
standards, local contexts and CSR guidelines faced by MNEs operating in developing
countries, with a perspective on tensions happening in and between the three levels.
The emphasis of the chapter is deliberately on tensions, given the contested nature of
the topic.
The aim of the review is synthesized in the following research question:
What is the current understanding of the triangular relationship, between global
ethical standards, the local context and CSR guidelines, faced by multinational
enterprises operating in developing countries?
The first consultation of the literature revealed that few studies deal with the three
dimensions (global–local–organizational) simultaneously, but rather examine the
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tensions between global standards and the local context or on the firm level separately.
To bring together these three dimensions, the chapter has been structured as follows:
The next section explains the method that was employed to consult the literature.
Part 3 of the chapter builds on the background for the review. It illustrates the
contribution of MNEs towards sustainable development and how this is positioned
in the overall discussion on the SDGs. Sections 4 and 5 present the results of the
review of international business ethics literature drawing on the debate on business
ethics and culture in cross-cultural contexts and trade-offs in CSR. After these three
descriptive units, a critical analysis of these two debates is presented in Section 6.
Hereby, literature gaps and corresponding avenues for future research are suggested.
The chapter concludes by presenting the main contributions and limitations of
the review.
2. Method
The literature pool addressing ethical considerations of MNEs operating in
developing countries is extremely wide and diversified in terms of disciplinary
contribution. Given the ethical focus on business, an international business ethics
perspective was considered the most appropriate to narrow down the review to
relevant articles.
The identification of relevant articles was pursued with in-depth research in a
sector-specific journal on international business ethics that possesses a comparatively
high impact factor score considering comparable journals (Journal of Business Ethics).
In addition, a more general search was run on Web of Science, JSTOR and Google
Scholar using the following research strings: multinational enterprises (MNEs),
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), international standards, local, cross-cultural,
developing country, sustainability, trade-off, tension, and conflict.
All articles were screened for relevance based on a reading of the abstracts
followed by the papers themselves. In the abstract review, articles were assessed for
their relevance on the topic and included in the review if they fulfilled the following
criteria: (1) take an international business ethics perspective towards MNEs operation
in developing countries, (2) focus on ethical tensions faced by MNEs operating in
cross-cultural contexts, (3) take a critical perspective on the concept of CSR and its
country variances, and (4) deal with relevant theories connected to the previous
points. Key publications in the field were retrieved with snowball consultations
of references.
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From a total of ninety screened articles,2 eighteen were selected for review by
applying the previously mentioned criteria: respectively, nine articles discussing the
relationship between business ethics and culture in cross-cultural contexts, as well as
nine articles on trade-offs in CSR.3
In this first phase of the review, the concepts of multinational enterprise and
Corporate Social Responsibility were defined, as they are relevant for gaining a
consistent understanding of the topic. A multinational enterprise is denoted as
“that [company which] engages in foreign direct investment (FDI) and owns or, in
some way, controls value-added activities in more than one country” (Dunning and
Lundan 2008, p. 3).4 Given the societal relevance of MNEs’ activity and their role
in the international context, the definition of Corporate Social Responsibility by the
European Commission is suggested. This describes CSR as “the responsibility of
enterprises for their impact on society. Respect for applicable legislation, and for
collective agreements between social partners, is a prerequisite for meeting that
responsibility. To fully meet their corporate social responsibility, enterprises should
have in place a process to integrate social, environmental, ethical, human rights
and consumer concerns into their business operations and core strategy in close
collaboration with their stakeholders” (European Commission 2011, p. 6).5
Finally, to endow the reader with a complete picture, it is considered necessary
to provide a “working definition” of sustainable development. Conscious of the
great debate around the meaning of such an all-encompassing topic, sustainable
development is defined following the Brundtland tradition as the “development that
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987).6
2 On Google Scholar, screening of articles was narrowed to the first thirty articles, filtered by relevance
with the research strings.
3 In respect to the articles sample, there is awareness that the number of examined articles is limited;
however, there is also confidence that the definition of specific criteria enabled a focus on the most
relevant articles. Additionally, this review aims to give an overarching perspective on literature in the
three dimensions and is not intended to represent an exhaustive elaboration of literature addressing
this topic.
4 In business management literature, the term multinational enterprise (MNE) is sometimes used
interchangeably with multinational corporation (MNC). In this chapter, the first is adopted following
the definition by Dunning and Lundan (2008).
5 COM (2011) 681 final.
6 The author is aware of large limitations of societal and political definitions of sustainable development;
however, the following allows for a discussion on societal implications of MNEs in developing
countries, given social justice as a foundational basis.
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3. MNEs’ Contributions to Sustainable Development
Before presenting the results of the review, few words are spent to illustrate
firms’ contribution to sustainable development, with a focus on the role of MNEs.
Hereby, firms’ contribution to sustainable development will first be briefly discussed
by looking at the historical and theoretical evolution of the concept and, second,
at societal implications related to SDG 8.
It is widely acknowledged that sustainable development has three
complementary dimensions: environmental, economic and social (Elkington and
Rowlands 1999). Firms play a crucial role in all three and have, therefore, to be
conceived as one of the key actors in achieving (or hindering) sustainable development.
Sustainability thinking related to firms originated in the economic field in the 1930s,
when the first articles about social responsibility of business appeared (Carroll 1999).
The first theorization of the relationship between companies and society came in
the 1950s by American economist Howard Bowen (1953), who argued that because
firms are critical centers of power, they could influence the lives of citizens. In the
1970s, the concept of social responsibility, in addition to financial responsibility,
started to be widely discussed. This new dimension of business attracted several
critiques. The most renowned critique was by Milton Friedman, who argued that
“the [only] social responsibility of business is to increase its profits” (Friedman
1970, p. 122). Nowadays, the main idea behind CSR is known as the “triple
bottom line principle”, implying that businesses should not only serve economic,
but also social and environmental ends (Elkington and Rowlands 1999). The focus
on profit does not disappear but is incorporated in the pressure of stakeholders such
as consumers, civil society and governments that value such effort (McWilliams
and Siegel 2001). In the last sixty years, literature on ethical responsibility in the
corporate world has been growing substantially, contributing to different theoretical
approaches theorizing the role of firms in sustainability. To mention a few: Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR), Stakeholder Theory, Corporate Sustainability and Green
Economics (Chang et al. 2017). Despite growing consensus on the contribution of
MNEs towards sustainable development, there is still great debate concerning the
management of sustainability by MNEs, especially in the complex institutional setting
of developing countries (Burritt et al. 2020).
As this chapter critically reviews tensions faced by MNEs in pursuing globally
established sustainability guidelines, a discussion on how companies differ in
interaction with societies through changing commitment is required. Garriga and
Melé (2004) present a classification of four main theories: (1) instrumental theories,
where the corporation is seen as an instrument for wealth creation, and its social
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activities are only a means to achieve economic results; (2) political theories, which are
concerned with the power of corporations in society and a responsible use of this
power in the political arena; (3) integrative theories, where the corporation is focused
on the satisfaction of social demands; and (4) ethical theories, which are based on
ethical responsibilities of corporations to society. Of the four, ethical theories are key
in framing the contribution of companies to sustainable development from a justice
perspective. An instructive example of these theories comes from Wettstein (2009).
He argues that MNEs should pursue global justice because of their increased and
autonomous role as agents of change and the weakened role of national states in the
international governance set (ibid.). This is particularly true in developing countries,
where MNEs are increasingly expected to fill in gaps of weak institutional settings
(Crane and Matten 2005) and act as contributors to social development, given their
financial and technological means (Crane and Matten 2005; Scherer and Palazzo 2008;
Jamali 2010). MNEs can contribute to this social development in developing countries
by promoting inclusive economic growth, which tackles unmet needs and increases
overall well-being of the host-country (Gohou and Soumaré 2012; Kaplinsky 2013).
This occurs when new job opportunities are created (Aaron 1999), as well as through
the introduction of higher-quality goods into local markets, which can increase
customers’ well-being (Agénor 2004). Additionally, investment-based activities of
MNEs can generate incentives for other firms and foreign business ventures to also
invest in the region, resulting in additional employment opportunities (Kaplinsky
2013). Furthermore, MNEs can create incentives for local SMEs to expand by
entering the local ecosystem of the MNE (ibid.). The latter is relevant for coupling
economic growth with decent work. For instance, by entering the ecosystem of the
MNE, the local business can get more competitive and indirectly more compliant
to international standards, under the pressure of the partnership with the MNE
(Aerni 2018).
These findings indicate how MNEs, if well addressed, demonstrate the potential
to be drivers of positive change. Yet, despite positive externalities, MNEs have not
always demonstrated behavior in favor of sustainable development. Indeed, this is a
recent trend as the history of corporations is scarred by numerous cases of human
rights violations and environmental disasters, especially in developing countries
(Giuliani and Macchi 2014). The recent ethical turn on business by MNEs makes
future systematic investigations more pressing.
From a societal and political perspective, the contribution of business towards
sustainable development can also be analyzed in terms of the UN SDG Agenda.
Indeed, businesses can influence all 17 Goals directly and indirectly. As opposed to
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their antecedents, the UN Millennium Goals, which mainly focused on governmental
responsibility, the SDGs emphasize the role of all societal actors in achieving
sustainable development and making a direct call for business engagement (SDG
Compass 2015). The introduction of specific goals has both facilitated businesses
by offering guidance in targeting specific domains of sustainable development and
at the same time challenged them to comply with globally established goals in
different contexts.
The activity of MNEs in developing countries is indirectly connected to all 17
goals; however, considering their primary role as economic actors, they can make
a substantial contribution to Goal 8 by boosting economic growth while ensuring
compliance with the highest international working standards.
While the SDGs make the responsibility of the private sector clear, it is disputable
to what extent global actors such as MNEs are able to cover this role. For instance,
the implementation of the SDGs in their business should not be confused with a
communication exercise. On the contrary, the 17 goals should be strongly anchored
in the core functions of the business and be made part of the business culture.
The paradigm shift advocated by Agenda 2030 presents many challenges to
businesses, especially to transnational actors such as MNEs, which have to balance
between the global expectations and complexities of the local context. This illustrates
how corporate contributions to sustainability should escape simplistic categories
and rather be prone to more complex contextualization. The first dimension of this
contextualization will be addressed in the next section.
4. Doing Business between Global Standards and Local Contexts
To understand the relationship between global standards and the local context,
it is necessary to first define what is meant by standards in general. According to
the International Organization for Standardization, standards are: “documents
established by consensus [ . . . ] that provide, for common and repeated use,
rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at the
achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context” (International
Organization for Standardization 2018, p. 2). In the following chapter, the notion
of standards generically refers to international guidelines related to compliance
with sustainable development issues levied on MNEs working across cross-cultural
contexts. An exhaustive exploration of international standards is beyond the scope of
this chapter as it would preliminarily require a definition of one specific sector where
the standards are established. The following paragraph rather aims at presenting
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relevant debates from the business ethics literature on how companies are facing
this tension.
Literature that investigates the relationship between global standards and the
local context presents differentiated disciplinary backgrounds, given the widespread
perspective from which it can be examined. One field that mostly contributed to
describing companies’ challenges associated with compliance with global standards
in local contexts is international business ethics (De George 1993; Donaldson and
Dunfee 1994; Kolk and Tulder 2004). The most dominant research interest in this
field is associated with the relationship between “culture and ethics” (Javalgi and
Toya 2018). Indeed, ethical standards result as the expression of a specific ethical
perception, while the peculiarities of local context and the communities that are part
of it can be understood through cultural determinants (Soares et al. 2007).
Given the relevance of literature in this domain, this section presents ethical
considerations guiding business activities across cross-cultural contexts. The major
part treats a classical controversy in international business ethics, notably the one
between cultural relativism and ethical imperialism. Hereby, conceptual notions
are exemplified along empirical evidence from more recent studies. In the final
part, other perspectives are presented that are equally located in the international
business ethics literature but look at the relationship between global standards and
local context from a different angle.
The first overarching debate that engaged with the tension between global
ethical standards and local context is the one between cultural relativism and ethical
imperialism in business ethics. Cultural relativism emerged in the anthropological
research by Franz Boas in the first decades of the 19th century (Dall and Franz 1887).
The essence of cultural relativism can be synthesized by the creed “When in Rome,
do as Romans do” (Donaldson 1996). This means that, within the infinite cultural
diversity, all cultural practices are considered equally valid. There are no absolute
criteria for judging one practice as better than another (Katherine 1988) and the
standards that people use to judge behavior are relative to the culture in which they
are raised (Herskovits 1973). Thus, there are no international rights and wrongs in
cultural practices. This implies that this conception of cultural practices questions
the validity of human rights theory, which aims to create absolutes for judging the
actions of all cultures (Katherine 1988).
In contrast to cultural relativism is ethical imperialism. This is based on
absolutistic claims of truth expressed with unique sets of categories (Kolb 2008).
In business ethics this describes a situation where a specific ethical code is imposed
from a company to another with different standards (ibid.).
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Kolk and Tulder (2004) offer an empirical exemplification of these two different
logics by examining child labor codes in MNEs. Because of different cultural
perceptions of children in society, host-countries and the Western home-country may
differ on the adopted standards (ibid.). Their research analyzes how fifty leading
MNEs address dilemmas related to conflicting norms and expectations from working
in foreign countries, focusing on corporate codes of ethics. They found that, in the
case of child labor regulations, a multidomestic approach (relativist approach) is
more prevalent than a global strategy (universalist approach). 7 In other words,
the examined MNEs tend to adapt to host-country laws rather than adopting Western
home-country laws, where the latter are usually stricter (ibid.).
However, when ethical imperialism and cultural relativism are translated into
practice, they both display inadequacies. A radical cultural relativistic perspective
can result in moral blindness when it is not making an exception of fundamental
standards across cultures. Advocates of human rights theory argue that the wide
tolerance of cultural relativism can pose threats to the legitimacy of the existing
international human rights system (Katherine 1988). Managers could, for instance,
use cultural relativism as an excuse to tolerate unethical behaviors to ensure business
opportunities (Donaldson 1996). On the other hand, ethical imperialism is constrained
by its absolutistic foundations (ibid.). Every country is based on a different foundation
of ethical behavior, which leads to a variety of ethical standards among countries.
The belief in a universal ethical standard of behavior is inconsistent as we observe that
ethical practice is continuously influenced by context (Donaldson and Dunfee 1994).
Applying universal standards without taking into consideration the conditions in
the local context may lead to inadequate compliance. Such ineffective attempts
have been investigated in a study on working conditions in Chinese clothing
industries (Ngai 2005). Many Chinese manufacturing enterprises working for Western
multinationals in the fashion industry have had to enhance the factories’ regulations
on workers’ conditions due to anti-sweatshop movements. The study showed that,
despite the improvement in terms of reduced working hours, the Chinese employees
still wanted to work overtime as the basic salary would have been too low to support
their basic needs (Ngai 2005).
7 Both multidomestic and global MNEs are characterized for their operation in different countries;
however, they differ in their strategic approach. Multidomestic MNEs adapt their business model
depending on the country in which they are active, based on market opportunities and cultural values,
while global MNEs have a centralized approach and reproduce a similar business strategy in all the
countries where they operate. For a further differentiation and empirical support of these categories
see Harzing (2000).
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A third rationale is introduced by Donaldson and Dunfee (1994) to overcome
limitations of cultural relativism and ethical imperialism: “moral free space”.
The moral free space is conceptualized as an acknowledgement to context-specific
conditions coexisting with some form of human core values (hypernorms) (ibid.).8
Despite the dominance of the culture–ethic relationship in informing
international business ethics, considerations on the relationship between international
standards and local context have gained importance in other perspectives.
Institutional approaches, for instance, have explained the relationship between
international standards and local context in terms of internal and external pressures
to conform to legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Yang and Rivers (2009) show
that subsidiaries of MNEs will likely adapt to local practices to legitimize themselves
if they operate in developing countries with diverse institutional structures and
stakeholder bases. Other studies in the field have analyzed how the adoption
of global standards redefines local practices (Mennicken 2008). By exploring the
application of global accounting standards in an emerging economy, Albu et al.
(2014) illustrate how the interplay of local actors and their search for legitimacy can
influence organizational adaptations to the local context.
To conclude, it is worth mentioning that the multidimensional nature of the
relationship was of great inspiration also for governance scholars (Fung 2003).
A study of governance arrangements of global agri-food markets in the Kenyan
horticulture industry shed light on the disputed nature of the implementation of
global standards in local contexts characterized by different standards of quality and
production processes in the market (Ouma 2010). Other studies on global governance
investigated the double-sided nature of international standards that lead to the
exclusion of emerging economies to profitable markets due to non-compliance with
the latter (Nadvi 2008).
5. Tensions in Corporate Social Responsibility
The ambivalent nature of CSR raises challenges to MNEs operating in
cross-cultural contexts. Today’s MNEs are not limited to external pressure from
compliance with global and local ethical standards but are facing new challenges in
their organization dimension as well. In contrast with past companies, current MNEs
are increasingly compelled by their stakeholder base to increase their CSR dimension.
8 Examples of hypernorms are human dignity, respect for basic rights and good citizenship. The concept
of hypernorms is the basis of the Integrative Social Contract Theory developed by Donaldson and
Dunfee (1994).
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For instance, since 2018, the European Union requires all companies with more than
500 employees to disclose information on the way they operate and manage social
and environmental challenges. Information to be disclosed must include clarifications
on the way companies address environmental protection, social responsibility and
treatment of employees, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery,
and diversity in company boards (European Parliament 2014).9 CSR practices
advanced by companies do not represent the ultimate solutions to these challenges
but present themselves as inherent tensions originating from the complex nature
of sustainable development. In other words, modern MNEs must comply with
international standards in cross-cultural contexts while ensuring their CSR guidelines
and coping with their own controversies. The question, therefore, is: Do CSR practices
fit in the global–local tension? Are they enforcing the tension or, alternatively, creating
synergies?10
Tensions occurring at the corporate level in complying with sustainability
dimensions have been addressed by organization scholars, focusing on trade-offs
in CSR (Hahn et al. 2010).11 This concept is relevant to the overall topic for two
reasons. First, it allows for clearer identification of the somehow blurring concept
of “tensions”, with the more concrete understanding of “trade-offs”. Trade-offs in
CSR are defined as “those situations in which corporate contributions to sustainable
development can only be achieved if one accepts a compromise between at least two
sustainability aspects that are in conflict [with] each other” (Hahn et al. 2010, p. 220).
This definition does not imply that circumstances of trade-offs automatically result in
a lower contribution to sustainable development compared with win–win situations
(ibid.). Second, the concept of trade-offs is strongly linked to the concept of synergies
(Haffar and Searcy 2017). Tension between two or more CSR criteria can result in
either sustainability trade-offs or sustainability synergy (Epstein et al. 2014). Thus,
from the identification of trade-offs, it could be possible to retrieve synergies.
9 Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council.
10 This question is relevant when CSR trade-offs are linked with ethical tensions on the global–local
level. However, an exhaustive answer to this question would require an empirical exploration of these
different dimensions and is left to future in-depth analyses.
11 Please note that Hahn et al. define “trade-offs” in respect to corporate sustainability (2010), whereas the
following review adopts the notion of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Since the CSR definition
provided by the European Commission encompasses the three dimensions of sustainable development,
it is argued that the definition of trade-offs by Hahn et. can be equally applied to trade-offs in CSR.
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Hereby, two debates on trade-offs happening in CSR are presented: the first
is overarching and foresees trade-offs in the notion of CSR, and the second is
context-specific and analyzes CSR tensions in cross-cultural contexts.
Literature on CSR has traditionally been dominated by a “win–win perspective”
on the three principles of economics, society and environment (Hahn et al. 2010).
However, given the complex and multi-faceted nature of sustainable development
and the change involved, a discussion on trade-offs and tensions is equally urgent
(ibid.). Additionally, as presented in Section 3, the concept of CSR has its roots in
Western democratic countries and relies on typical rights and obligations which
characterize these societies. However, in many developing countries it might be
difficult to ensure the same conditions, and this could result in inadequate or lacking
applications of CSR (Prieto-Carrón et al. 2006).
Based on these considerations, scholars have started to challenge the win–win
paradigm that CSR is achieved only at the intersection of the three principles
of economic, environmental and social aspects of sustainable development and
describe trade-offs in CSR as situations where these principles cannot be achieved
simultaneously (Hahn et al. 2010; Prieto-Carrón et al. 2006; Haffar and Searcy 2017).
The analysis of trade-offs does not attempt to resolve the conflict between different
disciplines but tries to “clarify the competing considerations, probe what gives
them weight and explore their relationship” (Margolis and Walsh 2003, p. 284).
This perspective allows for a more inclusive notion of CSR and for enriching
contributions to sustainable development (Hahn et al. 2010).
In this sense, a useful contribution is represented by methodological frameworks
aiming at detecting trade-offs in CSR at different levels. Hahn et al. (2010) show
that trade-offs in CSR can occur at different levels (individual, organizational,
industrial and societal) and dimensions (outcome, temporal and process). Haffar and
Searcy (2017) analyze the link between sustainability trade-offs and sustainability
synergies, developing a framework to understand when tensions can transform into
opportunities. The framework is built on three tension areas (private value-shared
value, scope-depth, measurement–management) and corresponding trade-offs
categories. One of these categories involves the strategic role of stakeholders
in influencing the decision-making process of a company along its supply chain.
This is of key importance because perceptions of the conflicts of CSR can considerably
diverge between stakeholder groups (Angus-Leppan et al. 2010).
Other scholars (Rost and Ehrmann 2017) analyzed distortions in the notion of
CSR by investigating trade-offs between corporate social performance (CSP) and
corporate financial performance (CFP) in reporting biases in empirical management
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literature. In their study, they showed that published evidence in win–win CSR
research tends to overestimate efficiency. The research field expects to find a positive
association between CSP and CFP, while the authors demonstrate strong tentative
evidence for a positive reporting bias in the CSP–CFP literature but only weak
tentative evidence for CSP efficiency (Rost and Ehrmann 2017). The trend of the
reporting bias may be influenced by collective cognitive structures within a research
discipline (e.g., authors not writing on unfavorable findings, higher rejection rates
of studies documenting conflicting evidence, etc.). The authors point out that the
implications of such distortions are severe when results are being used by academics
and practitioners to justify research questions and results or support decision making
in the business context. The consequences of this reporting bias “may result in
inappropriate decisions by policymakers, managers, or scholars, and could thereby
harm employees and other stakeholders, and lead to wasted resources and misdirected
future research” (Rost and Ehrmann 2017, p. 34).
The second stream of research has engaged with trade-offs of CSR occurring in
cross-cultural contexts. In this field, scholars focus on shortcomings of the traditional
Western understanding of CSR in developing countries and emphasize the need to
avoid a “one size fits all approach” and opting for a contextualized understanding
of CSR in middle and low-income countries (Prieto-Carrón et al. 2006; Utting and
Marques 2010; Khojastehpour and Jamali 2020). Utting and Marques (2010) argue that
the mainstream Western CSR debate has tended to ignore important developmental
issues related to corporate power, economic liberalization, unsustainable investment
and consumption patterns. Additionally, Prieto-Carrón et al. (2006) point out that
a one-sided view of CSR ignores more complex issues about the actual impacts
of CSR initiatives such as the roles of power, class and gender which characterize
those interventions. Empirical evidence from developing countries suggests that the
standard management-oriented discourse on CSR may result in limited contributions
(Prieto-Carrón et al. 2006), specifically concerning the significance that CSR initiatives
may assume in these countries. For instance, many companies in developing countries
make donations for philanthropic purposes (Kumar et al. 2001). However, according
to some scholars (von Schnurbein et al. 2016), this is not considered CSR as it is not
directly related to the core business strategies of companies. A concrete example for
that comes from India where in 2013 the government brought into law a mandate
on firms’ CSR spending (Ministry of Corporate Affairs MCA). Although the new
law improved general awareness of CSR issues, this further enforced the traditional
philanthropic dimension of CSR in India (Yesudhas 2017).
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An attempt to overcome the hegemony of Western notions of CSR may be
represented by the distinction between global and local CSR. The latter focuses
on different perspectives on whether MNEs should develop centrally coordinated
global CSR strategies, or whether they should stimulate decentralized, local CSR
strategies (Muller 2006). Husted and Allen (2006) suggest that the key difference
between global and local CSR is the community that demands it. Local CSR deals
with the firm’s obligations based on the standards of the local community, whereas
global CSR deals with the firm’s obligations based on global standards to which all
societies can be held. While centralization can be more efficient, it can lead to a lack of
ownership and reduced legitimacy at the local level. At the same time, decentralized
strategies, while locally responsive, may also be fragmented and context dependent
(Husted and Allen 2006). When the local context is a developing country with
lower CSR standards and less public pressure, the risk is that multinationals target
the lower rather than higher standards that may be expected from them in their
home countries (Muller 2006). Definitive evaluations on which approach is the most
effective are difficult to attain, as the outcome of global or local CSR approaches is
strictly dependent on the host-country where the company is operating. For instance,
in his study on CSR in Mexican subsidiaries of European MNEs in the automotive
industry, Muller finds empirical support that in a “lower CSR context”, decentralized
decision-making is associated with higher local CSR performance (2006).
6. Discussing MNEs’ Corporate Social Responsibility in Global Standards and
Local Complexities
In the following section, the abovementioned knowledge on tensions happening
in the triangular relationship between global ethical standards, the local context and
CSR guidelines faced by MNEs operating in developing countries is brought together
and developed further.
Underlying justice implications frame the activity of MNEs in developing
countries as a relevant topic for sustainability research. Due to societal pressure
and increased agency in the governance set, multinationals are required to assume
an active role in promoting economic growth, while ensuring compliance with the
highest sustainability standards. However, the application of international ethical
guidelines is not straightforward and needs to be adapted to the condition of the local
context. Among different framing forces of this environment, culture has a major
impact on human behavior and individuals’ ethical perceptions (Soares et al. 2007).
Thus, culture can be seen as an influencing factor for ethical standards in businesses
across different countries. In this sense, the debate between cultural relativism
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and ethical imperialism is exemplificative of inadequacies of one-way solutions.
Rather, when doing business across different cultures, managers should try to balance
compliance with universalistic ethical standards with relativistic adaptations to the
local context.
Different approaches have contributed to explain when MNEs are faced with
local–global tensions: (1) ethical theories, which are among the most prominent in the
field, describe tensions in business when global and local ethical standards, influenced
by different cultures, come together; (2) institutionalist theories envisage tensions
when MNEs are subject to different (international and local) pressures for legitimacy;
(3) governance theories detect tensions which arise from the multidimensional and
multi-spatial nature of MNEs.
Additionally, an MNE that is working in a developing country not only faces
challenges from the management of global–local requests but also has to comply with
its own CSR dimension, which presents itself as inherent tensions. These tensions
can be better understood with the notion of trade-offs and are distinguished as
(1) internal trade-offs, which are inherent in the nature of CSR and question
the simultaneous contribution to sustainable development of all three economic,
social and environmental principles, and (2) external trade-offs, which take place
when Western conceptualizations of CSR are exported and contextualized among
cross-cultural contexts.
Given their global reach, MNEs are facing multiple pressures to contribute to
sustainability targets. The exposure to these conflicting forces may result in tensions
between the three levels (global–local–organizational).
At first glance, the boundaries of tensions between global–local and the
organization’s level may be blurred and sometimes overlapping. CSR initiatives,
for instance, could represent the incorporation of international standards at the
business level. However, the rationale that guides the adoption of certain rules at a
company level may be very different from that of an international organization.
The influence of the three different levels (global, local, organizational) and
motivations that guide them are key determinants to understand and try to manage
tensions occurring between and within the three levels. Each level is characterized
by its context and specific values. Tensions may arise between the levels when
conflicting values are brought together.
These findings suggest that in order to successfully implement the global
standards in cross-cultural contexts, MNEs are required to embed these standards in
the local economic ecosystem of developing countries. They should, in other words,
work as facilitators between the global ethical standards and the local dimension.
137
This would, however, require a coherent CSR agenda that is firmly anchored to the
core business of the company.
In view of these findings and recurring themes between the two strains of
literature, a list of criteria that should guide the identification of relevant theoretical
approaches is developed. Such criteria could help scholars to identify suitable
theories aiming at detecting tensions between global standards and local context and
at the CSR organizational level in empirical explorations and consequently increase
scientific support on multilevel tensions faced by MNEs in developing countries.
In this sense, a fertile theory that analyzes tensions faced by an MNE in a developing
country on the three levels should: (1) represent prominent theories in international
ethical business, (2) have been used in previous studies to understand CSR practices
of businesses, (3) take into consideration the societal environment in which a company
is operating, (4) have been used to address the activity of MNEs in cross-cultural
contexts and finally, and (5) have sound scientific bases to examine the values of a
corporation and the different environments where it is operating.
Moreover, throughout this chapter, some research gaps related to tensions faced
by MNEs operating in developing countries were identified. Based on the review at
hand, a recapitulating list of knowledge gaps is presented.12
From the literature consulted, it is derived that there is an overall lack of critical
investigation on the concept of CSR in three domains: Firstly, acknowledgment
and assessment of trade-offs and conflicts between the economic, environmental
and social principles inherent in the nature of sustainable development (Hahn
et al. 2010); secondly, the dominance of the mainstream Western notion of CSR and
little systemic investigations on the adaptations/variations in different cross-cultural
contexts, especially in developing countries (Prieto-Carrón et al. 2006; Khojastehpour
and Jamali 2020). In this regard, there is especially little information on how local
and global socio–political–economic factors influence CSR meaning (Mitra 2012).
Additionally, evidence on CSR activities of MNEs in developing countries are “scant,
mixed, and fragmented” (Jamali 2010, p. 184). A third domain that requires further
investigation is that of reporting methodological biases on the relation of CSP and CFP
(Rost and Ehrmann 2017). Additionally, few studies examine cultural adaptations of
Western subsidiary MNEs in developing countries (Márquez et al. 2016) and how
12 The following list of knowledge gaps is uniquely based on the author’s current knowledge and the
consultation of literature. If some gaps are indeed filled, this may be due to oversight.
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MNEs are dealing with tensions occurring from multidimensional levels, namely,
global standards, local contexts and companies’ guidelines.
Based on the following gaps, it is suggested that scholars engage in a discussion
on trade-offs in CSR given the complex and multifaceted nature of sustainable
development and ethical questions arising from the activity of MNEs in developing
countries by critically investigating variances of CSR practices in developing countries.
Additionally, questions of cultural fit of MNEs in developing countries should be
investigated as the successful adaptation to local context is a driver for FDI.
Finally, and most importantly, it is recommended that scholars investigate
naturally occurring tensions stemming from the multidimensional dimension in
which MNEs are embedded, namely, global, local and organizational. As this review
sets the stage for exploring multilevel sustainability tensions faced by MNEs, future
research can build on these findings to develop appropriate strategies to deal with
these tensions. Such knowledge would not only contribute to the academic debate but
also be relevant for the societal and political agenda towards sustainable development.
In terms of SDG 8, a comprehensive understanding and identification of multilevel
tensions faced by MNEs represents a prerequisite for the achievement of “inclusive
and sustainable economic growth”.
7. Concluding Remarks
This chapter aimed to explore literature on tensions faced by MNEs in developing
countries when confronted with global standards, local context and CSR guidelines.
Given the few studies addressing the three levels simultaneously, relevant knowledge
was gathered by examining two separate debates in international business ethics
literature, namely, the relationship between “business ethics and culture” and
“trade-offs in CSR”.
The review of distinguished debates gives an overarching perspective on the
multidimensional tensions faced by MNEs in developing countries. Additionally,
based on these findings, criteria for the selection of suitable theoretical frameworks
are developed, which could guide scholars to identify relevant theories to analyze
tensions faced by real-world MNEs operating in developing countries.
The review of relevant literature emphasizes the importance of wider
consideration of the context where the company is embedded. In this sense,
the perspective on MNEs in developing countries allows one to better understand
framing conditions in complex institutional environments and ultimately prevent
other “Rana Plazas” from happening.
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Moreover, in an era where the reputational character of MNEs is increasingly
under the spotlight, identifying issues that could raise tensions and trade-offs on the
three levels becomes fundamental to design as well as putting in place strategies to
respond adequately to external and internal threads.
The author is aware that some debates have been presented without entering
into an extended discussion. Ethical tensions faced by MNEs have attracted infinite
numbers of contributions, and exhaustive exploration of all of them is beyond the
scope of this chapter.
Despite some limitations, the author hopes that this chapter may represent a
starting point to further discuss tensions happening at the different levels of operation
of MNEs in developing countries.
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1. Introduction
Climate change and weather extremes are already impacting millions of
people, devastating crops, eroding coastlines, and threatening freshwater reserves.
A continued build-up of greenhouse gas (GHG) pollution is expected to lead to
warming, more acidic oceans and a continued rise in the sea level, changed weather
patterns, and an even more significant threat to supplies of food, water, and fish
(IPCC 2014). The food and agriculture sector is particularly vulnerable and will be
hit in multiple ways (FAO 2016a).
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth
Assessment Report, the effects of climate change on crop and food production are
already visible, reducing yields, mainly for wheat, maize, and rice,1 in some parts
of the world (IPCC 2014). A further rise in temperatures will likely exacerbate
such effects. Food production will be impacted by climate change itself, as well as
related issues such as water availability, pests, and disease. While there may be some
positive effects, the most likely results are very worrying and are expected to have
environmental, social, and economic dimensions (IPCC 2019).
This is particularly true in emerging economies, where the food and agricultural
sectors (agri-food) make a significant contribution to economic performance:
smallholder farmers and the rural poor in such areas appear to suffer even more due
to the limited resilience and diversity of production (FAO 2015a). Climate change
is expected to reduce soil resilience and increase the vulnerability of products and
producers, and destabilize markets with higher price volatility (Chatzopoulos et al.
1 In cereal production, “there is evidence that climate change has already negatively affected wheat and
maize yields in many regions and at the global level. The IPCC warns that decreases in crop yields of
10 to 25 per cent and more may be widespread by 2050”. Furthermore, “the increased frequency of
warmer nights in most regions is . . . impacting rice yields and quality” (FAO 2017a).
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2020). If producers are not flexible enough to shift and adapt quickly to changing crop
suitability, we can, for instance, expect increased migratory pressure, with people
moving away from farming and into cities and even across borders (IPCC 2014).
That is, if not dealt with properly—and quickly—climate change will hinder the
achievement of vital goals for human development: it threatens to undermine
and maybe even reverse recent progress in the fight against poverty, hunger, and
malnutrition (UN 2019a).
Still, we can only expect effective measures if all stakeholders—individual
farmers as well as governments, research institutions, advisors, providers of technical
solutions, and the financial sector—increase and coordinate their efforts (McKinsey
and Company 2015).
Decisive, ambitious measures could help agriculture to better handle expected
changes but also serve to create synergistic effects between climate and development
goals. The right measures could even help keep global temperatures in check.
The sector contributes significantly to emissions—about 10 to 12 percent of
human-made greenhouse gases (GHG) are produced by the agriculture sector.
The sector is the main contributor of non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gases
(e.g., methane), the primary source of agricultural emissions, coming from the
digestive process of livestock and stored animal manure. It also emits large volumes
of nitrous oxide from fertilizers, whereas the post-harvest stages of the production
chain emit significant amounts of GHGs, as do food loss and waste (FAO 2015b).
Climate-smart agriculture (CSA), an expression coined by the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO 2017b), pursues three
main objectives—sustainable increase in agricultural productivity and income,
greater resilience of food systems, and the reduction of emissions associated with
agriculture—that may best help address climate change and meet development goals.
There are already ongoing efforts to engage business in CSA. The World Business
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) has launched an initiative to test
large-scale projects in five pilot regions of the world (WBCSD 2015).
The US Agency for International Development (USAID) is working with the
Sustainable Food Lab (Sustainable Food Lab 2019)—a global network of organizations
looking to work towards a more sustainable food system—and coffee and cocoa
partners, including private companies, to develop a learning community that provides
business cases, strategies and action plans for the engagement of agribusiness in CSA.
The FAO has also launched the Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture
(GACSA) to help create transformational partnerships on CSA. The Alliance is an
action-oriented multistakeholder platform that brings together national governments,
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growers, scientists, business and civil society, as well as international organizations
to discuss and learn about on-ground solutions and policy mechanisms combating
climate change in the agricultural sector (GACSA 2014).
Lastly, the World Bank has been investigating supply chains (World Bank 2015)
to highlight concrete examples of how farmers and food companies can work together
to build more resilient models.
The critical challenge, though, is how to integrate business models when most
potential actions increase costs and reduce returns in the short-term, while even
the medium-term benefits remain uncertain. Who will finance or invest in the
needed changes? Encouraging agribusinesses requires new incentives and perhaps a
combination of hard and soft laws, including regulations and subsidies. We need to
figure out how to introduce incentives that businesses will adopt: it is unlikely that
the sector will make the necessary changes independently.
This paper aims to facilitate the business contribution to transforming agri-food
systems to become more climate-smart. We lay out the threats, possible approaches
and, finally, propose hard and soft policies that may help guide the sector into
the right direction while promoting the United Nations’ Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) (UN 2015). It is critical for the business to play a role early on in this
multistakeholder process: this will help ensure that the legitimate concerns of all
actors are taken into account (WRI 2015).2
What is the best way then for the private sector to support this transformation?
Business involvement can be founded on several areas of social and economic
inclusion and environmental sustainability, and the SDGs provide a useful framework.
They provided a breakthrough for businesses in providing a structure for guiding
overall sustainability targets and indicators. SDGs help enterprises create principles,
codes, and voluntary commitments to eradicate poverty and hunger, sustain
responsible production and consumption, tackle climate change, and ultimately
promote sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth.
Sustained and inclusive economic growth (SDG 8) is a prerequisite for sustainable
development and contributes to improved livelihoods, new and better employment
opportunities, and greater economic security. The agriculture sector is the basis and
2 Partnerships will become increasingly essential for transformative goals, i.e., for those that tackle
systemic problems, remove barriers, change established dynamics and implement long-term solutions.
New models of cooperation are emerging based on multi-stakeholder platforms that facilitate the
dynamics of collaboration between industrial actors, policymakers, academics, researchers and citizens.
These models provide food for thought on how the involvement of a broad interdisciplinary audience
can open up new opportunities for sustainable development (WRI 2015).
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the most vulnerable part of this growth, and transforming it to deal with new contexts
and dramatic changes requires a more comprehensive vision that implies a broader
transformation of the rural economy (WRI 2018; World Bank 2020). Addressing the
socio-economic and environmental challenges related to climate change and making
progress towards SDG 8 requires a concerted effort from all actors. Businesses have
started to act in certain areas but, given the enormity of the challenge, need to do
much more and need to be supported in their efforts by a system of policies and an
enabling environment of multistakeholder collaborations.
2. Threats of Climate Change to the Food and Agriculture Sectors
A growing number of businesses fear that the effects of climate change may
disrupt their supply chains and their ability to grow in a sustainable and profitable
way. The biggest threats are likely to come from menaces to food security, nutrition,
and human health, genetic resources, and agrobiodiversity3, and land degradation,
as detailed below (Stockholm Resilience Center 2010). At the same time, the global
food system is a significant emission contributor with up to a third of total emissions.
The Global Sustainable Development Report (UN 2019b) clearly states that feeding
the global population in 2050 under current agricultural practices poses significant
threats to the Paris Agreement and other Sustainable Development Goals, while
agriculture supports livelihoods and employs over 1.1 billion people (Independent
Group of Scientists appointed by the Secretary-General 2019).
2.1. Food Security, Nutrition and Human Health
According to the FAO, food security relates to food availability, access, utilization,
and supply-chain stability, and climate change threatens to undermine them all
(FAO 2017a). Food availability will likely be affected by declining yields in the crop,
livestock, fisheries, and aquaculture sectors. For instance, crop yields in Brazil could
fall by up to 70 percent for soybeans and up to 50 percent for wheat with a warming
of 2 ◦C (World Bank 2014a, 2014b). The IPCC warns that average yield reductions of
10 to 25 percent by 2050 could be widespread (FAO 2017a).
The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), in its report “Climate
Change: Impact on Agriculture and Costs of Adaptation” (IFPRI 2009), predicts that
3 “The impact on biodiversity, along with nitrogen levels, has already entered the warning stage
for surpassing what our planet can manage. These factors must be addressed jointly with climate
mitigation and adaptation throughout the full value chain of the agricultural sector” (Stockholm
Resilience Center 2010).
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rice productivity will decrease by 14% in South Asia, 10% in East Asia and the Pacific
and 15% in sub-Saharan Africa by 2050. This would lead to price increases of between
32% and 37% (IFPRI 2009). The impacts will vary not only by crop but also by region
depending on factors including latitude and irrigation.4 To give some examples,
estimates suggest that the United States could see a 20% drop in corn production,
particularly in mid-Western states, whereas Brazil’s corn production could decline
by nearly 16% by 2050.
Some of the most significant impacts of global climate change will be
felt in developing countries among “subsistence” or “smallholder” farmers.
Their vulnerability stems both from being mainly located in tropical areas and
from various socio-economic, demographic, and political trends that limit their ability
to adapt to climate change. For instance, climate change can affect crop rotations, so
growers have to consider new crop varieties, sowing dates, cropping density, and
fertilization levels when growing crops to achieve sufficient yields for a growing
population. These are all challenging pursuits for smallholders. Food accessibility
will likely be hit by diminished purchasing power. This is because impacts on
production have carry-on social and economic effects that come from fluctuations in
agricultural incomes and prices, which also affect trade and investment. A proper
evaluation of the economic cost of land degradation should also take into account
factors including environmental vulnerability, demographic pressures, economic
dependence on land, social and political instability, and the international context
(Dupont 2015) and commitments, all of which can amplify the extent of the impact of
degradation (UNCCD 2015).
Climate change is expected to have an impact on food utilization, mostly through
food safety and health.5 It can reduce food safety by making food-borne diseases
more widespread. It can also affect health in multiple ways, including geographical
shifts in some diseases, heat stress, and natural disasters. The foreseen increases in
the frequency and intensity of climate-related events are expected to undermine food
stability. All of these effects are likely to affect nutrition by changing the composition
of diets as well as available calories (Stockholm Resilience Center 2010).
4 If less water is available, soil better able to retain water will be more resistant to drought.
5 In general, climate change is likely to reduce food safety through a higher incidence of food-borne
diseases. Climate also affects health via multiple pathways, including geographical shifts in
vector-borne diseases, heat stress and natural disasters, which in turn affect the nutrition of people
and their ability to provide care as well as nutritional contents of food.
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2.2. Genetic Resources, Agro-Biodiversity, Water and Soil
The number of crop varieties declined significantly in the 20th century,
and intensive monoculture systems have expanded worldwide (FAO 2017a).
These trends threaten adaptive capacity, increase genetic vulnerability and reduce
nutritional diversity, leading in turn to lower resilience among agro-ecosystems
and livelihoods (Bioversity International 2013; FAO 2020).6 This situation is further
exacerbated by climate change: increased temperatures and the scarcity of water make
it challenging to conserve both crop and wild plant genetic resources (FAO 2017a).7
Climate change also poses significant threats to natural resources that are vital
for farming. Such damage and depletion undermine the ecological processes that
support healthy, productive landscapes, and climate change may become the leading
cause of biodiversity loss (WRI 2005). For instance, soils, the basis for plant growth,
are deteriorating and are lost at significant rates due to the adverse effects of climate
change. What is more, loss of soil fertility is associated with loss of carbon in the soil.
This destabilizes the soil and reduces its buffer and storage capacity for nutrients
and water; it also means that soil degradation is a source of carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions. The loss of soil carbon reduces farmers’ resilience to climate change and
increases atmospheric CO2 (FAO 2017a).
3. Addressing Climate Change in Agriculture
Climate change is a global issue requiring locally adapted responses (FAO 2016b).
Businesses must help make agricultural systems less vulnerable, secure the sustainable
provisioning of food and support the livelihoods of those who produce it.
Addressing the threats mentioned above means transforming agri-food systems
so that they become increasingly more efficient, use resources more wisely, and are
more resilient to risks, shocks, and long-term climate variability while protecting
and enhancing biodiversity (FAO 2017a). All actors in the value chain must also
make efforts to reduce the emissions associated with the business itself. For instance,
post-harvest phases use over 70 percent of the energy and release around 30 percent
6 It is estimated that of a total 300,000 plant species, 10,000 have been used for human food since the
origin of agriculture. Out of these, only 150–200 species have been commercially cultivated of which
only four—rice, wheat, maize and potatoes—supply 50 per cent of the world’s energy needs, while 30
crops provide 90 per cent of the world’s caloric intake (FAO 2010).
7 “Climate change is projected to significantly reduce renewable surface water and groundwater
resources with particular intensity in most dry subtropical regions. Many regions are likely to face
substantial water scarcity” (FAO 2017a).
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of the greenhouse gases of the entire agri-food value chains (excluding those resulting
from land-use change) (FAO 2011; Garnett 2011).8 In addition, food loss and waste are
responsible for about 8 percent of global GHG emissions (FAO 2015b, 2017b). If the
sector can, at the same time, reduce carbon emissions and promote sequestration,
such changes could represent an enormous opportunity to support both climate and
development goals. While it is not clear who should pay in the face of low carbon
prices, business needs to take a leadership and coordination role in dealing with
the challenges. Hence, agriculture (SDG 2 coupled to SDG 15) has the potential to
support a number of ecosystem services, including mitigation and adaptation to
climate change, giving it a strong co-benefit leveraging effect across other SDGs such
as SDG 13, SDG 8, and SDG 4.
Businesses using both adaptation measures and mitigation potential should
advocate on behalf of food security and nutrition as well as environmental, social,
and economic sustainability for growers at the global level. What is the best way to
do this?
Climate-Smart Agriculture Approach
While many alternative sustainable strategies have been developed over the
years, they all strive to maintain productivity and usefulness to society over the long
run. Sustainability is a process rather than a prescribed set of practices and generally
supports the convergence of all the available technologies and their use in solutions
able to address local needs and societal requirements. In our opinion, attempts to
maintain growing, predictable harvests with as little fluctuation as possible should
not compromise the structural integrity or resilience of the production system.
Management and conservation of resources such as soil and water should remain a
priority while taking energy inputs into account.
The FAO’s Climate Smart Agriculture approach has been introduced to guide
the transformation of agricultural systems, safeguard food provisioning, integrate
adaptation, mitigation, and food security. It provides an inclusive policy framework
for a wide range of farming interventions in different contexts and could help us
redesign and reorient agri-food systems to effectively support the development and
8 What are the best ways for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the food system? The analysis done
by Garnett showed that around half of the food sector emissions came from agricultural production,
and the other half came from: manufacture of synthetic fertilizers (5%), food processing (12%),
packaging (7%), transport (12%), retail (7%), home food preparation (9%), catering (6%), food waste
disposal (2%) (Garnett 2011).
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safeguard food security in a changing climate (FAO 2017a). It aims to maximize
benefits, pursue synergies and manage trade-offs across the three main CSA objectives
of improving productivity, building resilience, and reducing emissions associated
with agriculture.
The approaches could allow us to support an increase in crop productivity
through the good management of soil, water, and biodiversity and help adapt
the livelihoods of people likely to be affected by climate change. We can support
agricultural practices contributing to reduced emissions, deforestation, and the
degradation of land. The combination of soil and weather maps giving precise
information about local meteorological conditions, soil type, and restorative need
can help optimize local soil treatment to be more efficient, retain more carbon, reduce
leakages of nutrition as well as improve water irrigation schemes.
Integrating Climate Smart Agriculture into business models could help the
sector protect its supply chains, grow sustainably and profitably, all while meeting
its commitments to reduce its impact on the environment.9 This could also address
the concerns of some investors and large commercial banks beginning to establish
strict investment criteria.
4. How Businesses Can Contribute to Climate-Smart Agriculture
What is the best way then for the private sector to support CSA? While it is
clear that the private sector has a range of technologies, a depth of knowledge, and
appropriate diagnostic tools and can help to channel substantial climate financing
into agricultural systems, an overarching, coherent, and locally adapted approach
is needed.
Business’ involvement can be founded in several areas of social inclusion and
environmental sustainability, and the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (UN 2015)
provide a useful framework. They have provided a significant step forward for
companies in delivering a framework to guide their overall sustainability objectives
and indicators. SDGs help businesses create "soft laws" or business standards such
as codes of sustainability, principles, and voluntary commitments to ensure that their
operations are sustainable. CSA could help businesses to set targets that support
SDGs: SDG 1 on ending poverty, SDG 2 on ending hunger; SDG 8 on economic
9 The World Business Council for Sustainable Development CSA initiative has convened a group of
companies from the agri-food sector to address the double challenges of climate change and the need
to meet the food needs of a growing world population (WBCSD 2015, 2020).
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growth; SDG 12 on responsible production and consumption, including the reduction
of food waste; and SDG 13 on tackling climate change.
Climate change erodes food security, nutrition, poverty reduction, and sustainability
in many ways, and agribusiness should be encouraged to focus its climate change
strategy on improving food security and nutrition. Working within such a framework
and following a harmonized approach for sustained, inclusive, and sustainable
economic growth will require prioritized action. More concretely, agribusinesses can
help support such goals in the following ways:
4.1. Increase the Uptake of Digital Agriculture
Consumer preference for sustainable food on the one hand and increasingly
demanding access to capital on the other is putting pressure on farmers to manage their
resources efficiently and accountably in order to maintain a competitive advantage
over the long term.
Digital or precision agriculture—simply defined as translating agronomic advice
into better and more precise execution of farm operations and applications to the field
using equipment and machinery, usually through map-based digital systems—is
one way in which they can do this. Digitalization can improve forecasting, diagnose
pests and diseases, provide apps to measure wind speed, and improve spraying.
In general, it gives us a chance to reach out to a vast number of farmers (WEF 2016).
Precision farming technologies, including the use of drones, soil sampling,
probes, high-efficiency irrigation, and GPS-enabled machinery, could combine field
and soil information with weather and product data to provide an integrated,
intelligent strategy in the field. The customized, real-time, finely tailored, thoughtful
insights gathered can help growers tackle intra-field variability, make smart choices
on what to plant, when to plant, where to plant and what to apply to the plant and
soil, and increase production efficiency while reducing resource degradation and
carbon emissions.
Agribusinesses could help farmers adopt precision agriculture practices through
consolidation across the food value chain, new cooperative ways of investing, and new
finance and risk-sharing models that favor them. However, commercial models are
mainly available, because of the required investments, in developed countries.
The opportunities to leapfrog current developments are, therefore, more
significant in the least developed countries, but this will require new service delivery
models that build on what is available to make innovations more accessible and
affordable. This entails more investment and innovation, testing, and demonstrations.
Famers will need to provide more data, but more data should also be made available
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to them. We will also require improved and tailored information services that
offer longer-range weather forecasts and information on changing cropping and
farming protocols.
4.2. Build Smallholder Farmer Resilience
Agriculture research companies need to develop specific technologies such as
seeds that are more resistant to disease, drought, and flooding to meet the needs of
smallholder farmers. For example, genetic advancement in certain crops well suited
to small-scale farming, such as dietary staples including cassava, savory types of
bananas, sorghum, and millet, could help promote food security in the context of a
changing climate through local self-sufficiency and reliance. Doing this requires that
agribusinesses include the correct measures in innovation scorecards so that they can
make the right choices in the research and development process.
In addition to research, the sector could promote new business models and
approaches to support smallholder farmers at all stages of the production value
chain. There are many examples of new business approaches that fit the needs
of smallholder farmers. These include finance and risk-sharing models, trading
partnerships, small and affordable package sizes, and cooperative input distribution,
models. Sustainably scaling up these models will provide new opportunities
for agribusinesses.
4.3. Promote Ecosystem-Based, Connected Landscape and Conservation
Agriculture Approaches
Ecosystems services help build resilience and mitigate the vulnerability to the
effects of climate change on communities and their livelihoods. Integrating the
protection of biodiversity and ecosystem services into adaptation and mitigation
strategies and conserving genetic resources increases the resilience of food and
agriculture systems to risks. Strategies to address climate change should be better
aligned with attempts to protect biodiversity and ecosystems.
For instance, creating connected landscapes with healthy, functioning ecosystems
can help rehabilitate degraded land and maintain the biological flows and
infrastructure needed to increase the resilience of agriculture to drought and other
climate impacts. Landscape connectivity would, therefore, not only help build
resilience against climate change but also sharpen our attention and dedication to
the triple goal of people, planet, and profit (De Vivo et al. 2016; WBCSD 2017).
In a similar way, no-till methods of soil management enhance the water retention
capacity of the soil and prevent soil erosion by incorporating crop residues into
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the surface and minimizing carbon losses in the soil. They can also reduce the fuel
consumption associated with cultivation by 60 to 70 percent (FAO et CABI 2006).
4.4. Improve Nutrient Management
Crops rely on soil nutrients (e.g., fertilizers, organic amendments, and N-fixation)
and re-cycled inputs from the remains of crops left in the field. Optimizing fertilizer
use efficiency in crop production can minimize nutrient losses to the environment
while increasing nutrient delivery to the target crops. For example, the use of
smart fertilizers can either delay the release of nutrients for uptake or transform
nutrients into other forms that are less susceptible to loss. Categories of products
that improve fertilizer efficiency include the controlled release of nitrogen fertilizers,
nitrogen stabilizers, and phosphate management products. New services for efficient
nutrient management may also be an opportunity and can consist of soil analysis
(soil pH to optimize the availability of nutrients to crops, as well as organic matter),
crop variety-optimized fertilizer application rates, and weather forecasts to optimize
the application. Optimizing and supplementing the supply of nutrients to crops with
fertilizers, the use of organic amendments, and the remains of crops/ cover crops left
in the field are essential to soil health (FAO 2006).
4.5. Reduce Food Loss and Waste
Global food losses are enormous. The FAO estimates that about one-third of
all cultivated food is lost due to pests, deterioration, waste, ineffective processing or
transport, inefficient logistics, and consumer preferences (FAO 2017b). Businesses
could encourage joint efforts and the prioritization of a framework for food loss
and waste mitigation based on nutritional, environmental, and social indicators.
This could help value chain actors such as those involved in packaging, processing,
post-harvest handling, and distribution to evaluate options for reducing food waste
along the value chain, taking into account infrastructure needs and constraints.
It could also help businesses set standards and protocols for reducing food waste,
as well as defining targets and action plans to achieve them. Since reasons for losses
vary around the world, local and regional analyses should form the basis of any
action plans.
In addition, the private sector, NGOs, and local authorities should help raise
consumer awareness against food waste. One way of doing it is via food labeling and
by supporting social awareness campaigns. It is also possible to use feedback loops
to increase consumer understanding of who has produced the food and under what
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circumstances. This approach to traceability can address nutritional needs, as well as
expand cultural approaches to food, facilitating access to more healthy diets.
Food waste poses as well substantial equity issues, more so when considering
that food waste goes parallel, with 2 billion people suffering from food insecurity
(Independent Group of Scientists appointed by the Secretary-General 2019).
4.6. Seek Multistakeholder Support
The CSA approach requires the assistance of multiple stakeholders to identify
optimal interventions. They should, at the same time, take social, economic,
and environmental constraints and opportunities through the entire food value chain
into consideration (FAO 2017a). We nonetheless need to recognize that businesses
are best organized through value chains in which all parties have something at stake.
Businesses could align with and seek the support of governments, academics,
and civil society organizations at appropriate levels to roll out their CSA strategies.
For instance, companies could engage with global climate-related initiatives such
as the Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture to strengthen dialogue and
partnership with NGOs and other stakeholders (Acosta et al. 2019; World Bank 2014a,
2014b; McCarthy et al. 2018).10
4.7. Measure and Evaluate the Impact
Businesses will also need to make an effort to measure and assess the actions
they introduce as well as results achieved. This will involve gathering data and
evidence to better inform policy and investment decisions on the links between food
security, nutrition, and climate change (FAO 2019). Better knowledge and capacity to
analyze the impacts of climate change on food security and nutrition and on agri-food
can improve the measures taken.
Companies will need to support and strengthen decision-making based on
the lessons learned from sectoral and cross-sectoral analysis of information, data,
and knowledge. Common frameworks for measurement and outcomes should also
be established (TFCFD 2017).
10 The list of global and regional multi-stakeholder initiatives is impressive, as is the diversity of fields
of action and approaches: ISF, the Smallholders Finance Initiative; the World Cocoa Foundation;
the Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil; the Global Coffee Platform; and IDH, the Sustainable Trade
Initiative; to name some, but a few.
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4.8. Endorse Platforms to Share Knowledge and Foster Learning on CSA
Businesses could help develop CSA knowledge-sharing platforms to facilitate
learning and access to the latest information in the fast-evolving and multi-faceted
field of climate change. These platforms, designed with partners throughout the
value chain or with local authorities, could help to increase individual and collective
awareness and knowledge, as well as improve education on mitigation, adaptation,
impact reduction, and early warning for the private sector (CGIAR 2020). Companies
might also set up agri-food centers to provide farmers with the necessary technology,
education, and advice. These centers can be part of established state agricultural
extension services or new units created to enable farmers to learn practices from each
other. They could also help to achieve economies of scale by combining collection and
storage from several farms. The centers allow new ideas, technologies, and business
models to spread rapidly, and they can work with financial institutions to offer
loans. The centers could also be used to provide timely weather information to
promote improved on-farm weather monitoring and reduce risk. Tools to help
farmers and advisors to see climate-related risks and potentials of their individual
farms need to be further developed and made available to all farmers. This will
include developing the capacity of institutions to collect data and the formation of
international data and analysis to assist increasingly integrated and efficient agri-food
systems (UNDP 2020).
4.9. Build Innovative Financing Models to Support CSA
According to the International Financial Cooperation, access to adequate financial
resources is crucial for the creation of a market for CSA, but farmers rarely have
access to credit, as the financial institutions regard them as a high risk. Adopting
CSA requires up-front investment, which often takes time to lead to productivity
gains. In addition, market premiums for sustainable products rarely offer adequate
margins to finance climate-smart investment programs (IFC 2017). Businesses could
help educate and encourage financial institutions on the business models for CSA
to identify opportunities to increase investment. There is also a more general need
for innovative financing and ways to cut risk. This could include first-loss facilities,
insurance, capacity building, structured markets, social impact bonds, etc.
Farming should be understood as a provision of services rather than just food.
By doing so, farmers could be incentivized and receive financial support for their
actions towards ecosystem services. By doing so, policies activating this approach
could actually cover a wide range of SDGs from “No Poverty SDG 1”, “Zero Hunger
SDG 2”, “Good Health and Well-Being SDG 3”, “Decent Work and Economic Growth
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SDG 8”, “Climate Action SDG 13”, “Life Below Water SDG 14”, to ”Life on Land
SDG 15“.
For this to happen, farmers and pastoralists need better regulation and
access to markets, including infrastructure such as processing plants and producer
cooperatives (Rueff and Rahim 2016). Adaptive capacities in adjusting market
requirements to support quality farming and livestock producers may ease
uncertainties and constraints for exporting farming goods. In the meat sector,
for example, commodity-based trade allows healthy animals originating from
foot and mouth contaminated areas to be exported nevertheless when deboned
(Rueff and Rahim 2016).
4.10. Introduce Index-Based Insurance
Index-based insurance is a scheme covering smallholders for losses due to climate
hazards. Policyholders are compensated according to an index of hazards (i.e., drought
indices) and not on actual losses. This principle keeps an incentive for policyholders
to still work towards saving their production and acting against a hazard when
possible while being compensated, unlike conventional schemes. With conventional
programs, policyholders would have no incentive to protect their output since the
greater the losses, the higher the compensation (Rueff and Rahim 2016).
5. Conclusions
The agriculture sector is particularly vulnerable to potential threats from climate
change and variation and must be prepared to adapt. Decisive measures could
help agriculture face expected changes, help keep global temperatures in check
and serve and create synergies between climate, development goals, and sustained
inclusive growth.
Businesses have a significant potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
increase carbon sequestration in the soil while contributing to food security objectives
and meeting key goals of human development. Boosting the operational efficiency
and productivity of food production systems through improved technologies and
better management practices can significantly contribute to reducing the footprint of
global agriculture. To this end, agribusinesses should support and endorse the CSA
approach to help small and large-scale farmers tackle changing climatic conditions by
maximizing crop yields while using less land and non-renewable natural resources.
The private sector can help by developing both conventionally bred and genetically
modified seeds, chemical and biological pesticides as well as a range of adjacent
technologies and practices.
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At the same time, addressing societal challenges related to climate change and
making progress towards SDG 8 requires a concerted effort from all actors. Businesses
have started to act in certain areas but, given the enormity of the challenge, need to
do much more to support CSA and need to be supported in their efforts.
5.1. Addressing Climate Change with Hard and Soft Laws
We must pursue ambitious approaches to both adaptations and to cutting
emissions.11 New public policies promoting CSA as a means of addressing
such challenges are critical instruments for achieving collaboration and coherence
in actions.
We argue that such policies should be developed in two parallel tiers. On the one
hand, we need policies that directly target agricultural actors, stimulating farmers to
implement appropriate mitigation and adaptation technologies and management
practices. On the other, we need policies that create an enabling environment for
other actors and sectors to contribute to the implementation of the CSA indirectly.
5.2. Policies Directly Targeting Agricultural Actors
These sorts of policy options can be grouped into those that rely on either
legislative, economic, or social levers. Legal interventions allow for the introduction
of requirements and mandatory management standards, pushing agricultural actors
to adapt their technologies and management practices. Nonetheless, their efficiency
in generating the necessary change depends on mechanisms, instruments, and tools to
verify and ensure their enforcement. Options include setting rules on the management
of resources (land, water, emissions) or managing the impacts on the environment
and human health.
The economic lever can be used to create a pull effect on agricultural sector
actors by providing compensation for additional costs or financial incentives to act
in the desired way. The extent and scope of such policies are dependent on the
public resources available and on the mechanisms in place to check the delivery of
the desired results. They can be an excellent option to promote certain practices
(e.g., conservation agriculture, biodiversity corridors, water harvesting, etc.) or can
be considered when the change in agricultural practices delivers on certain public
11 Possible mitigation opportunities include land management, food loss and waste reduction and
reducing emissions from land-use change and livestock.
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goods (e.g., food security, water management, pest control, landscape management,
air quality, etc.).
Social-lever policies represent a softer approach and relying on raising awareness
and education, in general, on the social organization of the community. While results
are usually only visible over the long term, the impact is embedded in the fabric
of society.
5.3. Policies Creating an Enabling Environment
We also need policies that create an enabling environment for other actors and
sectors to indirectly contribute to the successful implementation of CSA.
Research and innovation policy has a vital role in developing new and improved
solutions for agricultural production and for successfully contributing to the
establishment of CSA. Such measures include adapting crops to new geographical
zones or making them more resistant, developing machinery for precision agriculture,
or IT systems that make better use of farming data and satellite technology.
Their development should not rely solely on public research but also on new policies
that encourage private companies to invest resources to develop economically
sustainable products and technologies. To this end, companies must be provided
with the appropriate economic and regulatory environment to allow them to control
and manage the risks associated with such investments.
Appropriate policies should encourage and support public–private partnerships
and multistakeholder collaboration platforms: they help spread the burden and
reduce individual risks in the development of the appropriate solutions for
the implementation of the CSA. Multistakeholder collaboration also enables the
development of standards and guidelines necessary for implementing desired actions,
all without creating risk imbalances in the value chain (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Elements that interplay in promoting CSA to addressing climate change
and driving inclusive economic growth. Source: Figure by authors.
5.4. Recommendations
Given the complexity of the challenges related to climate change and the different
ways in which agriculture can respond, a mix of policies should be considered.
This will ensure a stable and fair common ground for all actors while encouraging
them to adjust their strategies and operations to cope with the emerging threats.
At the country level, the recent adoption of the SDGs provides an opportunity
to create such an enabling framework. Considering policy options for agriculture
within a more general policy approach to making progress on the SDG 8 ensures
that decisions are taken on a commonly accepted ethical and practical framework for
individual and collective action. It also ensures that there is a common baseline.
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Companies should, therefore, consider aligning their strategies and operations
to work towards the SDGs, thus acting in sync with the general objectives of society.
In doing so, products, solutions, and technologies will be aligned to the future needs
of their clients and will empower other actors and sectors to create sustained and
inclusive economic growth benefitting us all.
Transformative change through the 2030 Agenda will likely be achieved
by applying an SDG interconnectedness approach. Some SDGs do have a
leveraging co-benefit effect, while others present trade-offs across a series of SDGs.
Policy coherence and effectiveness will be achieved if food security and agriculture
options take into account their strong leveraging effect, but also addressing the
trade-off that they can have when it comes to climate change and land degradation,
if not adopting a CSA approach (Pham-Truffert et al. 2020; Newell et al. 2019).
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Employment Gender Gap in the Renewable
Energy Sector
Sumon Vangchuay and Amanda Niklaus
1. Introduction
Energy transformation is increasingly perceived as the pathway towards a more
inclusive and sustainable future. The accelerated global deployment of renewable
energy sources is believed to create jobs, reduce poverty, improve human welfare,
reinforce gender equality and lead to some form of societal re-structuring and
“systemic change”, through which societies can become more fair and inclusive
(IRENA 2016, 2019a, 2019b and 2020). To that end, renewables are mentioned as
instrumental in meeting the targets of UN Sustainable Development Goals (the SDGs)
which nation-states have committed to delivering by 2030 (e.g., CCSI et al. 2019).
In the context of the SDG 8 (Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable
economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all),
we investigate the premise of the claim that the renewable energy sector will
provide “important opportunities for greater inclusion and equality” (IRENA 2019a).
In assessing such opportunities, we examine (1) the rationale for gender equality
under SDG 8 and (2) the connections with SDG 5 (Achieve gender equality and
empower all women and girls) and, to a lesser extent, SDG 7 (Ensure access to
affordable, reliable and sustainable modern energy services for all). Lastly, we discuss
(3) the gender gap in the renewables workforce and specific challenges facing women
in their renewable energy jobs and employment.
1.1. Background and Knowledge Gaps—Gender and Energy
For the purpose of this study, we categorized the literature on energy transition
into two broad aspects of change: technical and socio-politico. The technical change
covers specialized questions related to the technology and economics of energy
sources of the society (e.g., Odum 1971; Elliott 1997). Proponents of technical
energy transition range from those advocating for a minor shift in the use of
fossil fuel to those fully committed to a complete transition to 100% carbon-free
renewable energy system (e.g., Jacobson and Delucchi 2009). Energy transition
movements are supported by different socio-political groups who advocate effective
policy awareness campaigns with the promise of more sustainable renewable-based
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systems (e.g., EU 2002; WEC 1994) and the fundamental change to the energy system
(Stephens 2019).
Social scientists have only until recently begun to inquire into complex social
dynamics required to achieve energy transformation (e.g., Fri and Savitz 2014;
Berkhout et al. 2012). The transformative potential of renewable energy is often
reinforced by the so-called energy democracy movement which connects energy
system change to a liberal agenda of social justice and equality (e.g., Burke and
Stephens 2018). Central to such a movement is the incorporation of new voices and
relevant “social logics” from diverse stakeholders into the energy transition debate
(Pearl-Martinez and Stephens 2017; IUCN 2015). Because diversity and inclusion may
hold the key to the success of energy transition, gender has been widely documented
as one critical factor informing more sustainable responses to climate and energy
challenges (e.g., Nagel 2015).
However, the question of gender in the energy sector has only evolved as “a
late bloomer” (Clancy 2009), compared to the far more prolific literature on gender
and the environment or in sustainable development. Few studies in the early 1990s
explored relationships between gender and renewable energy (Farhar 1998) as well
as the issues of gender in energy policy and economic development (Parikh 1995).
Subsequent studies examined the concepts and issues concerning gender and energy
(Clancy and Khamati-Njenga 2003), gendered use of energy in the household in
developing countries (Räty and Carlsson-Kanyama 2010; Carlsson-Kanyama and
Lindén 2007), how to integrate gender into energy policy (Clancy and Feenstra 2006)
and the lack of gender awareness in the development of energy systems (Clancy 2009).
In contrast to the environmental and economic benefits of alternative energy sources,
social and labor dimensions were much less studied. Prior to 2010, research on
gender and the energy workforce was very limited.
Within the last decade, the gender issue in the renewable energy workforce
received more research attention. Topics include women’s occupational patterns
in renewables jobs (Baruah 2016), the value and benefits of gender diversity
(Pearl-Martinez and Stephens 2017) and women’s professional development, for
example, via networking organizations (Allison et al. 2019). The visible role of women
in renewable energy deployment and access is now documented and being measured
against progress in the context of the ongoing energy transformation (IRENA 2016,
2019a, 2020).
Nonetheless, there is little research on the gender gap in the renewables sector in
the context of SDGs. In particular, we found a knowledge gap in understanding why
gender should be a compelling rationale for an inclusive energy transition workforce
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under SDGs, particularly under SDG 8 (and SDG 7). Given a weak underpinning of
gender and labor rights under SDG 8 (Rai et al. 2019), mobilizing a gender-inclusive
workforce for energy transition on a large scale is questionable. The authors aim to
bridge this knowledge gap and to better understand the gender rationale behind the
renewable energy transition under the SDGs.
1.2. Object of the Study
The main objective of this study is to examine the gender gap and assess an
outlook for gender equality in the renewable energy workforce under SDG 8 by
answering the following three questions:
(1) How are (gender) equity and inclusion considered under SDG 8?
(2) How is SDG 8 (and SDG 7 to an extent) related to SDG 5?
(3) What is the extent of a gender gap in the renewable energy workforce and what
are the main challenges and difficulties facing women in their renewable energy
jobs and employment?
2. Materials and Methods
To answer the above questions, we employed mixed-methods research
combining quantitative and qualitative data analysis through a literature review,
desk research and a qualitative survey.
2.1. Methodology
We used literature review and desk research to analyze primary and secondary
data on the issue of equity/diversity under SDG 8 (Section 3) as well as on the situation
of women in the renewable energy employment context (Section 4).
In answering the third question, we supplemented our desk research on the
gender gap and challenges facing women in the energy workforce with qualitative
survey results gathered from a semi-structured questionnaire and interview (Section 4).
We used a small sample of the target population, namely, women currently active
in the renewable energy workforce. We adopted this “gender” approach in order
to collect and understand the perception and situation of women in the renewable
energy workforce as a precursor to subsequent studies where the views of both men
and women in the sector should be collected through a larger sample size.
Our 30 anonymized respondents came from renewable energy network partners,
comprising national and international women’s groups and associations in the
renewable energy sector (see Acknowledgments).
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The demographic information of the sample obtained is outlined by age group,
level of educational background, company size, years of work experience and level
of seniority in their company. Figure 1 shows the demographic composition of our
survey respondents.
The majority of the respondents are between 24 and 40 years old (71%), obtained a
postgraduate level of education or higher (79%), have more than 6 years of experience
in the energy sector (56%), currently work in small- and medium-sized enterprises
with less than 250 employees (63%) and hold a senior level position within their
respective company (53%).
Our questionnaire, comprising 16 closed and open-ended questions, was
designed to collect demographic information as shown above and obtain attitudinal
and anecdotal information on the following topics:
1. Main reason(s) for a low share of women in the renewable energy sector;
2. Challenges, if any, in their career entry and advancement;
3. Their view on women in leadership positions within the sector;
4. The existence and their perception of “glass ceiling”;
5. Three personality traits necessary for career success in the sector.
The results were initially grouped into broad categories, i.e., positive, negative,
and neutral. Key words and phrases were delineated by recurring themes of gender
gap and challenges in the energy workforce and weaved into our line of argumentation
in Section 4.
2.2. Structure of Arguments
This paper is structured into two parts: First, we discuss the rationale for
pursuing a more gender inclusive energy transition under SDG 8 and the relations to
SDG 5 (and SDG 7, when relevant). Second, we examine the situation of women and
a gender gap in the renewables workforce, supplemented by qualitative information
on women’s perception of the gender gap and the difficulties they face at different




(a) Age: 45% of survey respondents were between 30 and 40 years old. 
 
 
(b) Education: 76% of survey respondents had a Master’s degree. 
 
 
(c) Firmographics: Respondents’ company size by number of employees. 
 
Figure 1. Cont. on next page.
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(d) Respondents’ years of experience in the energy sector.






Figure 1. Demographics of the survey: (a) age, (b) education, (c) firmographics,
(d) experience and (e) seniority. Source: Figure by authors.
3. Rationale for Gender Inclusive Energy Transition under SDG 8
Our first question concerns the relevance of equity/inclusion under SDG 8.
To answer this, we first examine how issues of equity or equality are considered in
the target requirements under SDG 8. Then, we place SDG 8 in the context of overall
SDGs and the extent to which SDG 8 is linked to SDG 5 (on gender equality) and
SDG 7 (on sustainable energy).
Under SDG 8, the renewable energy sector can contribute to meeting its twelve
targets in two broad areas: (i) economic growth and (ii) expanding employment.
To underline relationships between the two, we adopted a three-dimensional approach
to welfare (economic, social and environment) (Giannetti et al. 2015; Chancel et al.
2014) to assess gender equality considerations under SDG 8. We then examined the
rationale behind the SDG 8 primary measurement for “Decent Work and Economic
Growth”, namely, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and assessed whether the approach
to welfare under SDG 8 has a gender implication for the energy sector.
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3.1. Macroeconomic Growth of Renewables
Renewable energy offers solutions not only to meet energy demand while
reducing carbon emissions but also to boost to the economy and productivity through
innovation and diversification (WEF 2012). As an economic sector, renewable energy
contributes to the economy in two major ways. First, jobs and value are created
from within the sector by transforming and distributing energy goods and services.
Second, its value chains potentially affect the creation and procurement of all products
and services, thus supporting economic activities across sectors of the entire economy
(WEF 2012). On the surface, the promise of a successful energy transition can enable
the meeting of many targets under SDG 8, particularly, Targets 8.1, 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4.
The “economic growth” aspects of SDG 8 are primarily measured by traditional
economic indicators, such as GDP (Target 8.1); diversification; technological
upgrading and innovation (Target 8.2); growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized
enterprises (Target 8.3); and decoupled economic growth from environmental
degradation (Target 8.4). Given that the macroeconomic impacts of the renewable
energy sector will be measured mainly through GDP, data are encouraging for the
sector. With the global average of 6% share to the GDP of the whole energy sector,
renewable energy’s projected impact on GDP growth ranges between 0.2 and 4%
(IRENA 2016; Statista 2015; WEF 2012).
Renewable energy correlates positively with GDP growth in two ways: (1)
increased capital formation (Chien and Hu 2008) and (2) cost-effectiveness and
investment attraction. Renewable technologies have been shown to lower costs
related to energy use or power bills compared to plant capital (Warr and Ayres
2009). Moreover, renewables are an increasingly attractive choice of investment and
diversification due to revenue-generating opportunities through its value chains. An
increasing share of renewables at all levels can positively affect the global economy
through power prices, investment, and trade (e.g., IRENA 2016).
In reality, however, the economic benefits of the renewable energy transition in
terms of GDP will vary depending on other factors influencing the economic structure
and composition of the available workforce. The target of a minimum 7% annual
growth in GDP under SDG 8 set no parameters for measuring or linking to sustainable
human socio-economic development. The measurement of GDP should involve other
measures for decent work, such as employment rate, and other broader measures
of sustainability and welfare, such as equality and inclusion (Coscieme et al. 2020).
While some countries (such as Sweden) have implemented SDG 8 targets to positively
influence the other SDGs (Weitz et al. 2018), many countries and organizations, such
as the European Union (EU), have treated GDP as a separate measurement from
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other welfare and equality dimensions (Coscieme et al. 2020). This separate treatment
could mean that pursuing SDG 8 with the sole view of GDP can be disconnected
with indices on sustainability and welfare, such as equality and inclusion, contradict
gender goals and goals on reducing other socio-economic inequalities. Depending
on how one links GDP to other equality measurements, the growth of the renewables
sector under SDG 8 can have little implication for gender equality.
3.2. Expansion of Employment and Human Welfare
Under SDG 8, the “decent work” aspects can be measured by a broad
measurement of labor and employment, including “full and productive work for
all”, “equal pay for equal work value” (Target 8.5), youth employment (Target 8.6),
elimination of forced labor and child labor (Target 8.7), working conditions (Target 8.8),
sustainable tourism (Target 8.9), access to financial services (Target 8.10) and two
supplementary targets on trade support for LDCs (Target 8.a) and global job strategies
(Target 8.b).
Growing evidence indicates that renewable energy improves broader
socio-economic and human welfare well beyond GDP, particularly in terms of
job growth, well-being and human development (WEF 2012). Doubling the share of
renewable energy deployment by 2030 projects a 2.7 % increase in global welfare,
compared to 0.6% GDP improvement (IRENA 2014, 2016). The global welfare is
projected to be higher through heating electrification and transport, improving
3.7% compared to 1.1% GDP (IRENA 2016). Because of a demand for labor in the
production and distribution of renewable energy (Wei et al. 2010), renewable energy
has created new employment opportunities (formal and informal) while addressing
energy scarcity in remote communities. The strongest improvement in human welfare
can already be seen across developed countries (such as the US, Australia and Japan)
and developing countries (such as India, Ukraine, Indonesia, South Africa and China)
(IRENA 2016, 2019b).
According to the 2017–2018 data, renewable energy (including hydropower) is
responsible for nearly 11 million direct and indirect gross jobs worldwide, a jump
from 7.1 million in 2012 (IRENA 2019b). The strongest job growth has been in the
solar photovoltaics (PV) industry, accounting for about 3.6 million jobs concentrating
in China, Brazil, USA, India and the EU (see Table 1). Other employers in the
sector include wind, hydropower, bioenergy and solar heating and cooling (SHC)
(IRENA 2019b).
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Table 1. Direct and indirect jobs in renewable energy, 2017–2018.
Technology World China Brazil USA India EU
Solar PV 3605 2194 15.6 225 115 96
Liquid biofuels 2063 51 832 311 35 208
Hydropower 2054 308 203 66.5 347 74
Wind power 1160 510 34 114 58 314
Solar thermal heating/cooling (SHC) 801 670 41 12 20.7 24
Solid biomass 787 186 79 58 387
Biogas 334 145 7 85 67
Geothermal energy 94 2.5 35 23
Solar thermal power (CSP) 34 11 5 5
Total 10,983 4078 1125 855 719 1235
Source: adapted from© IRENA (2019b).
China provides the most renewables jobs, accounting for more than 4 million
people. Its PV industry employs nearly 2.2 million people, 80% of them work in
manufacturing that produces 70% of the world’s panel production. Brazil comes
in second place with over 1.1 million jobs, mainly in liquid biofuels. The US is
the third-largest employer, covering 800,000 renewable-related jobs, mainly in solar,
wind and bioenergy, respectively. Next is India with over 700,000 million people in
renewables jobs. The European Union has more than 1.2 million renewable energy
jobs (including waste-to-energy), mainly in Germany and France (IRENA 2019b).
The share of renewable energy jobs, both direct and indirect employment, is
projected to double to 24.4 million by 2030 (IRENA 2016). Replacing fossil fuels with
renewables will lead to job growth across all technologies, particularly in technologies
with today’s already high employment rate, i.e., solar, bioenergy and hydropower.
Compared with coal or natural gas, solar PV creates 100% more jobs per unit of
electricity generated. Most jobs will come from installations, manufacturing and
bioenergy feedstock supply in new markets (IRENA 2016). In major economies, job
growth will concentrate in the skilled trades with high demand for environmental
professionals in science and engineering, law and finance (e.g., U.S. Bureau of Labour
Statistics 2017).
Because of its job growth potential, the renewable energy sector becomes a
valuable vehicle for achieving broad welfare objectives. Various dimensions of green
energy employment—including policy development, education and training—must
be assessed when judging a successful energy transition for the society as a whole
(Strietska-Ilina et al. 2011; UNIDO and GGGI 2015).
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3.3. Diversity and Inclusion under SDG 8
We consider SDG 8 crucial for a renewable energy transition because of
the influence it has on many other SDGs. Based on the wording of its twelve
targets, SDG 8 ranks among the top three most interconnected SDGs out of the
17 Goals (Le Blanc 2015). In other words, meeting the targets of SDG 8 in the
themes of “sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth” and “full and
productive employment and decent work for all” is essential to the success of SDGs
in their entirety.
However, equity and inclusion seem to be a missing link under both SDG 8
and SDG 7, the two SDGs crucial for the inclusive and sustainable energy transition.
While the linkages among targets of the two SDGs can be seen between energy use
efficiency (7.3), economic diversification (8.2), and resource efficiency and decoupling
economic growth from environmental degradation (8.4), it is unclear how to facilitate
inclusive growth from energy transition without addressing existing disparities in
the energy workforce. Given a significant deficit in remote areas of Africa and Asia,
addressing issues of equity and inclusion in the areas of employment and sustainable
energy can significantly improve the livelihoods of millions of women, men and
children. Under SDG 7, gender has not received consistent attention among member
states, even when progress on accelerating gender equality in all areas is among the
required reporting guidelines for SDGs (UN GA 2015). As stated in the analysis
of 2018 national reports on SDG 7, the linkages between SDG 5 (gender equality)
and SDG 7 are “rarely spelled out” in the country-level reviews (UN DESA 2018a;
UN DESA 2018b).
Furthermore, conceptual tensions between SDG 8 and SDG 5 can be observed.
SDG 8 emphasizes growth through GDP and productive employment in the formal
sector, while SDG 5 emphasizes the equitable value and recognition of women’s
social reproductive and care work, as well as domestic work. Despite a growing
body of labor research indicating that the two forms of labor are often connected
(Rai et al. 2019; Runyan 2016), prioritizing the formal labor sector can obscure much
of women’s true contribution to the economy. The GDP growth benefits mentioned
in Section 3.1 above are projected as a best-case scenario, whereby more women are
integrated into industry and service sectors (MGI 2015). However, it is unclear how
these indicators will address inequalities in the world of work and bring women into
the formal sector.
In the energy sector, women in emerging and developing economies are
employed in informal activities ranging from procuring fuelwood, to producing
charcoal, to traditional biomass and fuel-crop (IRENA 2020). Millions of Sub-Saharan
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African women are arguably engaged formally or informally in the biomass sector
(Baruah 2016). The production of fuel crops and biofuels at the village level is also an
important source of renewables employment for women in countries such as India
(ENERGIA 2009).
Furthermore, traditional economic targets, such as GDP, do not account for
unintended consequences of pursuing too narrow a GDP growth (Fioramonti et al.
2019; Fioramonti 2013, 2017). The narrow pursuit of economic growth without other
human indices linked to GDP has been linked to negative impacts on the environment,
health and social relationships, exacerbating the exploitation of labor and female
forced labor in particular, and further widening inequalities (Spaiser et al. 2017).
The narrow rationale for economic growth under SDG 8 can reinforce occupational
segregation by sex and prevailing gendered norms already existing in the energy
labor market (Rai et al. 2019).
The principle of equal pay for work of equal value (SDG 8.5) has an obvious
gender equity component. This principle is drawn from the ILO’s practice under its
convention on the subject (Equal Remuneration Convention, No. 100) and focuses on
the “value” of work performed rather than the “equal pay for equal work”. SDG 8.5
indicators, which focus on the average hourly earnings of female and male employees
and the unemployment rate by sex implying the “equal value” of the work performed
by women, are not linked to targets and indicators of SDG 5 or SDG 7 (Rai et al. 2019).
This principle of equal remuneration for men and women for work of equal value is
the only equity consideration under SDG 8.
It should be noted that the ILO has developed a sophisticated understanding
of gender equality drawing from its own practices under relevant labour
conventions on non-discrimination, equal remuneration and maternity, among
others (ILO NORMLEX 2020). The ILO also recognized gender equality in both
formal and informal labor (including unregulated and subcontract work) and paid
domestic work. With the exception of equal pay, it is unclear how equality practices
of the ILO are translated into “decent work” or “inclusive growth” under SDG 8.
The above-mentioned issues led us to cast doubt on achieving an inclusive
energy transition workforce under the SDG 8 framework. Not only is the rationale for
pursuing gender inclusiveness through SDG 8 not reflected in its main targets
and indicators, there are also tensions between SDG 8, SDG 7 and SDG 5.
When the equity/inclusion dimensions are not required in the energy transition,
the socio-economic benefits of energy transition can hinder progress toward gender
equality and widen existing gaps.
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4. Renewable Energy Workforce: Gender Gap and Key Characteristics
Gender disparities are specifically apparent within the energy labor market
(Ernst and Young 2015; Price Waterhouse Coopers PwC). In this section, we outline
some of the most salient themes characterizing the share of women in the renewable
energy workforce: (i) growing number of women in renewables workforce compared
to oil and gas; (ii) underrepresentation in specialized, technical and leadership roles;
(iii) barriers in the three stages of employment; (iv) gender pay gap; (v) lack of gender
awareness; and (vi) lack of data and measurement.
4.1. The Share of Women in Renewables Workforce: A Mixed Picture
A recent study conducted by IRENA reported 32% female employment
in the renewable energy workforce worldwide (IRENA 2019a; Lallement 2013).
When compared to other industries, that amount decreases to 19% (see Figure 2).
 
Figure 2. Share of women in the renewable energy sector compared to other sectors.
Source: adapted from © IRENA (2019a) (Boniol et al. 2019; WEF 2017); used
with permission.
A relative increase in women in renewables employment compared to that of the
shrinking oil and gas sector is part of a workforce transition trend in the digital and
technological age which requires 40–160 million women (7–24%) and 60–275 million
men (8–28%) to switch occupations by 2030 (Madgavkar et al. 2019). Women have
increasingly navigated outside their traditional female-dominant sectors (such as
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healthcare, humanities and social science). They are drawn to the renewable energy
sector that offers some “unprecedented” opportunities for women due to its demand
for a multi-disciplinary and diverse workforce (IRENA 2019a) coupled with prosocial,
humanist aspirations (Allen et al. 2019; Lucas et al. 2018).
However, the 32% share of women in renewables jobs is still much below the
47% average of the global workforce in 2019, and even lower when compared to
56 and 51% in the US and the EU, respectively (ILOSTAT and World Bank 2020).
Among popular technologies, progress is uneven. Solar PV became the largest source
of renewables employment for women in industrialized countries. In the US, women
represented 26.3% of the solar workforce (Solar Foundation 2019). Despite being the
fastest growing technology, only 21% of wind power jobs are occupied by women
(IRENA 2020).
Figure 3 shows the share of women categorized by three broad job fields:
science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) jobs; non-STEM technical
jobs; and administrative jobs (IRENA 2019a). The lowest share of women is
found in STEM areas, such as facility operations and maintenance; equipment
manufacturing, construction and installation project planning; and to a slightly
higher extent, in non-STEM technical careers, such as finance, statistician and
information technology. Furthermore, 45% of women’s participation in the sector is
concentrated in non-technical and administrative roles, such as human resources,
marketing, knowledge, legal and business development.
 
Figure 3. Job types of women in the renewable energy sector. Source: adapted from
© IRENA (2019a); used with permission.
4.2. Women’s Persistent Underrepresentation in Specialized and Technical Functions
Renewable energy jobs have largely inherited a pre-existing workforce with
aptitudes and skills closely associated with STEM fields that supply the demand for
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skilled labor in the traditional energy sector. This means that reasons for the low
involvement of women in the traditional energy sector also apply to renewables:
(i) women are not interested in technical jobs, (ii) a low number of women graduates
from STEM fields and (iii) the fact that the traditional scope of energy and utilities
was perceived as technologically complex (See Section 4.3.1). These factors continue
to affect the share of women in the renewables workforce throughout value chains
and job functions.
Overall, women are underrepresented in finance, trading, technology,
engineering and technical sales (Good Energy 2019), particularly in power and utility
and infrastructure entities (Ernst and Young 2015). In the renewables sector, men
outnumber women in key functions, namely, technical, managerial and policymaking
positions. These significant imbalances are a worldwide reality, from within highly
developed markets to communities where renewables are only just beginning to
extend energy access (IRENA 2019a).
4.3. Women’s Barriers in Three Stages of Employment
We outline below some recurring themes around the gender gap and challenges
facing women in renewables jobs and employment in three stages of employment:
(1) entry to employment, (2) job retention and (3) career advancement.
4.3.1. Barriers to Entry: Gender Biases and Assumptions in Technical Jobs
The gender gap in the renewables sector is often attributed to a small share of
women in STEM education participation and gender differences in early schooling.
Gender differences already exist in the early exposure to science and mathematics
in favor of men. These differences become more apparent as the level of education
increases, particularly from upper secondary education onwards (Chavatzia 2017).
Based on data from the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study
(TIMSS) Advanced 2015, the majority of students taking courses in both mathematics
and physics were boys (Chavatzia 2017).
In a UNESCO study of technical education for women in STEM in 120 countries,
the assumptions and biases against women’s abilities were also identified as factors
that affect negatively their interest, willingness and confidence to engage in STEM
subjects and subsequent job opportunities (Chavatzia 2017; Huyer 2015). Girls are
often brought up to believe that aptitudes related to STEM subjects are not natural
to women. There is some level of normalcy when referring to STEM and technical
career path in favor of men. This is evident among our respondents, who stated,
for instance, that “classic science is reserved for men’s expectation”. The energy
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sector is “rooted in the fact that women do not tend to gravitate towards studying
STEM subjects”. Normalizing words such as “normal”, “typical”, “traditionally”,
“belong to”, “natural”, “tend to”, “suited” and “suitable” are used to describe the
STEM and technical fields in men’s favor and to disfavor of women. Women do not
“really know that they can cope with technical and financing topics” or “have enough
confidence themselves to be capable of doing STEM studies”.
Women’s disinterest in STEM subjects may no longer be a norm among younger
generations, however. It has been documented that girls and boys shared similar
levels of interest in STEM studies and careers initially in secondary education (GSRI
2012). Nowadays, women actually make up more than 50% of STEM university
students in the 144 countries recently surveyed (IRENA 2019a). There is a growing
number of women that have been trained in STEM subjects and have graduated in
STEM and non-STEM technical fields in the last decade.
In the online survey conducted by IRENA, almost three-quarters (71%) of
respondents reported having at least a university degree in a science, technology,
engineering or mathematics (STEM) subject. When asked to rank several specific
barriers to entry according to their importance, they ranked the perception of gender
roles and biases at the top, followed by cultural and social norms, rather than
competences in STEM (IRENA 2019a). After schooling, women who have been
trained in STEM continue to face biases related to their ability or competences to
perform successfully in the energy sector jobs in the recruitment process. This bias
persists even when women have the same or even superior STEM qualifications and
work experience (Baruah 2016). Their credibility and ability to perform a technical
and complex task are often questioned (Baruah 2016).
There is an absence of pull factors for girls and women to pursue STEM career in
terms of social support network, role models and mentorship. Such absence leads to
a culture of isolation in higher education and in entry-level recruitment (GSRI 2012).
4.3.2. Prevailing Hiring Practices and Workplace Policies
Today, 70% of women across the globe prefer to work a paid job rather than solely
care for their families, a figure more closely aligned with 66% of their counterparts
(ILO 2018b). Outdated recruitment attitudes may prejudice many women as they
enter the industry, assuming, for example, that they will be working intermittently
and in lower paid positions (Nelson and Kuriakose 2017).
Our survey and recent studies shine a light on unconscious biases challenging the
“Myth of Merit” and the rationale for “cultural fit” in the recruitment and promotion
within the energy sector. The perception of gender roles reinforced and filtered by
183
cultural norms has permeated prevailing hiring practices and framing of a “cultural
fit” as being of merit (Rivera 2015). The criteria for a “cultural fit” can translate
to a hiring preference for the same gender, race, nationality, class or background
as the dominant ones in the organization (GWNET 2020). This applies not only
to staff placement but also to employment entry screening, i.e., apprenticeships
and internships.
When asked if they think sex/gender has impacted their chance of getting a job or
a promotion in the past, roughly 50% of our respondents used words indicating that
they were unfairly evaluated compared to male colleagues, such as “Male managers
using attribution bias during promotion selection” or “Some males [are] promoted
much earlier than females” or simply “Men promote men”. While more than 40% of
our respondents said they were unsure or there was no influence, many of them are
in junior roles or at the beginning of their career.
Recent studies reported a generational gap among the younger generation
entering the energy sector. When diversity is seen at the entry to mid-career
professionals, the decline in diversity is reported from above the mid-career and
senior leadership positions (IRENA 2019a, 2020). One of our respondents, who is
from a large company (250 employees or more) commented that, even when efforts
are made to recruit more women into the company, “we have found that women
plateau mid-career”. This gender imbalance at the leadership level will further
limit the opportunities of recruiting more women into the organization or providing
enabling environments to support women’s career progression into senior positions
(GWNET 2020).
4.3.3. Barriers to Career Retention Related to Familial Needs
There are barriers related to the expected role of women in the family and
their work–life balance which could affect their ability to stay in employment at the
mid to senior management level. Difficulty in managing a work–life balance and
lack of affordable childcare are common reasons for women’s career interruption
and eventual departure (ILO 2018b). One in three men still prefers their female
partner to be the main family carer and responsible for unpaid housework rather
than be in a paid job (Gallup and ILO 2017). Furthermore, 50% of women graduates
who indicated interest in pursuing STEM-related careers upon their graduation
left employment or further training within the first decade after graduation due to
various family and childbearing commitments (GSRI 2012).
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When asked whether the perception of women’s role in the family (such as
pregnancy and care giving) has affected or has been a factor in their career, the




Yes No Not really/Not sure
Figure 4. Respondents’ opinion on whether the perception of women’s role in the
family (e.g., pregnancy and care giving) has impacted their career. Source: figure
by authors.
Women often face the double burden of balancing work and family, particularly
during their childbearing years. In Europe, 25% of women picked the reason for care
work as their reason to exit the workforce, versus 3% for men (UN Women 2015).
Our survey substantiates “the burden of childbearing” on women, where we have
gathered comments such as “I delayed telling people that I was pregnant due to
how it would affect my career prospects.”; “[career advancement] it also affects my
thinking and timing around when I would like to get pregnant. I would not announce
to my boss that I am pregnant before I have secured my next promotion and pay”;
“[for] the past 20 years I have been asked in job interviews when I planned to have
children”.
The gender gap after having a child is well documented (EIGE 2019;
Kleven et al. 2018; Leturcq 2016). Women see a significant decrease in their number of
hours worked compared to men after the birth of their first child (Kleven et al. 2018).
In Denmark, where there exists generous parental leave for childcare, a significant
drop (20%) in salary is observed for women after the birth of the first child (Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Earnings relative to women’s’ life events. Source: adapted from
Kleven et al. 2018; used with permission.
Women’s career breaks after having families are also related to a lack of flexibility
in workplaces (Kleven et al. 2018; UN Women 2015; Leturcq 2016). Working mothers
are 50% more likely than fathers to say that being a working parent inhibited their
career advancement (Pew Research Centre 2013). Workplaces often require a strict
working schedule and do not provide the flexibility for taking care of family demands.
After the first childbirth, women tended to change jobs more often and were 10%
more likely than men to seek government jobs for more flexibility. It was reported
that, after the arrival of their second child, highly skilled women would reduce their
working hours by an average of 5 hours, and 18 hours for lower-skilled women, who
have less working flexibility and are more likely to work shift-work (Leturcq 2016).
Childbearing can account for 80% of the wage gap overall.
Flexibility in the workplace is a recurring theme among our survey respondents:
“Energy projects need a period of continuous time that no women can guarantee they
won’t pause in a project [due to pregnancy]”, [There are fewer women in energy jobs
because they do] not have the flexibility required by some roles”, “Many roles [in
the renewable energy sector] also involve significant travel and nights away from
home”. After maternity leave, “it’s difficult to compete when they (male colleagues)
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work 5 days/week whilst I work 3 (days) . . . however the expectations (in terms of
job performance) are the same”.
Support for working women could be the most efficient means to keep women
in the labour force. In a study on 28 EU countries, the affordability of childcare is
by far the most often cited reason for unaccommodated needs (50%), followed by a
lack of available places (12%), inconvenient opening hours (8%) and distance (5%)
(EIGE 2019). Studies have shown that a provision of subsidized childcare services
is positively correlated with the increased participation of women in the workforce
(Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017).
There is an incentive to invest in the childcare infrastructure and services. An
analysis of 7 OECD countries shows that investing only 2% of GDP in the care
industry would increase women’s employment from 3.3 to 8.2% and from 1.4 to 4%
for men (ITUC 2016). Investing 2% GDP in public care services would create up to
four times as many jobs for women and could reduce the gender employment gap
by 50% in some OECD countries (WBG 2016). Companies, too, can provide more
support and flexibility without compromising performance, budgets and revenues.
4.3.4. Barriers to Career Advancement
While the ability for women to persevere and advance in their jobs is shaped by
a number of factors, two issues are salient: (i) the absence of women leadership and
social networks and (ii) the myth of leadership/what it takes to be a leader.
(i) Lack of Women Leaders, Mentors and Social Networks
Women’s underrepresentation in the boards, senior management, policy making
and governance of organizations is more acute in the energy sector compared to
other sectors (e.g., Emelianova and Milhomem 2019; Deloitte 2019). A study from the
International Energy Agency surveying 153 energy companies found that women held
an average of 20% of seats on company boards across Finland, Sweden, Italy, Austria,
Chile, Canada and Australia and occupied only 21% of the most prominent C-Suite
titles (CEO, CFO, CIO, CMO and CHRO) among the top U.S. energy companies
(Korn Ferry 2017). CEOs accounted for only 8% on average across the same countries
(IEA 2019). The 4 companies with the largest numbers of female board members
were Hydro-Quebec, 56%; Engie, 56%; General Motors, 50%; Iren Spa, 46%; and
Statkraft, 44%. Of 68 energy companies, 18% of the managerial positions are occupied
by women (IEA 2019). Furthermore, 61% of the largest energy companies under the
Russell 3000 Index with head offices in the US have no female representation on their
board of directors (GMI Ratings 2012).
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The situation in the public sector is no better. A 2015 study from the Environment
and Gender Index led by the UN found that women occupy only 4% of the World
Energy Council positions of which a majority of 18% are administrative positions
(IUCN 2015). The International Energy Agency found that only 17% of energy
ministerial positions were held by women between 1980 and 2017 (IEA 2019).
The absence of women leaders in the sector reinforces the existence of the “glass
ceiling” (Morrison et al. 1987; Hymowitz and Schellhardt 1986). The metaphor has
now been applied to a situation of both women and minorities in a business context
where they believe that some forms of inequality exist that stop them from moving
up in their careers.
According to a Pew Research study, 68% of Americans believe it is easier for
men to achieve a top executive position. Both women and men admitted that women
have to do more to prove themselves, while more women than men think this is the
biggest obstacle to advancing their career (Pew Research Center 2019). In an IRENA
study, where the existence of glass ceilings was identified as a key barrier to career
advancement, men represent at least 75% of board members in nearly 50% of the
participating private sector firms (IRENA 2019a).
Figure 6 shows that the majority of our respondents said they believe a glass
ceiling exists in their workplace in one form or another (Figure 6). On a scale of 1 to
5 (5 being evident, and 1 being non-existent), the existence of a glass ceiling was
identified as evidently (5) by nearly all women respondents who are currently in
leadership/senior managerial positions.
One of our respondents from a medium-size company (50–249 employees)
admitted “I was the first woman in management hired in the 35 years of the company’s
history (5 people informed me of this in my first week). No woman was promoted to
management before”. Another respondent from a company with over 250 employees
elaborated why she believed the glass ceiling evidently exists in her company. “Our
leadership team hires/promotes people of a similar perspective/view/nature. In fact,
we had a discussion in recent weeks as part of the Diversity and Inclusion [D&I]
group, where it was argued that ‘strategic hires’ should be subject to the same D&I
practices that we are trying to implement across the company. There was push back
by the leadership team. Also, we are battling for a D&I performance metric to be




Figure 6. Perception of the existence of a “glass ceiling” among survey respondents.
Source: figure by authors.
One reason for the “glass ceiling” is related to a doubt in women’s abilities to
fare well in technical and “powered” roles. Even when women want to thrive in
the sector, one respondent reflected from her mid-career experience, “they could be
sometimes relegated to more commercial administrative roles, which won’t let them
grow to the powered positions”. Few women who manage to secure top positions can
eventually find their leadership situation not tenable as they are less well connected
compared to their male colleagues (IRENA 2019a).
Studies have shown that mentoring and networking activities designed for
women are key to break through the glass ceiling and to remain in top positions
(Richards 2017; Dow 2014). Multi-level mentorship and leadership programs
are necessary in providing dynamic social support, including promoting gender
awareness and building networks to support sustainable career development.
Examples of successful mentoring programs include MetLife’s 14-month leadership
program training high-potential women in the company’s leader pipeline. After 4
years of implementation, over 50% of MetLife’s managers are now women. Another
example is Sodexo’s Mentoring Circle program which led to an increase in the
representation of women by 10% at entry and manager level and doubled the C-Suite
after 5 years of implementation (Montero 2019). Engie’s ambitious gender targets
and the progress made to reach them resulted in the company being one of the best
FortuneGlobal 200 performers in having women in leadership at the board level
(62.5%) and in the management teams (30%) for new operational entities (Engie 2018).
Strategic alliances can be formed with local and national diversity and inclusion
independent groups to identify diverse candidates in leadership positions. Good
examples include Women of Renewable Industries and Sustainable Energy (WRISE),
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the NAACP, Women in Energy Network and American Association of Blacks in
Energy (AABE) (SEIA 2017). However, still too few are in place, particularly at the
organizational level in energy companies. Numerous non-profit organizations have
promoted mentorship programs, such as Women in Renewable Energy (WRE) and
Global Women Network for the Energy Transition (GWNET).
(ii) The Myth of Leadership and Management Style
In the energy sector, leadership positions are traditionally reserved for
experienced senior managers, technical directors and engineers often with high-level
STEM qualifications—who are nearly all men. Knowledge and skills aside, one
can also argue that the management level of an energy organization is limited to a
familiar culture and personal traits validated by men already in the positions.
Studies have tried to explain the lack of women in leadership by associating it
with acceptable leadership qualities and management style. Qualities considered as
desirable and effective in negotiation and business settings, such as willingness to
take risks in negotiating profitable deals, are often male-biased (Pew Research Center
2019). Positive traits more commonly found in women, such as being diplomatic,
agreeable, or considerate, are considered as disadvantageous in a leadership position.
While men are on average more than twice as likely to interrupt a woman speaking
than a woman would a man (Handcock and Rubin 2015), women are often criticized
for being “mean” or “unlikable” when they try to adopt those very same qualities
their male counterparts accept as effective in business negotiation (Sandberg 2013).
Regardless of personality traits, women choose to bring to the table, data have
indicated the multi-fold impact of women leadership on corporate performance,
including environmental and economic returns. A study from EY showed that
utilities with greater representation of women showed higher economic performance
with the top 20 gender-diverse utilities outperforming the bottom 20 by 14.8%
(McPherson 2019). Countries with a higher represented of women in parliament are
more likely to lower carbon-dioxide emissions and set aside protected land areas
(UNDP 2016). Companies are more likely to increase investment in renewable energy
and to decrease carbon emissions throughout their value chain when there are more
women on the board of directors (CRB 2012). Although the investment in female
business owners is less than half of the investment in their male counterparts, women
start-ups generate seventy-eight cents for every USD 1 invested versus thirty-one
cents from their male counterparts (Abouzahr et al. 2018). Successes of women’s
leadership have been associated with increased revenue and improved economic
performance through leveraging innovation, pro-social considerations and their
relationships (Catalyst Information Center 2013).
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As women take on more leadership roles in many parts of the world (Pew
Research Center 2019), a systematic analysis of women’s contribution to energy
transformation will be crucial for effecting impactful changes within the industry.
Given that the issue of the gender gap is primarily an issue for the gender concerned,
women are more likely to take initiatives regarding issues that relate to women, such
as family policies, education and care (NG and Muntaner 2019). Progress towards
gender equality will require the presence of women representing women’s voice,
particularly those in the position to bring about change within an organizational
structure (e.g., Sandberg 2013).
4.4. Gender Pay Gap
The gender pay gap is a worldwide phenomenon with an estimated level at
around 20–23%. This means a woman earns 77–80 cents per USD 1 a man earns in
comparable jobs (ILO 2018a; Gallup and ILO 2017). Based on data from 62 countries
reported on the SDG progress in 2019, the median hourly gender pay gap is at 12 %
(UN 2019). The pay gap exists in low-income countries as well as in countries with
high per-capita levels, with some of them with the highest gender wage gaps in the
world. The gender pay gap is self-reported by Ireland, Mexico and Switzerland as
their main challenge to achieving SDG 5 (UN DESA 2018b).
Despite higher average wages in the energy industry compared to other sectors
among OECD countries, women occupy the lower wage class across occupational
categories (OECD 2017; Antoni et al. 2015 German data). The gap is widened in
managerial and professional occupations (including the bonus gap), in craft and
related trades and in plant and machine operation and assembling (Good Energy
2019). Specific examples in renewable energy include EDF Energy the recompenses
men 31.9% on average more than women, Innogy Renewables 22%, and SSE 22%.
Consultancies active in the sector reported the following: Amec Foster Wheeler
Environment and Infrastructure UK offers wages to men that are 22% higher than
those of women, and Wood Group 16.6% (A Word About Wind 2018).
IRENA identified the multifaceted causes of the gender pay gap in the
renewable energy sector as follows: (1) women’s larger concentration in
lower-paying, non-technical and administrative jobs and junior positions; (2) women’s
comparatively weaker negotiating positions; (3) their tendencies to compromise work
for family obligations, such as parenting and caregiving; (4) the attitudes and values
of employers, and (5) pay discrimination (IRENA 2019a).
Progress on closing the gender pay gap has already been made in Iceland with
public utility Reykjavik Energy, who consciously increased its portion of women in
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management to 49% and in Australia, where the Australian Institute of company
directors provided a deadline to increase boards made up of women by 30% within 3
years to ASX200 companies. This induced a significant positive change, such as with
Energy Australia, where women now occupy half of the 10 seats of board members
after a careful plan implemented by the company (HRM 2019).
4.5. Lack of Awareness on the Needs and Benefits of Gender Diversity
Among the contributing factors to a gender gap in the energy sector is
related to a lack of gender awareness and awareness on what gender diversity
could bring to the table. On an interpersonal level, this lack of awareness can
create unpleasant working environments for women, for example, a culture of
isolation and loneliness. Women working as the “only” woman in the team have
reported significantly worse work experiences than women who work with other
women (McKinsey and Company 2018). Almost two-thirds of women receive regular
microaggressions in business settings. Their judgment in their own area of expertise
is often questioned and they feel under constant pressure to provide proof of their
competence compared to their male colleagues (McKinsey and Company 2018).
An awareness of gender issues is an issue for all men and women stakeholders
and cannot be assumed to happen naturally in an organization, let alone in the entire
industry. Perceptions of inequity are further shaped by gender awareness and bias,
and women are often made more aware than men. In the IRENA study, for example,
60% of men believe that women and men are paid equally, compared to 29% of
women responding (IRENA 2019a). While it is understandable that gender awareness
in the renewables sector is driven by women (IRENA 2019a), efforts should be made
to involve men. Women and men interviewees in the energy sector who had not
been exposed to discriminatory issues themselves often did not know how to identify
and recognize barriers and enablers in the context of their employment and career
progression (GWNET 2020).
To raise gender awareness with buy-ins in an organization is to recognize gender
as a factor in creating a competitive advantage, contributing to the bottom line
and serving as a force for economic growth (e.g., World Bank 2006; Goldman
Sachs 2010; MGI 2015). Research indicates that having gender diversity in a
company is linked with greater creativity, innovation and openness. In fact, certain
competencies that women display more often than men, such as higher cognitive,
social, emotional and skills, are expected to be highly valuable to enterprises
(McKinsey and Company 2018).
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Investing in gender-inclusive recruitment processes and policies can be justified
through a compelling business case or a cost-benefit analysis. By investing in a
system for the recruitment and advancement of the best person for the job without
the influence of gender bias, the benefits will likely outweigh the costs. In the ILO
report on a business case for gender diversity, 57 % of companies surveyed globally
agreed that gender diversity initiatives improve business outcomes (ILO 2019).
The challenge might lie in ensuring buy-in within the organizational structure
through quantifiable measures indicating projected benefits of diversity, such as
improvements in profitability and productivity, company image and reputation,
ability to attract and retain talent, creativity, innovation and ability to understand
consumer needs and interests (ILO 2019).
4.6. Lack of Data and Measurement
Gender gaps in the renewable energy workforce and supply chain are less likely
to be taken seriously, unless there are clear data to support necessary adjustments.
There is not currently a wide range of gender-disaggregated data available for the
whole energy sector, let alone for subsector-specific studies. In most employment
data, specific information on the participation of both sexes is not generally included
(World Bank 2013). In many countries, adding a gender metric to employment data
and constituent subsectors would be an additional burden.
Restricted data on the level and nature of women’s employment pose a multi-fold
challenge to addressing gender diversity in the energy transition (Baruah 2016). Short
of having gender as a data point in the collection of information about the renewables
workforce and its supply chain, analyses of the energy transition will be incomplete
or misleading in multiple ways. For example, without gender-disaggregated
data, current employment practices will continue to limit opportunities for women
(e.g., Rivera 2015). When gender-sensitive methodologies for data collection and
research design are not applied, scientific progress will be developed without reference
to women’s needs. Overall, when gender biases and disparities are perceived as
business as usual, policies and initiatives on the energy transition are less likely to
integrate a serious consideration of gender.
In recent years, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector
have increasingly explored the gender issue in the energy sector of developing
countries (World Bank 2013). Some renewable energy companies are taking the lead
in providing opportunities for women. Statkraft, a generator of renewable energy, has
provided employment opportunities specifically for women in Peru and set the clear
targets of developing gender diversity to have 40% top management positions filled by
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women (Statkraft 2015, 2018). Fortum, a renewable energy supplier, has been elected
among top 100 companies for gender equality (Equileap 2019). Siemens Gamesa,
a wind turbine manufacturer, is part of the United Nations initiative Women’s
Empowerment Principles: “a community of companies committed to making a
difference for women in the workplace, marketplace and community, accelerating the
global momentum toward gender equality in the workplace” (Siemens Gamesa 2020).
These initiatives are mainly undertaken by a few relatively large publicly listed
companies, which are perhaps more under the scrutiny of the public eye and
incentivized by the likes of Bloomberg (Bloomberg Gender-Equality Index (GEI)).
5. Conclusions and Recommendations
We attempted, in this study, to demonstrate that gender equity and its various
approximations (equality, diversity, inclusion, parity) are not simply an ethical or
fairness issue but an economic issue. Gender diversity is compatible with economic
growth when the deficits and benefits of gender parity influence the agenda and
outcome of inclusive growth.
It is no secret that women’s increased workforce participation in the last decade
is a key contributor to economic growth. Closing the employment gap would further
increase a significant positive impact on the development of economies and would
increase GDP in the Eurozone by 13%, for example. Once employment parity is
in place, global GDP should grow to USD 12 trillion, resulting in a 26% increase
in global annual GDP or USD 28 trillion by 2025 (MGI 2015). The lack thereof has
tremendous economic costs and, thus, underlines the need for diversity. Women’s
limited access to employment in certain regions (such as in Asia and the Pacific) has
been reported to cause a loss equivalent to USD 42 to 47 billion in GDP each year
(WEF 2015).
A gender-inclusive energy transition will require, at the very least, indicators
which measure progress beyond GDP towards addressing inequalities and tackling
barriers which result in those inequalities. This will require an alternative economic
theory which embraces equality and diversity as an integral, if not essential, part of
economic growth. Theories such as “gender equality as smart economic”, one which
constructs women as entrepreneurs and a fundamental source of future business
growth (World Bank 2006; Goldman Sachs 2010), might be worth exploring for the
energy transition. As the renewables sector sees a growing share of women entering
through trade, financial and business services, a framework which can broadly
integrate and empower them to compete effectively in the sector’s workforce is of
great urgency.
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It is unfortunate to find key targets and indicators under SDG 8, except for
Target 8.5, fundamentally at odds with gender equality. As the rationale for pursuing
diversity and inclusion is not reflected in SDG 8 main targets, there is no incentive at
the national level to ensure that women are accounted for in the energy transition. It
is unclear how women can be empowered to participate effectively and grow more
innovative and competitive in the renewables workforce and its economy. This is a
missed opportunity.
It is crucial, in our view, that gender diversity be taken seriously at the
management level among energy companies. Given that the employment gap
between men and women across the globe is estimated to be around 27% and in
Europe at 12%, there is much to overcome for the renewables sector to take a leap for
change. As the renewables workforce is portraying itself as young, technologically
savvy and progressive, the sector will be pressured to close the gender gap. Given
that gender parity will likely not be realized within the next 100 years (WEF 2019), the
industry should be proactive at the forefront of bridging a gender gap as much as it is
seeking more sustainable energy sources as an alternative to fossil fuel (Eurostat 2017).
The most important first steps involve collecting gender information and
setting concrete gender targets and measurements. Companies should invest in
value creation and promote gender equality as a business/economic issue and
recognize the return on investment (ROI) benefit for companies to take gender targets
seriously. Gender indicators could be part of a financial target for companies. At the
organizational level, the awareness of the social and cultural benefits of gender
diversity and the consequences of exclusion should be incorporated into companies’
key performance indicators (KPIs), involve both women and men and be integrated
and measured wherever possible. Institutional policies should be put in place to
recruit female talents, promote an inclusive team culture, and tackle gender biases in
order to encourage women to stay in their jobs. There can be no inclusive growth if
workforces lack diversity.
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“Me muess d’Lüt neh wie si sy—Anderi gits e
keini”.1 Decent Work and Sustainable
Development for the 21st Century: The Case
of Wyon AG in Switzerland
Marianthe Stavridou
1. Introduction
The question of decent work is a very complex one, especially in a world
with multiple issues, discrepancies, and growing inequality. In each country,
authorities aim to regulate employment in the formal sector and try to control
the informal sector with different methods (SIDA 2004). Depending on the country’s
political system, several consultations with citizens, economic actors, political parties,
government, enterprises and trade unions may be needed. It is important to
achieve a consensus on passing employment laws and regulations, and accepting or
abandoning supranational non-mandatory regulations and international standards
or agreements. However, International Organisations try to define decent work and
propose minimum standards for all their member states. These standards should
tackle issues like poverty, modern slavery, child labour, migration, and climate change
or resource depletion during early globalization (DIHR 2020).
On 25 September 2015, the United Nations’ 193 member states voted to adopt
the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a set of 17 goals and 169
targets with the ambition to guide global policy-making until 2030. SDGs were meant
to be “a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity” (United Nations 2015a). This
Agenda was inspired by human rights discourse, and its goals have been welcomed
as a result of democratic participation. Their widespread praise was in contrast
with their predecessor “Millennium Development Goals”, which received criticism,
being described as an “opaque” and “elitist” approach “excluding all but a ‘triad’ of
powerful nations” (Rai et al. 2019; Briant-Carant 2017). In effect, Agenda 2030 aims to
encourage development efforts from governments, states, corporations, institutions,
International Organisations and the civil society. It also offers opportunities for the
private sector to collaborate, and sustains collective action to help tackle urgent
planetary issues. Despite having support from different stakeholders, this process
has also received criticism, being described as a top-down operation with democratic
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deficits. According to critics, the discussants were not all at the same level, with
major actors having a greater influence over the discussion, and with the exclusion
of marginalized people. Therefore, this Agenda reflects the mainstream ideas and
interests of the most influential discussants, and the prevailing economic sentiment
regarding development (Rai et al. 2019).
The definition of decent work in the International Labour Organisation’s Work
Agenda has four pillars: employment creation, social protection, rights at work
and social dialogue. This was elaborated with the participation of governments,
businesses and organized labour, a tripartite structure that reflects the structural
foundation of this U.N. Agency. Even though this structure creates a unique forum
in which the representatives of different parties can freely debate and elaborate
international labour standards and policies, it has served for many years as a
barrier to the participation of unwaged people, people in the informal economy,
in volunteering, in the care economy and in private households (Rai et al. 2019).
In reality, ILO marginalized unwaged labour and focused only on the waged part
of the economy. However, in 2012, ILO presented a new version of the concept
of decent work, accepting the participation of female movements and recognizing
the need to address the informal economy that represents, in fact, a fundamental
inequality within the labour market. ILO thereafter promoted “decent and productive
work for women and men in conditions of freedom, equity, security, and human
dignity”. It also recognized that “all workers have the right to decent work, not
only those working in the formal economy but also the self-employed, casual and
informal economy workers, as well as those, predominantly women, working in
the care economy and private households” (ILO 2012). However, this new ILO
concept was still ambiguous. Its core values—dignity, equality, fair income and
safe working conditions (ILO 2012)—may have different interpretations in different
political, economic, societal and cultural settings, and are neither quantifiable nor
measurable. Moreover, ILO links decent work to productive work and implicitly
assumes the existence of a non-productive work; concepts, discussed in the classical
and neoclassical political economy in the last two centuries, which influenced the
approach to modern management and the discussions on economic sociology and
Marxist economic analysis. These concepts also heavily influenced the national
accounts. In mainstream economic theory, productivity is the key source of economic
growth and competitiveness. In many cases, to remain competitive and attract foreign
investments, governments decide to lower labour standards at the expense of the
most vulnerable workers, and of the economy as a whole. The concept of decent
work in Goal 8 follows the ILO Decent Work Agenda, and is related to economic
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growth and productivity. It is one of the most important Goals, creating linkages
with the ten other Goals (Le Blanc 2015), but also tensions and contradictions.
This chapter aims to challenge the idea of decent work related to productivity
and economic growth, and questions the concept of decent work for the 21st century.
For that purpose, it examines the business model of high-end technology Small and
Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in Switzerland, in which ethical values, focus on human
needs, and democratic decision-making process prevail over economic growth and
productivity. The chapter frames this business model within the Swiss Economy
and discusses SDGs, highlighting tensions between the SDGs and within Goal 8.
Finally, it aims to propose a new approach to the concept of decent work, taking a
human-centred perspective.
The Swiss SME ecosystem is multifaceted. Thus, this paper presents the case
of Wyon AG, a company that operates in a valley of Appenzell, as an example
of a long-term investment in people, planet and prosperity. Wyon AG creates a
new paradigm of entrepreneurship and embedded economy, transcending existing
theories of sustainability, responsibility and management.
2. Wyon AG: “Me muess d’Lüt neh wie si sy—Anderi gits e keini”
2.1. Ethical Grounds
2.1.1. Dignity
“Me muess d’Lüt neh wie si sy—Anderi gits e keini”, in Swiss German, means:
“We should accept people as they are—others don’t even exist”. This motto is the
ethical foundation of Wyon AG, the leading idea that the visionary owner Paul Wyser
heard from his father, a Catholic carpenter in the protestant valley of Basel, where he
grew up. It is also the foundation on which he and his family built the company from
the ground-up twenty years ago and the most important ethical principle linking
the past with the present and future generations. In this sense, the first condition
of ILO—dignity—is given in the human-centred approach with which the owners
developed their business: you cannot change human nature; you must accept it and
make the best out of it. Human dignity is the state or quality of being honourable or
respectable, and the value behind all other human values. Democracy, in particular,
can only be supported on a foundation of human dignity and requires legitimacy,
inclusion and accountability, values also linked to ILO’s second condition of equality.
Accepting people as they are, respecting them in their existence and treating them
as equals is inscribed in Article 1 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of
Human Rights: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
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They are endowed with reason and conscience and are to meet one another in a spirit
of brotherhood” (UNDHR 1948). This acceptance, with dignity and equality, brings
benefits to any society, organization or human activity. According to the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, moral equality is the view that equality is central to justice,
that all individuals are entitled to equal respect and that all human persons are equal
in fundamental value or moral status [ . . . ] It is a fundamental principle of most
forms of democracy (SEP 2001).
2.1.2. Trust
Growing up as a member of a large family, Paul Wyser learned to trust and be
trusted; in society, he learned to respect cultural differences and also endure exclusion
and discrimination because of his family’s cultural/religious differences. Therefore,
he learned to trust within the family and build strong relations that helped him to
design the human journey of his company. Indeed, trust implies responsibility and
conveys security and wellbeing, regardless of any incongruity. In Wyon AG, ethical
values are materialised in their entrepreneurial acts, not only towards employees but
also towards society and the environment.
Above all, the corporate structure is egalitarian. The company has a flat and
lean management style, with employees sharing equal responsibility and power. The
owners/managers encourage the employees to think and act like entrepreneurs
and be active members of the teams in which they work. Employees work
collaboratively on tasks and behave as equals. Even though owners/managers
delegate responsibilities, the employee teams take part in the decision-making
process, bring their development ideas forward, work together on solutions, and
decide on the hiring of new employees and development of new products. After all,
they know the company best. Relationships with the customers are also direct and
personal, with solid ties and frequent direct collaboration.
This management structure reflects the Swiss tradition of direct democracy:
employees are actively involved in the development of the company and the wellbeing
of the workforce, in the same way that citizens are actively involved in the political
and social process. It brings success and transforms employees by giving them
appropriate space to shape the company as a joint project, and to thrive. Open
dialogue, cooperation and transparency in communication are also of great benefit in
creating a common ethical basis and resolving issues more openly and transparently.
The assumption and acceptance of responsibility, moreover, is a crucial factor in the
company’s success. In other words: The success of Wyon AG is co-designed with the
employees in a long-term relationship, in which the personal pronoun “we” stands
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above the pronoun “I”, as the team personality stands above the individual. This
approach creates a common culture, and a basis for working together and reaching a
consensus on solutions. It allows people to live and work as equals, and the company
to flourish.
2.1.3. Fair Income
Wyon AG not only gives employees responsibility and decision-making power
but also, under certain conditions, a part of the company’s shares, especially after
Paul Wyser’s retirement and the gradual succession of management to the next
generation. “How much money do you need to be happy?” Wyser asks, justifying
the decision to keep only a small amount of shares for him and his wife and offer the
rest to the next generation and the employees. This fact not only respects ILO’s core
value of fair income, but also transforms the employees into co-owners that invest
in and develop their own company, establishing tight relationships and avoiding
turnover. To this end, employees are trained as apprentices from the outset, and
later they mature as specialists in order to know and innovate the products, finding
solutions for the company’s common advantage.
Financial independence is essential for the decision-making process, as much
for the present as for the future of the company. For this reason, Paul Wyser invested
his own money to start the company, and today the company invests its profits in
research and development, innovation, sustainable development, and in people’s
wellbeing and infrastructure. Paul Wyser and the next generation of management do
not believe in “modern managers who strive for short-term profits and gains”, as
he emphasises.
The modern manager’s perspective reveals a utilitarian approach to business
and responds better to the question “how much money is in it for me?”. Paul Wyser’s
question focuses on happiness and human values.
Wyon’s owners/managers believe in sustainability that requires long-term
engagement and trustworthy relations. To sustain a company for people, the planet
and prosperity, you need to have a long-term perspective, without dependencies
on banks, stock exchanges or individual private investors and investment funds.
Such dependencies could hinder long-term success and change the management
focus from people-centred to short-term and profit-oriented, in Paul Wyser’s opinion.
Independent SMEs need people with a vision of creating a safe and transparent work
environment, putting people and their needs at the centre of focus and transforming
the business environment into creative joy and satisfaction.
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2.1.4. Cooperative Principles and Empowerment
Since the beginning of this venture, Paul Wyser wanted to “lead the company
beyond money”. Therefore, personal relations with employees, customers, suppliers,
the community and other stakeholders are of great importance. Humans are the most
important stakeholders for Wyon AG. To this end, the company grew from a family
business into a real social enterprise in only twenty years. Wyon AG is a privately
owned company, not a worker cooperative. However, cooperative principles are
applied to fit the company needs.
Cooperatives and worker-owned enterprises could re-imagine and re-configure
the economy as a whole, because the principles of their governance differ drastically
from those of the conventional hierarchical business management. During the
financial crisis of 2007, the idea of democratic management in organizations and
communities rose in the world and cooperative business structures surfaced as more
resilient. According to ILO, “cooperatives have been more resilient to the deepening
global economic and jobs crisis than other sectors” (ILO n.d.). In Switzerland,
cooperatives and their principles are well known. The country has more than 9.600
cooperatives in different sectors of the economy, with over half of the population
working within a cooperative business. The political system, well known as a
direct democracy, needs the cooperation of people, along with the Cantons and their
consensus, in advancing policy in a particular direction.
In 2012, the United Nations declared the year as the International Year of
Cooperatives to highlight their contribution to social and economic development, in
the creation of employment, reduction in poverty and in encouraging integration
(Cheney et al. 2014). Cooperatives are people-centred enterprises, with democratic
participation that aims to create sustainable businesses which generate long-term
jobs and prosperity, based on common values and principles and putting fairness
and equality first (Rochdale Principles 1934, ICA 2021). Human-centred principles
like anti-discrimination, motivation and rewards, democratic and open participation
in decision-making, equity, autonomy and independence, education, training and
information, and concern for the community are some of the cooperative principles
that also apply to Wyon AG. The target is to empower employees and make them
active members of the teams, the company and the community. Empowerment is also
given great attention in the SDGs because it is the bundle of measures that increases
the degree of autonomy and self-determination of individuals and communities.
Empowerment is the basis of democratic participation. It enables people to represent
their interests in a self-reliant and self-determined manner. Furthermore, it motivates
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people to act responsibly. The action of empowerment refers to both the process of
self-empowerment and professional support for people.
As part of a certain business approach, empowerment is used in participatory
management and decision-making processes. It is defined as the sharing of
various organizational factors, i.e., information, reward, knowledge or power of the
employees of lower grades (Bowen and Lawler 1995). As a multi-faceted approach,
empowerment helps businesses to build community capacity, create social capital,
ensure compliance and improve the legitimacy of the decision-making process, and
offer transparency and inclusion. It enables the most effective decision-making,
because larger groups of people make better decisions than small groups of experts.
It also helps to resolve agreements by having a shared understanding of the business
reality, building trust and confidence and receiving a licence to operate at a community
level (Sharma and Varma 2011; Kao et al. 2016).
2.2. Externalization of Ethical Values
2.2.1. The Environment
Having intrinsic anthropocentric values and teamwork on equal terms, Wyon
AG sets a further milestone, with the externalisation of ethical values. First of all,
the very same building of Wyon AG is designed to be in harmony with nature. The
company is located in Appenzell Steinegg, a small village with 1000 inhabitants in the
Rüte district. The village lies at the western foot of the mountain Fähneren, about 2 km
southeast of Appenzell. As a typical Swiss village, it needs environmental protection.
For this reason, the 4000 m2 building is not only designed to be environmentally
friendly, but also to save energy and resources using the latest technologies. A
heat pump provides heating with geothermal probes located in the main building.
A chiller provides cooling, and the “free-cooling” energy can be buffered in the
existing storage tank, and thus be used to optimise the system in terms of further
energy. A mechanical ventilation method ensures a pleasant indoor climate and
a very sophisticated IT system optimises energy consumption and security. The
optimisation of resources and the in-house production of energy are important
issues for any company. Thus, recycling and reuse of plastic and other materials
is embedded in the corporate praxis, and the in-house energy production from
renewable sources ensures energy sufficiency and protection of the environment. The
electro-technological facility is integrated into the building structure, which creates a
U-shape with an inner garden, water fountain and plants. This garden is perfectly
embedded in the topography, designed to offer relaxation, peace and inspiration
to the employees. The flat and lean democratic structure of the operations is also
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present in the open and shared workspace, and the clean and pure production area is
also symbolically painted white. The team offices are designed for individual work
that requires a high degree of concentration, with short paths to production areas
and always-open doors. Rooms for brakes, patios and the inner courtyard are also
used for crosscutting meetings.
2.2.2. Products and Collaborations
Since people were already the most crucial element in an early stage of
the company’s development, products were conceived for the improvement of
human health, within the range of the auricles, in diabetology, ophthalmology,
gastro-enterology and orthopaedics. Wyon AG specializes in the development and
production of rechargeable Li-Ion batteries in small and micro-sizes and has patented
plastic technology combined with the stacking technology and micromechanic
competences. The batteries are smaller, come in any custom shape and achieve
the highest capacities for their volume. Recycling and control of the supply chain
is also part of the company’s operations in order to optimise, save resources and
create a circular economy. Such micro-technological know-how is not only needed
in medicine, but also in aerospace and military, industries that could generate high
profits for the company. However, the human-centred approach of the owners does
not allow cooperation with such industries. On the other hand, cooperating with
customers in the medical field requires solid personal relationships on equal terms
and a deep understanding of human needs, unison in ethical values, along with a
vision for innovation, and the improvement in human life.
High-end technology and innovation are essential elements of success for an
SME. Switzerland is nonetheless an expensive production location. In order to sustain
long-term operations, preserve jobs and keep employment in the regions sound, the
SMEs should bring niche technologies to the global market and be one step ahead
of the global competition. Today, Wyon AG is a high-end technology firm with no
direct competition, which exports 90% of its products to Australia, Asia and Europe.
Moreover, for sustaining long-term relations, the workforce should feel welcome in
the working environment and be able to be integrated into teams. To this end, Wyon
AG has supported education and apprentices in the Appenzell region since 2013
through the Wyon-Foundation. This foundation reinforces and amplifies the presence
of the company in the local and regional communities. The foundation also supports
the very efficient Swiss technical education system and helps the region thrive, not
only as a workplace but also as an innovator of products, markets and society.
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With its approach, Wyon AG not only creates new working places but also new
standards in business and the economy. It applies an inclusive model to benefit
not only the company, but also society, the environment and human life. As Paul
Wyser believes, “the world is the market” and, in it, people’s needs drive innovation
and prosperity.
3. Switzerland and the Small and Medium Enterprises
3.1. Switzerland as a Hub for Technology and Innovation
Switzerland is one of the world’s leading countries in manufacturing and
innovation and, according to statistics, it has one of the highest GDP per capita in the
world. Despite international developments, adverse trends and de-industrialization
since 1970, the country was able to maintain its leading position because of its
strong focus on providing people with high standards in education and health
care. Switzerland also maintained high-quality technology and production, and
knowledge-based manufacturing, as well as an exceptional public infrastructure
that permits the development of businesses, even in the most remote parts of the
country. Political stability, a transparent legal system, efficient capital markets,
medium–low corporate tax rates and extended social security (CIA 2019) are also
essential for the country’s competitive advantage. According to the Competitive
Industrial Performance Index 2017, the country was ranked 6th in the world, due
to the high value-added per capita in the manufacturing industry, the high degree
of industrialisation and the high proportion of medium- and high-tech activities
(PwC 2018). According to the 2018 PwC report on Switzerland, two main factors are
essential for the continuing growth of the Swiss manufacturing sector over the next
four years: robust international demand, and the rise in domestic consumption. Both
may boost manufacturing and innovation and place the country as one of the leaders
in Industry 4.0; however, it may also cause a significant environmental impact due to
production methods and the use of large quantities of natural resources.
To tackle the arising challenges, the 2013 Green Economy Action Plan (BAFU
2020) and the Sustainable Development Strategy 2016–2019 (ARE 2016) anticipate a
series of various measurements, prioritizing the areas of consumption and production,
waste and raw materials, and reinforcing the public dialogue in order to conserve
natural resources, make consumption environmentally friendly and strengthen
circular economy.
Sustainable consumption and production also require some changes in consumer
behavior. It requires an increase in consumer awareness and environmentally friendly
decisions when it comes to purchase and use physical goods. Thus, sustainable
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industrialization is vital within the Sustainable Development Strategy 2016–2019, and
in the realization of the UN Sustainable Development Goals: The federal government
has declared its aim to transition to a resource-saving, sustainable economy which
fulfills its responsibilities along the entire value chain (Goal 12, ARE 2016, p.18) and
to build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization
and foster innovation (Goal 9, ARE 2016, p.16).
The cooperation of the private sector is essential to achieving these targets. In
particular, the industrial sector may advance the debate on sustainability, implement
different Action Plans, and adopt programs of new measures and other initiatives.
The Corporate Social Responsibility Position Paper and Action Plan of the Federal
Council (SECO 2020), the 2016 National Action Plan for the implementation of the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Federal Council 2016), and the
2013 Background Report on Commodities are headed towards this conclusion (Federal
Council 2013), and are expected to help the industry tackle sustainability issues.
Furthermore, the Federal Policy supports and strengthens the commitment of
all actors as a means to a more sustainable future and a circular economy. It is a
clear expectation of the Federal Council that Swiss-based companies have to fulfil
their human rights obligations and their responsibilities towards the environment
in all their activities, and that the Federal Council attempts to assume a role-model
function regarding its consumption patterns (PwC 2018).
3.2. The Agenda 2030 in Switzerland
The Swiss Confederation adopted the 2030 Agenda in 2015, due to its
long tradition of pursuing sustainable development. According to the baseline
assessment of 2017, SDGs were well-established in the legislation at multiple levels
of administration. However, more efforts are needed to ensure cohesion and
policy coherence, reconcile national and global perspectives and to level existing
discrepancies (OECD 2020; EDA 2016, 2018, 2020). The recent results of the SDG
implementation and measurements, however, attest some serious issues that also
heavily impact society and the environment:
Poverty: Despite positive developments and a strong economy, the Swiss Social
Statistics report of 2019 uncovers that, in 2017, income poverty increased, and around
675,000 people were affected. The poverty rate rose from 7.5% to 8.2% between 2016
and 2017, and 4.3% or 165.000 people were classed as the working poor. Long-term
unemployment rose as well, and seniors were heavily impacted (BfS 2019). Despite
being employed, the following groups of people are significantly affected by poverty:
(a) those who work only for certain parts of the year, (b) part-time employees,
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(c) self-employed people, (d) employees with a temporary contract, and (e) those
employed in small businesses.
Equality: The Federal Office of Gender Equality attests that there is not equal
pay for women and men, despite the Federal Constitution enshrinement of 1981 and
the Gender Equality Act of 1996. Women in Switzerland earn, on average, 18% less
than men, and only 56% of the pay gap can be explained by objective factors like years
of service or professional status and qualifications. A total of 44% of this gap remains
unexplained and the causes are potentially discriminatory, such as traditional gender
roles, the choice of education and training, the gender-based division of family and
domestic work as well as of paid work, gender-based distortions in the evaluation of
performance or general discrimination in the labour market.
Unpaid work: According to the Federal Statistical Office (BfS 2017), unpaid work
in Switzerland is worth approximately CHF 408bn and corresponds to 9.2 billion
hours. Time spent on unpaid work exceeds that of paid work: on average, each person
worked 1.320 hours/year and women took on 61.3% of the unpaid work volume. In
contrast, men took on 61.6% of paid work volume. Housework without childcare
makes up three-quarters of the total volume of unpaid work (77% of 7.1 billion hours).
Care for children and adults in households can be measured at 1.5 billion hours/year
(16% of the total volume). A total of 660 million hours were spent volunteering (7% of
the total). More time was spent on informal volunteering (436 million hours) than on
institutionalized volunteering (224 million hours).
In a society, any kind of inequality and discrimination has macroeconomic
implications, as lower pay or unpaid labour harms social insurance, pensions and
tax revenues. As women are not equally present in the labour market, the economy
benefits from a far smaller pool of high-skilled people, and competition between
companies may suffer from this distortion. Social exclusion in the market and society
jeopardizes social peace (EBG 2019), and creates biases in social and economic data
collection and, ultimately, in the shaping of an inclusive and egalitarian future society.
However, the Federal Government encourages the labour market participation of
older people and vulnerable groups, and the employment rate of women and young
people is increasing, while the wage gap between women and men decreases (SDG 8.4,
SDG 8.b, SDG 8.6, EDA 2016, 2018, 2020).
Switzerland’s commitment to the Agenda 2030 is long-term commitment to
sustainable development. On this path, questions about what we understand about
sustainable development and how we can achieve sustainability on a local, regional
or global level still remain open, and so does the role of the actors in this path
and their responsibilities. Unfortunately, the Federal Council in the Swiss Growth
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Policy 2016–2019 does not focus on the aforementioned issues. It instead focuses
on increasing productivity, which creates contradictions and clashes with the very
essence of the SDGs as an Agenda for the people, planet and prosperity.
3.3. Swiss SMEs: A Different Approach to Business and Development
According to the Federal Statistical Office in 2018, SMEs in Switzerland account
for more than 99% of businesses in the market-driven part of the economy (BfS 2018).
Out of a total of 608,952 businesses, 591,016 are SMEs and employ 3,039,326 people.
SMEs are locally embedded companies, well known in the communities in
which they operate and recruit people. They understand ethical responsibilities as
an inherent part of day-to-day work, and as a moral activity. Cultural context, direct
democracy, subsidiarity, decency and acceptance of any kind of difference constitute
the basis of their operations. Their owners are mainly families that also manage
the business, maintaining strong ties with the local cultural, social and political
realities. SME owners/managers have a deep awareness of the impact and the effects
of their activities. Thus, they aim to operate sustainably and responsibly, and they
strive to develop stable long-term relations with their communities. They do not
need to formalize any Corporate Social Responsibility practice or publish social
activities because their stakeholders are aware of their contributions (Stavridou 2018;
Stavridou and Vangchuay 2017; Looser and Wehrmeyer 2015). Consequently, for
SMEs, local embeddedness has a greater significance than it does for multinational
or publicly traded companies, which operate remotely and formalise their Corporate
Social Responsibility targeting to justify their activities and satisfy a much more
diffuse audience.
This SME approach has a long tradition in Switzerland, starting with
industrialization, which created adaptable forms of business in the community.
On one hand, it created the figures of the Swiss Patriarchs, well-known pioneers with
large industries, innovators and politicians, who also advanced social issues. On the
other hand, it created the tradition of cooperative businesses with a lean structure
and democratic decision-making process, which empower people to decide on the
presence and future development of the company and assume responsibility. As of
today, SME owners consider their success to be a continuum of six overlapping key






































Figure 1. Key drivers to success for SMEs according to owners. Source: Graphic
from Looser and Wehrmeyer 2015.
Ownership is the most important key driver. Owners are also managers of
their business, leading by vision. They take a long-term perspective into account, as
opposed to managers of big corporations, who are short-term, profit- and gain-driven.
Financial independence is paramount for them, preferring to do business without
any state intervention, regulation or other formalization. This liberalistic approach
allows them to consider leadership as a personal ability and enables the assumption
of responsibility for the present and future of the company. Owners/managers think
in a distinguished manner, in which vision, values and task-orientation are the path
to advancement and success.
This vision-driven approach to ownership leads a lot of the owners/managers
to transform employees to be owner–managers themselves. Such a transformation,
as well as the relationship between employees and owner–managers, is based on
egalitarian principles and the democratic tradition. Democracy is the second key
driver. Democratic principles help them to create real, trust-based and long-term,
tight personal relationships. Still, even if there is not an absolute democratic approach
deployed within the companies, a participatory approach with the owner–managers,
taking the employees’ opinions into account, is always in place.
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Small and Medium Enterprises are highly specialized. They offer a niche
product and a customised small-scale production, working very closely with their
customers. They maintain excellent personal relations and adapt production to
their customers’ needs and desires. The agility with which companies customise
products and services positions them as unique in the market and poses high entry
barriers to others, making it almost impossible for competitors to enter the same
market. Innovation, a niche product and high entry barriers are the third key driver
to their success.
The fourth key driver is the informality with which the organization takes care
of its customers’ needs. The externalisation of the internal flat and lean structure, the
agility in response to customer needs and the importance and drive of their networks
are the traits that make the company agile enough to respond to its environment
with efficiency.
Efficiency is the fifth key driver and accounts for quality. It also plays an
important role in the specialization and niche products, and it is a further crucial
factor for success. The quality of the organization reflects upon Swissness and
its positively connoted attributes: fairness, precision, reliability, political stability,
naturalness and cleanliness. SME owners/managers understand Swissness as some
sort of import protection, and as a compass to follow.
To give something back to the society by educating the workforce is the final
driver for success. The owner/managers put a system of apprenticeships in place,
educating their workforce from the beginning. They establish ethics personally during
the process of work socialization, offer adequate education for their company’s
advancement, and help the company gain qualified employees that understand
responsible business practices.
This approach to business development is an important characteristic of Swiss
middle-class capitalism. In cases like Wyon AG, cooperative structures take place
and the companies become real social enterprises, focusing on human needs instead
of profits, gains, or conventional growth. Switzerland is facing severe issues in the
implementation of Agenda 2030, despite competitiveness and a dynamic globalized
economy. A Wyon AG approach to sustainability could become a major example




4.1. The Difficult Relationship between Decent Work and Economic Growth
Economic growth is defined as an increase in goods and services produced per
capita over a period of time, measured on a national scale by taking the monetary
worth of the nation’s goods and services over this period into account. Conventionally,
economists create statistics by measuring growth as a percentage rate of increase in real
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over a year. The amount of wealth, divided among the
population (GDP per capita), acts as a metric for determining a country’s economic
output per each person living there. As such, it represents the basic statistical
information for a country’s performance assessment and its international comparison.
However, these measurements are crude and do not reflect socio-economic realities
outside of the stat-sheets. Arguably, the wealth of a nation is spread among far fewer
people, and rich nations with smaller populations tend to have higher per capita GDP.
The United Nations action for people, planet and prosperity is a supranational
program that follows a Triple Bottom Line (TBL) as a reference: social, environmental
and economic factors should lead to sustainable development for the years to come.
Still, the concept of decent work does not explain how the planet will be able to
achieve prosperity in terms of growth and productivity, concepts developed in the
20th century that have influenced the realities and the contradictions we live in today.
Goal 8 does indeed “promote sustained inclusive and sustainable economic
growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all” (United Nations
2015b). The belief is that “Sustained and inclusive economic growth is a prerequisite
for sustainable development, which can contribute to better livelihoods for people
around the world. Economic growth can lead to new and improved employment
opportunities and provide greater economic security for all. Moreover, rapid growth,
especially among the least developed and other developing countries, can help them
reduce the wage gap relative to developed countries, thereby diminishing glaring
inequalities between the rich and poor” (United Nations 2015b). Goal 8 has received
criticism for relating decent work to economic growth and its measurements, and for
neglecting societal realities in different parts of the globe (i.e., in African countries,
informal work is standardised). It has also been criticised for neglecting the impact of
rapid economic growth related to industrialisation and urbanisation, which have led
to extremely severe air pollution and caused increasing negative effects on human
health, visibility, and climate change, as the example of China shows (Li et al. 2016).
The debate on economic growth has been ongoing throughout 19th and 20th
century. Above all, the idea that the economy can infinitely grow contradicts physical
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limits and boundaries, and it is not realistic (Mill 1848; Keynes 1945; Meadows et al.
1972; Jackson 2016; Raworth 2017; Chesney 2017). Major questions in the growth
debate include all aspects of human life, from deprivation and poverty to climate
change. Questions on how humans can end deprivation and poverty without a
growing economy, how humans can end ecological degradation with a growing
economy, and how it is possible to create decent work in a fast-growing economy
have multiple answers that exceed the frame of this work. However, we note some
general considerations that could lead us to respond to the central question of this
chapter: How can we challenge the existing concept of decent work to truly fit the
needs of people, planet and prosperity?
4.2. Critique on SDG 8
To begin with, economic growth cannot a priori guarantee decent work or
prosperity. Even in developed economies, poverty rates are high, and human
and gender inequality persists. The example of Switzerland is paramount for
these features.
Secondly, the typical measurement of economic growth is the country’s GDP.
Nominal GDP does not capture the complexity of working reality or of working
conditions. It does not reflect differences in the cost of living or the inflation rates
between countries or regions. It gives no information about the production of
assets, the depletion of human and environmental resources, the violations of labour
rights—some of these are also prevalent across the Globe (i.e., the gender pay gap,
sexual harassment, the dismissal of pregnant women)—or the impact of precarious
working conditions on households and human lives (Fudge and Owens 2006).
Moreover, it does not reflect on the informal economy, which forms a significant
portion of the economy, ranging from less than 10% to over 40% of the GDP (IMF
2019) even in European countries. Additionally, unpaid work in general, be it
volunteering, care or household maintenance, is important labour for the functioning
of the economy (Sotiropoulou 2014; Wry 2015). However, even if people active in
the informal sector enter the formal sector and create tangible results in the GDP,
the informal sector, such as unpaid domestic work, care labour or volunteering,
would still be excluded from measurements and would not be considered as work
generating revenues or even as productive labour (Stiglitz et al. 2018; Rai et al. 2019).
Apart from a few countries that calculate unpaid work within a Satellite
Household Account to the GDP (OECD 2018; BfS 2017), SDG 8 does not address issues
of gender equality, time poverty or depletion of human resources and quality of life
related to economic growth; issues that create requirements in the provisions of public
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service, infrastructure, and social protection policies. A possible integration of the
Satellite Account into the GDP measurement would lead the economy towards a more
egalitarian approach in the 21st century, as well as the abolition of gender-segregated
labour markets that depend heavily on unpaid work. SDG 8 further directly
contradicts the SDG 5, which strives to address human equality, and recognizes and
values unpaid care and domestic work (Agenjo-Calderón and Gálvez-Muñoz 2019;
Wry 2015; Sotiropoulou 2014; Antonopoulos 2009; Branisa et al. 2013; Rai et al. 2019;
BfS 2017).
Third, the annual growth of 7% in less developed countries, as promoted by Goal
8, would exceed earth’s biocapacity by 50%, and accelerate global warming. Global
production and consumption could also rise above current limits. Scholars believe
that Goal 8 neglects the fact that UN Agenda 21 proposes to increase economic growth
sustainably: “economic growth should not come at the expense of environmental
degradation”. Furthermore, the main idea is that governments should seek to change
institutional structures “in order to enable more systematic consideration of the
environment when economic decisions are made” (Briant-Carant 2017). In addition,
Goal 8 fails to provide time-bound measurements and measurable targets, or account
for the lack of data and other information that could be misleading in the discussion
on sustainability. This is because the fundamental contradiction between resource
limits and economic growth remains. Furthermore, Goal 8 is also in opposition to
Goal 13, which demands urgent action to combat climate change and decarbonise
the economy at breakneck speed, six times faster than any other effort in history
(Hickel 2015).
Therefore, if humanity wants to combat climate change, it should abandon
the blind believe in economic growth and discuss the effects of this on the planet
and people. It is also important to establish a balance between developed and
underdeveloped economies (Hickel 2015; UNFCCC 2015; Briant-Carant 2017;
Rai et al. 2019), and policies that target economic development related to
social cohesion and environmental stability (Katsoulakos and Katsoulacos 2007).
A long-term perspective beyond GDP should be essential.
Goal 8 (8.2) moreover, aspires to “achieve higher levels of economic productivity
through diversification, technological upgrades and innovation, including through
a focus on high-value added and labour-intensive sectors” (United Nations 2015b).
This implies that technological upgrading and innovation would result in social
upgrading. In reality, labour-intensive industries (i.e., agriculture, mining, hospitality
or food services) use social markers like gender, ethnicity, class or race to shape labour
relations and do not necessarily translate gains into higher wages or the advancement
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of labour rights, such as freedom of association and collective bargaining (Ruwanpura
2016; Barrientos et al. 2012). In this sense, technological upgrades do not automatically
lead to either economic or social upgrades, or to human and gender equality, or to
full and productive employment, decent work and equal pay for work of equal value
for all women and men by 2030, as SDG 8.5 urges member states to achieve.
By relating economic growth and productivity to human labour for wages and
benefits, Goal 8 neglects the role of labour in life above the need for a survival wage.
The role of labour beyond existential needs is to boost creativity and innovation, and
ensure and facilitate movement between jobs (World Bank 2019). Creativity and
innovation are also important in the effective decoupling of all existing elements
in order to create new economic models that could respect human life and nature
much more than existing ones. According to the World Bank, as of today, in
developing economies, 8/10 people receive no social assistance and 6/10 work without
insurance. In developed economies, the payroll-based insurance model is challenged
by non-standard contract working arrangements. The World Bank (2019) proposed
rewriting the social contract and investing in human capital (public health and
education), ensuring a livelihood with a societal minimum that provides support
independently of employment. “We need new ways to invest in people and to protect
them, regardless of their employment status”, and we need to rethink the social
contract and adjust it to “the changing nature of work” (World Bank 2019, p. VIII).
In parallel with its emphasis on GDP per capita growth, SDG 8 (8.10) aims to
“encourage and expand access to banking, insurance and financial services for all”
(United Nations 2015a). Job creation should be the critical element of eradicating
poverty, forced labour, slavery and human trafficking. However, Goal 8 does
not reflect on the damaging effects that the lending practices of major financial
institutions can have on poor people. Lending is a way to proliferate inequality
and poverty, and to advance human dependencies. The risk of over-indebtedness
in under-resourced segments of society is high. By promoting access to financial
services, formalisation and growth of micro-entrepreneurialism as a route out of
poverty (target 8.3), SDG 8 propagates the continuous financialisation of the economy
in a way that obscures a possible underlying process of exploitation in the informal
sectors, and the unequal division of labour. Despite the euphoria about microfinance
as a development-oriented policy and as a means of lifting people out of poverty
(Briant-Carant 2017), critical voices arose against microcredits and their inefficiency
in formalising informal micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises and creating
higher-income possibilities. Excessive interest rates charged to borrowers, aggressive
lending policies, and the coercive or even violent methods of recovery applied
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by some microfinance institutions and local field officers, have led borrowers to
over-indebtedness and played a role in suicides. Additionally, the lack of information
and education given to borrowers sank them into a vicious cycle of debt. In many
cases, borrowers used microcredits from one lender to meet the interest obligations
of another lender, or became informal lenders for the same reason, complicating
the relationship between formal and informal lenders (Arp 2018; Arp et al. 2017).
However, even if the result of microcredits was to lift people out of poverty and,
along with micro-entrepreneurship, it could become a fully-fledged solution, “it’s
not enough to just assume that because a marginalised group has made advances in
society, they aren’t still marginalised in deeper, more fundamental ways” (Wry 2015).
Financial capital as such has no interest in supporting livelihoods, ensuring
education and jobs, creating equal opportunities, or recognizing any value in social
reproduction, culture and diversity. It has no interest in democratic processes or in
taking action for people, planet and prosperity, as the Agenda 2030 for sustainable
development suggests. Financial capital seeks only to ensure that households become
consumers of its products (Himmelweit 2017).
Finally, Goal 8 (8.a) proposes the installation of an “Aid for Trade” procedure
and provision of technical assistance. Nations that receive aid should lift trade
restrictions and make structural adjustments within their countries. “Aid for Trade”,
as a policy, is similar to the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the IMF
and the World Bank that, until now, created further inequality by deregulating
the labour market at the expense of women and vulnerable people and leading
countries to severe austerity, with devastating results for public health and education
(Sotiropoulou 2014).
A last critical point regarding all SDGs is the quality of data and measurability
of advancement. The ongoing developments in the internet economy (i.e., growing
centralisation, monopolisation and consolidation, threat to net neutrality, higher
volumes of bot traffic or biases within the data) challenge the statistics and eventually
lead to a growth in unreliable information (MacFeely 2019; Internet Society 2020).
The SDGs call on humanity to achieve harmony with nature, protect the planet
from degradation, and take urgent action on tackling climate change (Goal 6, 12, 13, 14,
and 15). They create tensions by calling to drive economic growth and assuming that
growth-as-usual and trade-offs, in favour of growth over wellbeing and ecological
viability, are feasible (Gupta and Vegelin 2016). In this context, Goal 8 contradicts
several other Goals and lacks an explanation of how to end poverty (Goal 1), because
its understanding of decent work remains attached to the mainstream economic
paradigm and its conventional measurements.
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4.3. Lessons for a New Concept of Decent Work
Twentieth-century mainstream economic thinking has influenced the United
Nation’s concept of decent work by relating it to economic growth. As argued, this
concept has received criticism for contradicting other SDGs and focusing on GDP
growth. In fact, the failure of the growth theory lies in the absence of understanding
that humans are social beings that evaluate wellbeing based on what they see around
them (Rogoff 2012). In the political and corporate debate that began in the early 1990s,
corporate responsibility issues have gained prominence, driven by the realisation
that development based solely on economic growth paradigms is not sustainable
(Katsoulakos and Katsoulacos 2007). People do not rely on absolute numbers or
crude measurements but on experience, life realities, education, ethics and other
psychological factors.
For this reason, the 21st century requires a new concept of decent work that
will be independent of the idea of economic growth; a new path for people, planet,
and prosperity that relies on humans, their needs and their rights; in other words, a
human-centred approach. Humans are able to create societies that prosper; therefore,
businesses should integrate human values into their core interests. Fundamental
human rights have already been established as indispensable norms for international
peace and security in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They were
acknowledged as such by the signatory states (UNDHR 1948). For this reason, our
societies need a new economic model, in which markets and the economy can work
optimally. This can only happen if businesses are embedded within social rules,
customs and institutions, and grounded in the theory of business in the society.
Under this model, companies must learn to do things differently and move towards
a human-centred perspective. Morality, art, spirituality and creativity are universal
abilities and inherent to human DNA (Harari 2018). For this reason, companies
should learn to have an active role in human rights protection, support freedom and
equality, and become powerful forces in the discourse on the international human
rights regimes (Ruggie 2008). If the central question of the twentieth century was
“how much money is in it for me?” the 21st century asks, in Paul Wyser’s words,
“how much money do you need to be happy?” The shift in the mindset is clear: not
money for the few in business, but happiness for each individual, is the central point
of this approach.
In other words, the 21st century business narrative should include the alignment
of business ethics with human rights and values. The human rights concepts (freedom,
dignity, equality, justice and fairness) can serve as a compass to define what is right,
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just and fair for the people related to business, community and the environment
(Stavridou and Vangchuay 2017; Raworth 2017).
5. Conclusions
Using the example of Wyon AG, we found that a new approach to decent work
should take on a human-centred perspective. Wyon AG developed its economic
activities with people, for people, integrating a different set of values in business and
generating a positive impact on society and the environment. In opposition to other
companies, which use CSR programs as remedies to their social and environmental
impact, Wyon AG generates benefits at multiple levels by investing in human
creativity and innovation, accepting differences as natural, and externalising intrinsic
values. This path aims to serve and innovate society and the environment. There
is no striving for uninterrupted growth, but for the creation of wealth based on
ethical principles, human acceptance and understanding. Even the core message,
“we should accept people as they are—others don’t even exist”, is deeply humanistic
and contradicts the conventional management belief that there are perfect candidates
for every job.
Wyon’s business approach has an intrinsic ethical code, which benefits people,
society and the environment and contributes to a much more important consideration:
a vision of human life in dignity, equality and peace. It is a model for people, planet
and prosperity. The approach of other ethical SMEs in Switzerland is similar. They
balance the economic part of their activities with social cohesion and environmental
stability, having this vision as a priority. Clearly, this approach is easier to apply
in a small and medium enterprise that operates locally, sets long-term targets and
has a democratic approach, than in a Multinational Corporation that operates
remotely and has a short-term vision, with hierarchical structures and obligations to
external shareholders.
The economy of the 21st century however, requires a new direction. The financial
addiction to GDP growth is the result of the idea that humans are rational individual
creatures living in a self-contained market and aiming for the maximisation of gains
and profit for themselves. Such a belief accelerated the depletion of human and
environmental resources, and even if statistics show a better picture for people lifted
out of poverty, the fact remains that, with this approach, even in mature economies,
poverty, unemployment, inequality and hunger persist at high rates. The ongoing
discussion on development inherent to GDP growth and measured with crude
measurements does not satisfy human needs, mainly because it follows a short-term
pattern for a long-term approach. Global economic policies should set long-term
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goals, and nominal GDP is a short-term indicator that does not even reflect working
realities. In order to tackle issues like poverty, inequality, climate change, or resource
depletion, people need to effectively understand correlations, and the socioeconomic
reasons behind them. Therefore, it is crucial to find a more human pace at which to
prosper, and new forms for business and the economy.
As the SDG is a global path to follow for people, planet and prosperity, this
approach should be redesigned, and focused on social and environmental needs. The
concept of decent work should especially be decoupled from GDP growth and linked
to human rights and values. Flat cooperative structures, democratic relations, dignity,
equality, fair income, a safe working place, and, finally, a circular economy form a
path that effectively offers a social license to operate in the community and create
resilience. Such an approach would take the pressure of growth out of development
and help societies to flourish in many different ways. Sustainability and responsibility
need a long-term approach, and decent work should be developed on common ethical
grounds that are intrinsic to all human actions and lived in everyday life.
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